Mackenzie Leigh Meier v. State of Minnesota ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0517
Mackenzie Leigh Meier, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed November 23, 2015
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-11-2982
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Katie Conners, Special Assistant
State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Chip Granger, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Willis,
Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAUBER, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary denial of her petition for postconviction relief,
arguing that (1) the district court abused its discretion by concluding that her petition was
time-barred; (2) she should be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea based on newly
discovered evidence, a Brady violation, due-process violations, manifest injustice, and
ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm.
FACTS
In September 2011, appellant Mackenzie Meier was charged with possession of a
controlled substance in the fifth degree. The complaint alleged that during a routine
traffic stop, a Hastings police officer heard the sound of breaking glass after he observed
appellant throw “an object out the passenger side window of the vehicle.” The complaint
also alleged that the officer later retrieved a glass pipe that was tested and determined to
contain .09 grams of methamphetamine.
On September 26, 2011, appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled
substance in the fifth degree. The district court stayed adjudication of the matter and
placed appellant on probation for three years. But after appellant violated the terms of
her probation, the district court filed an amended order on October 3, 2012, revoking the
stay of adjudication and sentencing appellant to a stay of imposition under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.135 (2014).
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In July 2012, the St. Paul Police Department Crime Laboratory (SPPDCL) came
under public scrutiny and was the subject of a Frye-Mack hearing in an unrelated Dakota
County District Court case. Independent reviews of the SPPDCL indicated problems in
the laboratory protocols and testing procedures. In light of the problems at the SPPDCL,
appellant filed a postconviction petition on July 18, 2014, arguing that she should be
allowed to withdraw her guilty plea or be granted an evidentiary hearing because (1) the
deficient SPPDCL testing is newly discovered evidence; (2) the state violated Brady v.
Maryland by not disclosing the deficient testing; (3) the state violated appellant’s due-
process rights by using unreliable scientific evidence to obtain the guilty plea;
(4) appellant’s guilty plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent; and (5) she received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant claimed that although her petition was filed
more than two years after her sentence, her petition was timely because it met the newly
discovered evidence and the interests-of-justice exceptions to the statutory two-year time
bar.
The district court denied appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing,
concluding that the petition is time-barred and fails on the merits. This appeal followed.
DECISION
An appellate court reviews a summary denial of postconviction relief for an abuse
of discretion. Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005). “A postconviction
court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or
is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn.
2013) (quotation omitted).
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I.
Appellant challenges the district court’s conclusion that her postconviction
petition is time-barred. A petition for postconviction relief must be filed within two years
of the later of “(1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is
filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2014). But, recently, our supreme court held that “[w]hen an
offender receives a stay of adjudication under Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1 (2014), there
is no judgment of conviction or sentence that triggers the 2-year statute of limitations in
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1).” Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Minn. 2015).
Instead, the section 590.01 time-bar is triggered “only after the stay [is] revoked,” the
offender is sentenced, and the district court enters a judgment of conviction. Id. at 41.
Here, because appellant received a stay of adjudication after pleading guilty on
September 26, 2011, the section 590.01 time-bar was not triggered on that date. Rather,
under Dupey, the two-year time-bar began to run on October 3, 2012, when the stay of
adjudication was revoked and the district court sentenced appellant to a stay of
imposition under Minn. Stat. § 609.135. Because appellant filed her postconviction
petition on July 18, 2014, less than two years after the district court revoked the stay of
adjudication and stayed imposition of appellant’s sentence, the district court erred by
concluding that appellant’s postconviction petition was time-barred under section 590.01.
II.
Appellant argues that the “deficiencies” at the SPPDC “should allow her to
withdraw her plea based on” (1) a manifest injustice; (2) ineffective assistance of
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counsel; (3) newly discovered evidence; (4) a Brady violation; and (5) a due-process
violation. But “[a] guilty plea by a counseled defendant has traditionally operated . . . as
a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v.
Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). “When a criminal defendant has solemnly
admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he
may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d
56, 64 (Minn. 2011). Because appellant had counsel and entered a guilty plea, she
waived all non-jurisdictional arguments in her postconviction petition. Therefore, the
only substantive arguments raised by appellant that were not waived by her guilty plea
consist of her manifest-injustice and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
A. Manifest injustice
A court must allow a defendant to withdraw her guilty plea when “necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15 .05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice
occurs if a guilty plea is not valid because it is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). Appellant argues that her guilty
plea was not (1) accurate; (2) voluntary; or (3) intelligent.
