Andrew Ellis v. Danielle Thompson, Abdul R. Johnson ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1991
Andrew Ellis,
Appellant,
vs.
Danielle Thompson,
Respondent,
Abdul R. Johnson,
Respondent
Filed June 22, 2015
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Worke, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-HC-14-2978
Andrew Ellis, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Danielle Thompson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
Abdul R. Johnson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Chutich, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-landlord challenges the dismissal of an eviction action, arguing that the
record does not support the district court’s conclusions that he failed to establish the
amount of rent due and that respondent-tenants were entitled to rent abatement. He also
challenges the district court’s decision to vacate a conciliation-court judgment. We
affirm the district court’s decision to vacate the conciliation-court judgment, but we
reverse the district court’s order for rent abatement, and remand with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of appellant for unpaid rent and late fees.
DECISION
Rent
On June 9, 2014, appellant-landlord Andrew Ellis filed an eviction action against
respondent-tenants Danielle Thompson and Abdul R. Johnson. Ellis argues that the
district court erred by dismissing the eviction action for failing to show the amount of
rent owed.
On review of a district court order in an eviction action, we review whether the
district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v.
Smallwood, 379 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19,
1986). In reviewing findings of fact for clear error, this court examines the record for
“reasonable evidence” to support the district court’s findings. Fletcher v. St. Paul
Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous
when this court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013)
(quotation omitted). But this court does not defer to the district court on a purely legal
issue. Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642
(Minn. 1984). This court applies a de novo standard of review to the district court’s
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conclusions of law. W. Insulation Servs. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d 355, 357
(Minn. App. 1990).
An eviction action is a summary proceeding to determine the present possessory
rights to property. See Amresco Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Stange, 631 N.W.2d 444,
445-46 (Minn. App. 2001) (noting that an eviction action, formerly known as an
unlawful-detainer action, is a summary proceeding); see also Minn. Stat. § 504B.001,
subd 4. (2014) (defining eviction as “a summary court proceeding to remove a tenant or
occupant from or otherwise recover possession of real property”). A landlord may
commence an eviction action when a person unlawfully detains or retains possession of
real property. Minn. Stat. § 504B.301 (2014). A landlord may also bring an eviction
action for nonpayment of rent. Minn. Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1 (2014).
The district court concluded that it was unable to reconcile the amounts Ellis
claimed were owed in the complaint with the amounts owed according to his testimony
and records. While the complaint alleges amounts owed for “expenses” that are
unexplained1, Ellis consistently claimed that Thompson and Johnson failed to pay rent in
April, May, and June 2014.
The parties entered into a written month-to-month lease commencing on May 1,
2013. Rent was due on the first of each month in the amount of $995. Rent received
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The complaint also claims late fees for several months in 2013, but these claims were
unsupported by testimony. Additionally, his written records show that Thompson and
Johnson were late paying rent nearly every month, and he provides no explanation for
seeking late fees for only some of those months. Finally, Johnson testified that when he
anticipated paying rent late, he contacted Ellis who told him not to worry about it. The
district court found Johnson’s testimony credible.
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after the fourth of the month was considered late and subject to a $50 late fee. When they
entered into the lease, Thompson and Johnson paid a security deposit and the last
month’s rent each in the amount of $995.
The complaint alleged that Thompson and Johnson failed to pay rent in April,
May, and June 2014. According to the complaint, the amounts due were $830 plus a $50
late charge for April, $995 plus a $50 late charge for May, and $995 plus a $50 late
charge for June. Ellis testified that he did not receive rent in April, May, or June, 2014.
Johnson admitted that he did not pay rent in May or June, and conceded that he owed late
fees. Johnson also indirectly admitted that he did not pay rent in April. He stated that he
believed that when he paid last month’s rent, that payment would be applied to rent for
April 2014 because the lease commenced May 1, 2013. But Thompson and Johnson
entered into a month-to-month lease; thus, the lease did not terminate after 12 months,
especially when Thompson and Johnson were still living in the unit in June 2014. Ellis’s
records also show that he did not receive rent in April, May, or June 2014. Even the
records submitted by Thompson and Johnson show that they did not pay rent in April,
May, and June 2014. Based on the complaint, the testimony, and the exhibits, there is
sufficient evidence to show that Thompson and Johnson failed to pay Ellis rent in April,
May, and June 2014.
After the hearing on the eviction action, the parties agreed that Thompson and
Johnson would move out on June 30, 2014. If Ellis applied the last month’s rent to June,
and applied the security deposit to unpaid rent after Thompson and Johnson moved out,
he would still be entitled to one month’s rent and late fees. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.178,
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subd. 3(a)(1), (b)(1) (2014) (stating that three weeks after termination of tenancy, a
landlord shall either return the security deposit or provide a written statement that the
deposit was withheld to remedy default in payment of rent). Because Ellis alleged in the
complaint that Thompson and Johnson owed him $830 for rent due in April, Thompson
and Johnson owe Ellis $980 ($830 for April rent and $150 in late fees). The district court
erred in concluding that it was unable to reconcile the amounts Ellis alleged were owed in
rent and late fees; therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of Ellis in the amount of $980.
