State of Minnesota v. Jerome Alden Streitz, Jr. ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0481
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Jerome Alden Streitz, Jr.,
Appellant
Filed December 21, 2015
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge *
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-13-6210
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle Prokopec Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Carl Ole Tvedten, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Jason W. Migala, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of second-degree possession of a controlled
substance and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of schedule I/II drugs,
arguing that the district court erred by not suppressing evidence that was obtained through
the expansion of a traffic stop. Because the traffic stop was lawfully expanded, we affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of July 16, 2013, a Sauk Centre police officer stopped a car pulling
a trailer with improperly functioning taillights. The driver, appellant Jerome Alden Streitz,
Jr., stepped out of the car without prompting. The officer, who had previous interactions
with Streitz, immediately noticed that “he wasn’t the same Jerry Streitz that [he’d] known
from a normal basis” and that Streitz was “very hyperactive,” sweaty, and had watery,
bloodshot eyes with abnormally dilated pupils. He also observed Streitz’s rapidly pulsing
carotid artery. The officer immediately suspected controlled-substance use. Based on the
officer’s experience, he found Streitz’s explanation for his behavior, that he was hot and
tired, not credible. The officer instructed Streitz to open his mouth. Streitz eventually
opened his mouth and the officer observed “extreme heat blisters on the back of his tongue,
which indicated he had probably been smoking from a glass pipe.” The officer
administered a Romberg test. 1 Streitz estimated the time correctly but was unable to keep
his eyes fully closed. The officer arrested Streitz and searched him, finding
1
In a Romberg test, the subject stands with his feet together, eyes closed, and head tilted
backwards and while attempting to estimate thirty seconds.
2
methamphetamine, a methamphetamine pipe, and cocaine on Streitz’s person. After being
read the implied-consent advisory, Streitz provided a urine sample, which tested positive
for controlled substances. Streitz was subsequently charged with second-degree
possession, fifth-degree possession, operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a
controlled substance, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of schedule
I/II drugs.
Streitz moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop and to
dismiss the charges. After a contested omnibus hearing, the district court denied Streitz’s
motion, concluding that the officer permissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop and
that Streitz was not coerced into consenting to the urine test.
The state dismissed the fifth-degree possession and operating a vehicle under the
influence of a controlled substance counts, and the court heard the remaining two counts
in a stipulated-evidence trial. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4 (allowing stipulation
to the prosecution’s case in order to obtain appellate review of a pretrial issue where the
pretrial ruling is dispositive and certain other conditions are met). The district court found
Streitz guilty on both counts. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Streitz does not contest the validity of the initial traffic stop for improper taillights.
But he argues that the district court erred in finding that the expansion of the traffic stop
was justified, and therefore the evidence obtained as a result of the expansion must be
suppressed. See State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004) (stating that
Minnesota evaluates the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops under the Terry
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framework). We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and the legal
issue of whether a search was justified by reasonable suspicion de novo. State v Burbach,
706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005).
The scope of a traffic stop “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances
that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.” State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d
125, 135 (Minn. 2002). But the Fourth Amendment permits a traffic stop to be expanded
when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of other illegal activity. Id. “[E]ach
incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the
circumstances which rendered [the initiation of the stop] permissible.” Askerooth, 681
N.W.2d at 364 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). Although the reasonable
suspicion standard is “not high,” it requires more than a hunch and “at least a minimal level
of objective justification for making the stop.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn.
2011) (quotations omitted).
We consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an officer had
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn.
App. 2003). We view the “totality of the circumstances” broadly from the perspective of
an objective officer, and consider the “officer's general knowledge and experience, the
officer's personal observations, information the officer has received from other sources, the
nature of the offense suspected, the time, the location, and anything else that is relevant.”
Appelgate v. Comm’r of Pub. Saftey, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987). A law
enforcement officer is permitted to make inferences and deductions that a person untrained
in criminal activity might not make. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d at 282.
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Streitz argues that the traffic stop did not reveal any signs of illegal activity where
there was no impaired driving behavior and he claimed his behavior was a result of being
“tired from an exhausting day” of travel. However, the officer testified that even though
he initiated the traffic stop because of the improper taillights, he immediately recognized
that Streitz was behaving abnormally. He based this observation not only on his previous
interactions with Streitz, but factors, including watery eyes, dilated pupils and an unusually
intense heartbeat, that based on his training and experience indicated controlled-substance
use. We conclude that the district court’s finding of fact that the officer had an objective
basis to reasonably suspect drug use based on the totality of the circumstances is not clearly
erroneous. Because the officer had an objective basis to reasonably suspect drug use based
on the totality of the circumstances, the officer permissibly expanded the traffic stop.
Affirmed.
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