1. Accurate
For a guilty plea to be accurate, a proper factual basis must be established. State v.
Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Here, appellant pleaded guilty to fifth-degree
possession of a controlled substance. Appellant’s signed plea petition demonstrates that
she was not making any claim that she was innocent. She also admitted at the plea
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hearing that she possessed the glass pipe containing methamphetamine and that she knew
the substance in the pipe was methamphetamine. These facts meet the accuracy
requirement.
2. Voluntary
A plea is voluntary if the defendant’s will was not overborne at the time she
pleaded guilty in response to improper pressures or promises. See State v. Farnsworth,
738 N.W.2d 364, 374-75 (Minn. 2007). Appellant argues that her plea was involuntary
because the test results from the SPPDCL improperly pressured her to plead guilty. We
disagree. Appellant never requested to investigate the SPPDCL reports, nor did she
dispute that the substance in her possession was methamphetamine. Moreover, appellant
acknowledged at the plea hearing that no one was forcing her to plead guilty, and that she
had not been promised anything outside the parameters of the plea agreement. Thus,
appellant is unable to demonstrate that she was improperly pressured or coerced into
pleading guilty.
3. Intelligent
A plea is intelligent if a defendant understands “the charges against him, the rights
he [was] waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90,
96 (Minn. 2010). Appellant claims that her plea was unintelligent because she did not
know about the testing deficiencies at the SPPDCL, she did not understand the scope of
her right to challenge the evidence, and did not know that she was waiving this right by
pleading guilty. But at the plea hearing, appellant acknowledged the charges against her
and that she was pleading guilty to fifth degree possession of methamphetamine, a
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controlled substance. Appellant also stated that her attorney informed her of the rights
she was waiving and that she would not have any other opportunity to object to the
evidence presented by the state. Therefore, the record reflects that appellant understood
the charges against her, the rights she was waiving, and the consequences of her guilty
plea. Because appellant’s guilty plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, she is not
entitled to withdraw her plea.
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must
demonstrate “(1) that [her] counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Nissalke
v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). An attorney provides reasonable
assistance when he exercises the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably
competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances. Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d
246, 252 (Minn. 2001).
Appellant contends that her “attorney did not act reasonably in light of all the
circumstances because the attorney did not demand and review the underlying [SPPDCL]
file in her case.” But this court rejected an identical argument in Roberts v. State, 856
N.W.2d 287, 293 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 2015). As in
Roberts, there is nothing in the record indicating that appellant ever questioned the
validity of the test results. Appellant also has failed to cite any evidence that would have
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given her attorney a reason to believe that the substance in her pipe was not
methamphetamine and, therefore, to question the validity of the SPPDCL test results.
Moreover, appellant has not shown that a reasonably competent defense attorney
exercising customary skills and diligence in a controlled-substance case would have
demanded the SPPDCL file before the discovery of the SPPDCL’s deficiencies. See
State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 267 (Minn. 2014) (stating that the reasonableness of
counsel’s conduct is judged in view of the facts at the time of the conduct). And finally,
appellant’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the test
results is considered a part of trial strategy, which this court generally does not review.
See Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004) (stating that “[t]he extent of
counsel’s investigation is considered a part of trial strategy,” which is generally not
reviewable). Therefore, appellant is unable to establish that she was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
III.
Finally, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her
petition without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. When a petition for postconviction
relief is filed, “the court shall promptly set an early hearing on the petition and response
thereto, and promptly determine the issues” “[u]nless the petition and the files and
records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014); see Erickson v. State, 842 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn.
2014). The threshold standard for an evidentiary hearing is lower than that for a new
trial; “[a]ny doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing should be resolved in
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favor of the defendant seeking relief.” Nicks, 831 N.W.2d at 504. The district court’s
decision on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012).
Here, appellant never challenged the lab results or claimed that the substance in
the glass pipe was not methamphetamine. Instead, she pleaded guilty to the charged
offense, admitting that the substance she possessed was methamphetamine. Appellant
has also failed to make any connection between the problems at the SPPDCL and the
testing of the evidence in her case. Accordingly, appellant cannot demonstrate that the
district court abused its discretion in denying her request for an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
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