Rent abatement
At the hearing on the eviction action, Johnson testified that in the winter months,
the pipes for the fixtures in the upper-level bathroom and kitchen froze. Johnson testified
that a maintenance worker responded to his calls and worked on the problem “several
times.” Johnson testified that even though the pipes froze, he paid rent in the winter
months. Johnson also testified that in May 2014, water leaked from the ceiling into a
ceiling fan in his children’s room. Ellis argues that the district court erred by concluding
that Thompson and Johnson “proved numerous violations of the statutory covenants of
habitability” and were entitled to rent abatement “in the amount of $300 per month for
the months of December 2013 [through] March 2014 and in the amount of $100 per
month for the months of May 201[4] and June 201[4].”
A tenant may assert breach of the statutory covenants of habitability in “excuse,
justification, or avoidance” of the landlord’s eviction action. Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn.
54, 59, 213 N.W.2d 339, 342 (1973); see also Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 307 Minn. 423, 427-
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28, 240 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1976) (stating that a landlord’s breach of the implied statutory
covenant of habitability may justify the tenant’s withholding rent); Meyer v. Parkin, 350
N.W.2d 435, 438 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that breach of covenants of habitability may
be asserted as a defense to an unlawful-detainer action), review denied (Minn. Sept. 12,
1984).
The district court erred by concluding that Thompson and Johnson proved
violations and were entitled to rent abatement. First, the district court ordered that rent be
abated $100 per month for May and June 2014 after finding that Thompson and Johnson
testified that “there was water leaking through the ceiling . . . during the months of May
2014 and June 2014 and this condition was reported to [Ellis].”
Thompson testified that the water leaked through the ceiling on May 3, 2014. This
is the only reference to water leaking through the ceiling in the record. Additionally, the
record does not show that the leak was reported to Ellis. Thompson testified that she
asked the upper-level tenant what happened and he said that the refrigerator leaked. And
Johnson testified that he called Ellis in April 2014, and that this was the last time that he
talked to Ellis. The water leak occurred the next month. Finally, Thompson testified that
the children slept in her bedroom since the water leak “just in case” something like that
happened again. “Just in case” something happens indicates that something was not
ongoing. Based on this record, the district court clearly erred in finding that water was
leaking through the ceiling during May and June 2014 and was reported to Ellis.
Second, the district court found that Thompson and Johnson testified that “the
pipes on the premises were frozen in the winter months . . . and this condition was
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repeatedly reported to [Ellis],” and concluded that they were entitled to rent abatement in
the amount of “$300 per month for the months of December 2013 [through March
2014].” But while a tenant may raise a breach of the covenants of habitability as a
defense in an eviction action, there is a procedure to follow.
If a violation of the covenants exists, a tenant must “give written notice to the
landlord specifying the violation,” and afford the landlord 14 days within which to
correct the violation. Minn. Stat. § 504B.385, subds. 1(c), .001, subd. 14 (2), .161, subd.
1 (2014). If the violation is not corrected within 14 days, the tenant may deposit the
amount of rent due to the court administrator with an affidavit specifying the violation.
Minn. Stat. § 504B.385, subd. 1(a)(c). Under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 608:
In any unlawful detainer case where a tenant withholds
rent in reliance on a defense, the defendant shall deposit
forthwith into court an amount in cash, money order or
certified check payable to the [d]istrict [c]ourt equal to the
rent due as the same accrues or such other amount as
determined by the court to be appropriate as security for the
plaintiff, given the circumstances of the case.
Thompson and Johnson did not follow this procedure. They did not provide
written notice of the frozen pipes. Although Johnson called someone about the frozen
pipes, he testified that the building superintendent came to the unit “several times” to fix
the problem. They did not deposit rent with the court administrator. Johnson testified
that even though the pipes froze, they paid their rent for those months. Thompson and
Johnson failed to pay rent for months that they did not encounter the problem with frozen
pipes; thus, they did not withhold rent in reliance on a breach of the covenants of
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habitability defense. Based on this record, the district court erred by concluding that
Thompson and Johnson were entitled to rent abatement.
Conciliation-court judgment
Ellis moved for amended findings or for a new trial. In the order denying the
motion, the district court noted that since its original order, Ellis had obtained a default
judgment in conciliation court against Thompson and Johnson for unpaid rent and late
fees. The court vacated the judgment because the eviction action had decided the issue.
Ellis argues that the district court erred by vacating the conciliation-court judgment.
“When a court obtains jurisdiction over a case it has the authority to determine all
relevant issues, and in exercising that power the court may restrain the prosecution of
other suits raising the same issues . . . .” Minn. Mut. Life Ins. v. Anderson, 410 N.W.2d
80, 81 (Minn. App. 1987). The district court resolved the issues of unpaid rent and late
fees before Ellis received the default judgment in conciliation court. Thus, in the
interests of judicial economy, the district court appropriately vacated the conciliation-
court default judgment.
The record before us does not support the district court’s determination that Ellis
was not entitled to recover rent and late fees, nor does it support the order for rent
abatement; therefore, we reverse the order for rent abatement and remand with
instructions to enter judgement in favor of Ellis in the amount of $980.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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