In re the Marriage of: Jo Ellen M. Healy v. John Henry Healy, Jr. ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1823
In re the Marriage of:
Jo Ellen M. Healy, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
John Henry Healy, Jr.,
Respondent.
Filed June 22, 2015
Affirmed
Hudson, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-000271133
Jason Schellack, Autism Advocacy & Law Center, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Brittany Stephens Pearson, Michael P. Boulette, Lindquist & Vennum LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HUDSON, Judge
In this spousal-maintenance and child-support dispute, appellant-mother argues
that the district court (a) reduced her maintenance award based on its misapplication of
the statutory factors and improper attribution to her of income; (b) should have awarded
her child support and failed to make findings of fact justifying its deviation from the
guideline support amount; and (c) abused its discretion by failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
The district court dissolved the marriage of appellant Jo Ellen M. Healy and
respondent John Henry Healy, Jr. by amended judgment in 2004. The parties have two
children: K.H., born in 1992, and D.H., born in 1995. D.H. has been diagnosed with
special needs and requires substantial, individualized care and supportive services. At the
time of the dissolution, appellant, a former teacher, was acting as D.H.’s primary care
provider and did not work outside the home; respondent was employed as a financial
advisor. The district court granted the parties joint legal custody of the children and
appellant sole physical custody. Appellant was granted $3,000 per month child support
and $2,500 per month maintenance.
In October 2012, after a support and maintenance dispute, the district court
approved the parties’ stipulation on those issues. Pursuant to the stipulation, the district
court ordered maintenance of $3,000 per month from May 15, 2012 until February 28,
2013; and $4,250 per month from March 1, 2013 until January 31, 2014. The stipulated
order also provided, in part:
Both parties anticipate and expect that [appellant] will
obtain appropriate employment and be able to contribute to
her own self-support. The support agreements reached by the
parties in this Stipulation are expressly linked to the
anticipation and expectation that [appellant] will earn income
and contribute to her own self-support. The parties anticipate
that spousal maintenance may be reduced in January, 2014 in
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light of [appellant’s] receipt of appropriate employment
income by said time.
The order further provided that either party may schedule a review hearing in January
2014 “for a de novo review on the issue of [appellant’s] appropriate employment and
ability to contribute to her own support.” Pursuant to the stipulation, the district court
also ordered $2,000 per month child support for D.H. from May 15, 2012 until
February 28, 2013. After that, when D.H. turned 18, respondent’s child-support
obligation would be reduced to $0. The parties thereafter devised a special-needs trust
for the benefit of D.H. Respondent agreed to place $500 monthly into the trust, which
would be available for mutually agreed-upon disbursements for D.H. Any disagreements
on disbursements would be resolved by binding arbitration. In May 2013, the district
court also appointed a third-party guardian for D.H. The court’s corresponding order was
not appealed.
In November 2013, respondent moved to reduce his maintenance obligation
effective February 2014. He alleged that appellant had been working as a substitute
teacher for an average of three hours per month and was also working as a personal care
attendant for D.H., but earning only $12 per hour for that work. He submitted the report
of a certified rehabilitation counselor, who opined that if appellant secured her regular
teaching license with 125 hours of training, her education and prior teaching experience
would allow her to maximize her earning potential at $40,000 per year in a public-school
teaching job, with additional summer work.
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In response, appellant moved to increase maintenance and re-establish child
support. She acknowledged that she had received increased maintenance, and that the
parties established the special-needs trust because, when D.H. turned 18, payment of
child support would have reduced or eliminated his eligibility for social-security-
disability and medical-assistance benefits. But she argued that the administration of the
trust had “proven inefficient and cumbersome,” with respondent declining to agree to
most of her requested disbursements. She alleged that she made good-faith efforts to find
employment that did not interfere with D.H.’s school schedule, but her ongoing
caretaking responsibilities had precluded her from securing reliable, steady employment.
