State of Minnesota v. Marstyn Ryan Taft ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0189
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Marstyn Ryan Taft,
Appellant.
Filed December 21, 2015
Affirmed
Randall, Judge*
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-14-2463
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Haig T. Huynh, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan Andrews, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RANDALL, Judge
Appellant Marstyn Ryan Taft challenges the district court’s ruling to admit evidence
of a prior burglary in order to prove motive and intent at his trial for attempted first-degree
burglary, arguing that this Spreigl evidence was improper because it had no legitimate
probative value and was highly prejudicial. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 19, 2014, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Maureen Dunnigan returned to her
Mendota Heights home after shopping at a grocery store. It was raining heavily that day.
Dunnigan parked her car in her garage, and then entered her home. As Dunnigan walked
into the “mud room,” she heard a “loud crash of glass.” She then heard another louder
“crash of glass” and a “thunk.” Dunnigan walked further into her home to investigate the
sounds and observed a man standing on her back patio. Dunnigan ran from her home and
called law enforcement from her neighbor’s residence.
Officer Larrive of the Mendota Heights Police Department responded to the
reported burglary in progress at Dunnigan’s home. Officer Larrive walked to the back of
the home and observed a man, later identified as Taft, standing on the patio and looking
into the residence. Officer Larrive identified himself as the police and ordered Taft to get
on the ground. Taft stated that he did not break the glass patio door and had observed “two
white guys” fleeing from the scene. Taft then stood up and “took off running.” Officer
Larrive pursued Taft and ultimately stopped him with his Taser.
2
Officer Willson of the Mendota Heights Police Department arrived at Dunnigan’s
home and photographed the scene. Officer Willson observed three windows with damage
to the glass. Officer Willson also noticed muddy shoe prints, broken pieces of rock, and
mud on one of the windows. Taft was transported to the Mendota Heights Police
department, where he was interviewed. Taft provided law enforcement with multiple false
names and dates of birth. Taft explained to law enforcement that he was in Dunnigan’s
neighborhood to solicit business for a landscaping company.
Taft was charged with attempted first-degree burglary, first-degree criminal damage
to property, false information to police, and fleeing a peace officer. At trial, the state
requested the court to allow evidence of a prior burglary that Taft had been involved in to
prove Taft’s motive and intent to commit the present offense. Over Taft’s objection, the
district court admitted the testimony of Marquell Crenshaw, who identified Taft as an
accomplice to a burglary that took place in Eagan the previous year.
The district court noted that Taft had presented evidence on that charge that he
made previous statements to law enforcement that there were other individuals involved in
the commission of the burglary, and that he was at the scene of the crime for an innocent
reason. Because of this, the district court held that the Spreigl evidence was admissible for
the state to prove intent and motive (modus operandi would have also fit). Crenshaw then
testified that on May 1, 2013, he, Taft, and another person committed a burglary at an
Eagan residence. The district court gave the jury a limiting instruction, both prior to the
introduction of the evidence and in the court’s final instructions, that the Spreigl testimony
was not to be used to prove the character of Taft or that he acted in conformity with such
3
character. The state did not mention any of the Spreigl evidence during its closing
argument. Taft appeals.
DECISION
“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). It
may be admissible for another purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake. Id.; see also State v. Spreigl,
272 Minn. 488, 491, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. 1965). District courts must follow a
five-prong test to determine the admissibility of Spreigl evidence:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state's case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.
State v. Asfeld, 662 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2003). Admissibility of Spreigl evidence lies
within the sound discretion of the district court, and on review, will not be reversed absent
a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Spaeth, 552 N.W.2d 187, 193 (Minn. 1996). Taft only
challenges the fourth and fifth prongs of the above test. Those elements will be addressed
in turn.
Here, the district court allowed the evidence of the prior burglary in order to rebut
testimony, elicited by Taft, that he was in the area of the incident as an innocent bystander.
Taft argues that the evidence of his involvement in the prior burglary was not relevant, nor
was it material, to prove motive or intent. Specifically, Taft argues that attempted first-
4
degree burglary does not have an element of motive, and the prior burglary did not provide
the jury with any legitimate assistance in determining the element of intent. We are not
persuaded.
Evidence of unrelated crimes committed by a defendant is admissible if the evidence
shows a motive for the present offense. State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 834 (Minn.
1998). Although motive is not an element of most crimes, the state is usually entitled to
prove motive because it explains the reason for an act and can be important to a required
state of mind. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 687 (Minn. 2006). Motive and intent are
distinct concepts. Motive “concerns external facts that create a desire in someone to do
something, whereas intent is a state of mind in which an act is done consciously, with
purpose.” Id.For example, in State v. Bauer, evidence that tended to show a strained relationship
between the defendant and the victim of a crime was relevant to establish the motive for
killing the victim. 598 N.W.2d 352, 364 (Minn. 1999) (noting that the strained relationship
also put the acts into context); see also State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 285 (Minn. 1997).
Evidence of prior assaults a defendant committed against his ex-wife was properly
admitted to show the defendant’s motive for threatening the ex-wife’s boyfriend. State v.
Halverson, 381 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Mar. 21, 1986).
Evidence that a victim was aware of robberies that had been committed by the defendant
was properly admitted to establish the defendant’s motive to kill the witness in order to
prevent her potential testimony. State v. Martin, 293 Minn. 116, 128, 197 N.W.2d 219,
5
226-27 (Minn. 1972). A common trend among these examples is a clear causal connection
between the prior bad act and the later offense.
There is nothing that shows a causal connection between the prior burglary and the
present offense. There are no external facts to show how the prior burglary created a desire
in Taft to commit the later burglary. The only connection between the two offenses is that
they were residential burglaries, but that does nothing to prove Taft’s motive to commit
the present offense. Thus, motive was an improper basis for admitting the Spreigl
evidence.
However, the district court also admitted the Spreigl evidence to show that Taft had
the requisite intent to burglarize Dunnigan’s home. The admission of Spreigl evidence for
the purpose of proving intent “requires an analysis of the kind of intent required and the
extent to which it is a disputed issue in the case.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 687. At issue for
purposes of this appeal is the charge of attempted first-degree burglary. At trial, the district
court gave the jury instructions on the required state of mind for Taft to be found guilty of
attempted first-degree burglary. The main issue at trial was whether Taft was the individual
who broke the glass window with the intent to burglarize the home, or was he simply at the
location of the incident to solicit business for a landscaping company as he claims.
In Spaeth, the court upheld the admission of evidence of burglaries that the
defendant committed approximately ten years prior to the charged offense in order to assist
the state in establishing identity and modus operandi. 552 N.W.2d at 195. The prior bad
acts “bolstered the state’s case on the issue of identity and helped rebut Spaeth’s innocent
explanation for his presence near the crime scene.” Id. (emphasis added). Although
6
Spaeth focused on admission of bad acts for the purpose of proving identity, the same
principles the court relied on apply here.
The defense’s theory of innocence was that Taft was in the neighborhood and on
the patio for the innocent purpose of soliciting business for a landscaping company. The
state’s aim was to use the Spreigl evidence in a very similar way to how it was used in
Spaeth, to combat the defendant’s innocent explanation for his presence at the crime scene.
The state needed to prove Taft’s state of mind for the attempt portion of the first-degree
burglary charge, because law enforcement intervened before a completed burglary
occurred. Evidence of the prior burglary provided the jury with a context for his presence
at Dunnigan’s home, and was used to help prove Taft’s intent to commit a burglary.
Evidence of Taft’s involvement was relevant and material for the issue of intent.
Taft argues that the admission of the Spreigl evidence had no legitimate probative
value, and was highly prejudicial. When determining whether the probative value of
Spreigl evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice, courts balance the relevance
of the prior bad acts, the risk of the evidence being used as propensity evidence, and the
State’s need to strengthen weak or inadequate proof in its case. State v. Scruggs, 822
N.W.2d 631, 644 (Minn. 2012). Prior bad act evidence can be unfairly prejudicial if used
by the jury for an improper purpose, such as proof of a defendant’s propensity to commit
the charged offense. Id. In addition to the factors mentioned, the court in Spaeth noted
that the district court minimized the prejudicial effect of the Spreigl evidence by providing
the jury with limiting instructions at the time the evidence was introduced, and again at the
end of the trial. Spaeth, 522 N.W.2d at 196. All relevant evidence that tends to establish
7
a defendant’s guilt is always “prejudicial” to the defendant, but that does not preclude its
admission.
The Spreigl evidence in this case had probative value in proving the element of
intent for the attempted first-degree burglary charge. The state had a need to strengthen an
area of its case—explaining Taft’s state of mind at the crime scene—after Taft elicited
testimony that he was at Dunnigan’s home for an innocent purpose. Because the factors in
Scruggs have been satisfied, the probative value of the Spreigl evidence was not
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The district court properly admitted the testimony
regarding Taft’s involvement in the prior burglary for the limited purpose of proving intent.
Affirmed.
8