She also sought removal of the third-party guardian, who had moved D.H.’s residence
from her home to respondent’s home.1
The district court denied appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing and issued
its findings of fact and order on maintenance and support. The district court reduced
maintenance to $700 per month, the approximate difference between the current
maintenance amount of $4,250 and an imputed gross monthly income to appellant of
$3,500. It found that appellant’s argument on maintenance “ignores that the parties
specifically stipulated to a de novo review of spousal maintenance, rather than a review
based on a change in circumstances.” The district court noted that appellant was
expected to obtain appropriate employment to contribute to self-support and had provided
several options for re-entering the teaching field, with her only expressed concern being
that she might be terminated due to an unexpected need to care for D.H. during work
1
The separate action to remove D.H.’s guardian is currently pending in district court.
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hours. The district court supported its attribution of income to appellant with findings
that the certified rehabilitation counselor had verified appellant’s ability for self-support,
that appellant worked 40 hours per week as D.H.’s personal care attendant at $12 per
hour and that she only earned a total of $766 for substitute teaching in 2013. The district
court also determined that the four or five job applications appellant made in an 18-month
period did not amount to a reasonable job search effort and that she had alleged no efforts
to further her education or to obtain a regular teaching license. The district court
observed that D.H. attends school 35 hours per week and was entitled to receive 35 hours
of personal-care-attendant (PCA) time and that appellant did not address why she could
not use those services for D.H.’s care until she arrived home from work. The district
court found that, although respondent had upheld his portion of the stipulation by paying
increased maintenance for an agreed-on period, appellant had failed to uphold her
portion, which amounted to bad faith. The district court also determined that appellant
had not demonstrated a change in circumstances and found her revised budget, which had
increased 60% in an 18-month period, to be inflated and not credible.
The district court also declined to order a change in child support, finding that,
while cumbersome, the process of obtaining reimbursement from the special-needs trust
did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances making the current child-support
amount of $0 unreasonable and unfair. The district court found that, assuming that D.H.
were to reside with appellant, her receipt of child support would result in D.H.’s
ineligibility for government benefits and would not necessarily be in his best interest.
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
I
This court reviews a district court’s decision on spousal maintenance for an abuse
of discretion. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). The district court
abuses its discretion when it resolves the matter in a manner that is “against logic and the
facts on [the] record.” Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).
This court treats the stipulated order as a contract for purposes of construction.
See Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating this principle
with respect to stipulated dissolution judgments). In interpreting the stipulated order, we
consider it as a whole to determine whether ambiguity exists. Blonigen v. Blonigen, 621
N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 2001). If no
ambiguity exists, its interpretation presents a question of law, subject to de novo review.
Id. “The general rule for the construction of contracts . . . is that where the language
employed by the parties is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction.”
Starr v. Starr, 312 Minn. 561, 562–63, 251 N.W.2d 341, 342 (1977). A contract should
be interpreted “in such a way as to give meaning to all of its provisions.” Brookfield
Trade Ctr., Inc. v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 1998).
Appellant maintains that, because the stipulated order provided that the issue of
maintenance was subject to the district court’s de novo review, the district court erred by
failing to address all of the statutory factors for awarding maintenance in that review. See
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2014) (stating maintenance factors, including the
financial resources of both parties, the time necessary for the maintenance obligee to
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acquire training to find employment and become capable of self-support, that party’s loss
in earnings and benefits, the marital standard of living, and the obligor’s ability to meet
needs while meeting the obligee’s needs); see also LeRoy v. LeRoy, 600 N.W.2d 729, 733
(Minn. App. 1999) (stating that when reviewing maintenance de novo, the district court
must consider statutory factors), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 1999). In support of her
argument, appellant points to the district court’s finding that “the parties specifically
stipulated to a de novo review of spousal maintenance, rather than a review based on a
change of circumstances.” She argues that, based on this language, the district court was
required to make findings on all of the statutory maintenance factors, and that a remand is
required to address those factors. See Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989)
(remanding maintenance issue when findings were inadequate).
We disagree. The stipulated order’s plain language provides that either party may
seek “de novo review on the issue of [appellant’s] appropriate employment and ability to
contribute to her own support.” It also provides that appellant would receive increased
maintenance for an approximate two-year period and that she agreed to seek employment
to contribute to self-support. Even more clearly, it states that “[t]he parties anticipate that
spousal maintenance may be reduced . . . in light of [appellant’s] receipt of appropriate
employment income.” We therefore read the district court’s subsequent order in light of
the stipulated order and conclude that the district court’s de novo review applied only to
the maintenance factors relating to appellant’s rehabilitation and employment. Of course,
the district court was free to address whether maintenance should be modified based on
other evidence of a substantial change in circumstances that would make the current
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maintenance provision unreasonable and unfair. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2
(2014) (stating that standard). But in doing so, the district court was not required to make
findings on all of the statutory maintenance factors. See Tuthill v. Tuthill, 399 N.W.2d
230, 232 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating, in the context of a maintenance modification
motion, that once the district court found a lack of substantially changed circumstances, a
failure to make findings on other maintenance factors did not constitute reversible error);
cf. Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 360 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that specific
findings on all statutory maintenance factors are not necessarily required “if the findings
that were made reflect that the district court adequately considered the relevant statutory
factors”).
Appellant argues that the findings on her ability to be self-supporting were clearly
erroneous. She maintains that the district court’s attribution of potential income to her
was speculative and failed to recognize her lengthy absence from the workforce, possible
loss of earning capacity, lack of employment opportunities, and caregiving responsibility.
See Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 197 (Minn. 1987) (remanding for an award of
permanent spousal maintenance, based on a non-working spouse’s 30-year absence from
the workforce and uncertain ability to become fully employed). But more recently we
have held that Nardini does not preclude the district court from considering a permanent
maintenance recipient’s prospective ability for self-support after reeducation or
retraining, even absent a finding of bad faith. Passolt v. Passolt, 804 N.W.2d 18, 25
(Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2011).
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A district court properly balances a maintenance recipient’s lack of reasonable
effort to provide for self-support against that person’s inability to provide for reasonable
needs, attributing income that, based on expert testimony, could have been produced by
reasonable effort. Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1997). Appellant
challenges the district court’s reliance on the rehabilitation consultant’s expert opinion,
arguing that it was speculative because the consultant did not meet with her, conduct a
vocational evaluation, or consider her role as primary caretaker for D.H. But appellant
did not challenge the accuracy of the information in the consultant’s report, maintaining
rather that she had increased living expenses and that caretakers of children with D.H.’s
special needs earn less than parents of children without health limitations. We recognize
the difficulty of appellant’s caretaking duties, should D.H. live with her. Nonetheless, the
district court did not clearly err by finding that appellant’s alleged increased expenses
were not credible and that D.H. had the opportunity to utilize PCA services, which could
be used for “bridge” hours until appellant returned home from work. See Sefkow v.
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts defer to district
court credibility determination).
Moreover, appellant does not dispute that she agreed in 2012 that she could earn
$52,000 yearly after obtaining a regular teaching license, yet she has taken almost no
steps to obtain that license or complete additional education. In addition, she has not
presented any evidence that her caretaking responsibilities for D.H. have increased since
the district court filed the stipulated order. Based on this record, the district court did not
clearly err by finding that she had not made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and did not
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abuse its discretion by reducing maintenance to reflect her receipt of potential income in
an amount approximately what she would have earned if she had rehabilitated.
II
A district court order regarding child support will be reversed only when a district
court abused its broad discretion “by resolving the matter in a manner that is against logic
and the facts on the record.” Bauerly v. Bauerly, 765 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. App.
2009). This court reviews questions of law relating to support de novo and findings of
fact for clear error. Guyer v. Guyer, 587 N.W.2d 856, 858 (Minn. App. 1999), review
denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 1999); Ludwigson v. Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Minn.
App. 2002).
Appellant argues that the district court erred by failing to order guideline child
support for D.H., who meets the statutory criterion for continued support. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.34(a) (2014) (setting forth process for determining an obligor’s presumptive
child-support obligation); see also Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 5 (2014) (including in
the statutory definition of “child” “an individual who, by reason of physical or mental
condition, is incapable of self-support”). She argues that a statutory presumption exists
that D.H. is entitled to support and that the parties’ stipulation did not prevent the district
court from awarding support in the future.
But as respondent points out, appellant requested modification of the stipulated
order’s child-support provision, not an initial determination of support. The stipulated
order reflected the parties’ agreement to modify support to $0, based on the establishment
and funding of the special-needs trust. Therefore, the district court did not err by
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applying the legal standard for support modification, rather than the standard for setting
initial support under Minn. Stat. § 518A.34(a). See Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 518
(Minn. 1993) (stating that determining the proper statutory standard to be applied is a
question of law).
The terms of a child-support order may be modified on a showing of a substantial
change in circumstances that makes the terms of the previous order unreasonable and
unfair. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (listing circumstances that constitute
substantial change). The moving party bears the burden of proof in a support-
modification proceeding. Bormann v. Bormann, 644 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. App.
2002). If applying the child-support guidelines to the parties’ current circumstances
results in a guideline support obligation at least 20% and $75 different from the existing
child-support obligation, a substantial change in circumstances is presumed, and a
rebuttable presumption exists that the existing child-support obligation is unreasonable
and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(1).
“[T]he existence of a stipulation does not bar later consideration of whether a
change in circumstances warrants modification.” O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, 678 N.W.2d
471, 475 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted). Because child support “relates to
nonbargainable interests of children,” it is “less subject to restraint by stipulation than are
other dissolution matters.” Id. (quotations omitted); see also Simmons v. Simmons, 486
N.W.2d 788, 791–92 (Minn. App. 1992) (noting that the welfare of children takes
precedence over any stipulated provision in a dissolution judgment).
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Nonetheless, this court has held that a stipulated judgment, with findings, may
rebut a presumption of unfairness and unreasonableness in a support-modification
proceeding. O’Donnell, 678 N.W.2d at 477. Here, the district court did not clearly err by
finding that mere alleged inefficiency in the reimbursement process of the special-needs
trust did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances rendering the current
support agreement unreasonable and unfair. The district court noted that the only
substantial change in circumstances was that D.H. was no longer residing with appellant.
And the district court found that, even if D.H. were to live with her, the receipt of
designated child support would adversely affect his qualification for social-security and
medical-assistance benefits, which would not be in his best interest. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.43, subd. 1(2) (2014) (stating that in deviating from guidelines in setting or
modifying support, the court may consider “the extraordinary financial needs and
resources, physical and emotional condition, and educational needs of the child to be
supported”). We conclude that, under these circumstances, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by declining to modify child support. See, e.g., O’Donnell, 678
N.W.2d at 476 (concluding that ordinary expenses incurred were insufficient to warrant
support modification when both parties were represented by counsel, the support obligee
was familiar with the children’s expenses, and when “there is no claim or finding that the
best interests of the children necessitate a change or were adversely affected by a
continuation of the support terms of the original judgment”).
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III
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining to hold
an evidentiary hearing. “Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion generally is
a discretionary decision of the district court, which [this court] review[s] for an abuse of
discretion.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. App. 2007).
The district court correctly noted that an evidentiary hearing is not required in
child-support and maintenance-modification proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd.
2(g) (2014). Family-law motions are generally decided on written submissions. Minn.
R. Gen. Pract. 303.03(d)(1); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.05 (stating that “[w]henever a
motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on
affidavits presented by the respective parties”). Appellant argues that the district court
should have held an evidentiary hearing to address her appropriate employment, her
actual earning capacity, and issues related to D.H.’s residence. The district court,
however, was able to adequately consider appellant’s employment and earning capacity
on the record submitted. And issues regarding D.H.’s residence are more appropriately
addressed in the pending action to remove his guardian, who allegedly made the decision
to move D.H. to respondent’s home. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
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