Jeffrey Hortian, Relators v. Darren E. Fischer, Wright County Planning Commission ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0171
Jeffrey Hortian, et al.,
Relators,
vs.
Darren E. Fischer,
Respondent,
Wright County Planning Commission,
Respondent.
Filed December 7, 2015
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Wright County Planning Commission
File No. PR20140002197
John L. Greer, John F. Mathews, James P.A. Morrighan, Hughes Mathews Greer, P.A.,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for relators)
John T. Peterson, Johnson, Larson, Peterson & Halvorson, P.A., Buffalo, Minnesota (for
respondent Darren Fischer)
Scott T. Anderson, Rupp Anderson Squires & Waldspurger, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent Wright County)
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
In this appeal, relators Jeffrey and Michelle Hortian challenge an amended
conditional-use permit (CUP) granted to respondent Darren E. Fischer by respondent
Wright County Planning Commission. The Hortians argue that the planning commission
incorrectly interpreted and applied relevant zoning ordinances and request that we reverse
the grant of the amended CUP and remand this case to Wright County Planning
Commision with instructions to revoke. Because the planning commission’s
interpretation was reasonable and its actions were not unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious, we affirm.
FACTS
Fischer owns a parcel of land in the Buffalo Township area of Wright County.
The property is located on a dead-end road and includes both the main residence and a
shed that serves as Fischer’s diesel repair shop. The property also houses some farm
equipment belonging to extended family.
In April 2006, the planning commission granted a CUP to Fischer to operate his
diesel repair business as a home-extended business. The property is zoned General
Agricultural (AG), which allows certain home-extended businesses as outlined under
Wright County, Minn., Zoning Ordinance (WCZO), § 741 (2015). Fischer’s original
2006 CUP was predicated on the operation of his diesel repair shop as a part-time
business with operating hours of 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. and a limit of two pieces of
equipment that could be parked outside the shop at any one time.
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The Hortians, who live on the adjacent property, complained about the business
several times over the years and eventually filed a complaint with local law enforcement
in November 2013. The Wright County Sheriff’s Department surveilled the property for
several days and noted violations concerning the operation of Fischer’s repair shop
outside the permissible hours granted in the original CUP. Fischer received a summons
and appeared before the Wright County District Court in February 2014. The case was
continued for dismissal on the condition that Fischer file for an amended CUP with
Wright County.
Fischer applied for an amended CUP in June 2014, seeking to modify or clarify
the conditions of his existing CUP. Fischer sought to modify the 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.
operating window or to seek clarity as to whether customers could pick up or drop off
equipment outside that window. He also asked to expand the interior shed space to
accommodate more equipment and to modify the CUP’s limitation on the number of
vehicles that may be kept outside at any given time.
The first hearing before the planning commission concerning the application for
an amended CUP occurred on July 17, 2014. At the time of this hearing, Fischer had a
favorable recommendation for the amended CUP from the Buffalo Township board. The
planning commission heard testimony from Fischer and his wife concerning the changing
nature of the business from part-time to full-time. Fischer estimated that 40% of his
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business is agricultural and is, therefore, well-situated in an AG district.1 Relators
testified in opposition to the amended CUP, arguing both that Fischer’s business was in
violation of the existing CUP and injurious to neighboring property owners. The
planning commission also heard testimony from two other citizens of Buffalo Township.
Fischer’s immediate neighbor to the south testified in support of granting the amended
CUP. Another Buffalo Township resident who did not live in the immediate vicinity of
the business and was not directly affected by it testified in opposition. After taking
testimony, the planning commission continued the matter in order to perform a site
inspection.
The planning commission performed a site inspection on August 18, 2014, and
discussed Fischer’s amended CUP application at the following planning commission
meeting on August 28, 2014. After discussing the site visit and hearing additional
testimony from several Buffalo Township residents, the planning commission continued
the matter to the next meeting on September 18, 2014, with direction to the county
attorney to draft findings consistent with an approval of an amended CUP. While
working on the findings, the county attorney determined that proper notice had not been
given, and the matter was again continued until the next meeting on November 13, 2014,
so that publication of a notice of public hearing could occur. At the November meeting,
the planning commission apologized for the publication oversight and again directed the
county attorney to draft findings consistent with an approval of the amended CUP. The
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Although Fischer estimated it was 40% agricultural at the time of the hearing, he noted
that he considers his work 100% agricultural during the spring farming season because of
the type of equipment requiring repair.
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matter was continued once more until the December 11, 2014 meeting when the planning
commission unanimously voted in favor of granting the amended CUP with specific
conditions. This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
A county planning commission’s decision to approve a CUP is quasi-judicial in
nature and is reviewable by a writ of certiorari. Big Lake Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty. Planning
Comm’n, 761 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 2009). A county is legislatively authorized to
carry out planning and zoning activities for the purpose of promoting the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of its community. Minn. Stat. § 394.21, subd. 1 (2014). As
a zoning tool, a CUP may be approved by the planning commission “upon a showing by
an applicant that standards and criteria stated in the ordinance will be satisfied.” Minn.
Stat. § 394.301, subd. 1 (2014). Upon review, a CUP approval is held to a more
deferential standard of review than a denial. Schwardt v. County of Watonwan, 656
N.W.2d 383, 389 n.4 (Minn. 2003).
This court independently reviews a planning commission’s approval of a CUP to
determine if the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Id. at 386. To show
that the planning commission acted unreasonably, the Hortians must establish that it did
not meet standards set forth in the zoning ordinance and that the grant of the CUP was an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 387. In determining whether the planning commission acted
unreasonably, we follow a two-step process. RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861
N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 2015). “First, we must determine whether the reasons given by
the [planning commission] were legally sufficient.” Id. at 75-76. If they are legally
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sufficient, we must determine whether “the reasons had a factual basis in the record.” Id.
at 76.
I.
As an initial matter, the Hortians assert that the parking of customers’ vehicles
outside Fischer’s business constitutes a violation of the zoning ordinance. The
interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law, which we review de novo. RDNT, 861
N.W.2d at 75. The goal in interpreting an ordinance is to ascertain and effectuate the
intent of the legislative body. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2014). When interpreting an
ordinance, we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Staab v.
Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012). Further, an ordinance “shall be
construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16.
We first look to see whether the language is free from ambiguity. Am. Family Ins.
Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000). “An [ordinance] is only
ambiguous when the language therein is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” Id. (citing Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.
1999)). “If the language is unambiguous, we must give effect to the unambiguous text
because the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the
spirit.” Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Dep’t, 783 N.W.2d 182, 193 (Minn. App. 2010)
(quotation omitted).
The Hortians challenge the county’s interpretation of WCZO § 741(3). This
section mandates that there be “no outside storage of supplies, equipment or maintenance
items; all work and work related items shall be kept in an enclosed structure.” WCZO
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§ 741(3). The Hortians contend that customers’ trucks parked outside Fischer’s business
awaiting repair or pickup are pieces of “equipment” or “work-related items” under the
ordinance that must remain inside the shop at all times.
In response to the Hortians’ argument, the planning commission stated:
We interpret section 741(3) to mean that the operation
of the business must occur in an enclosed structure and that
nothing used in the operation of the business can be stored
outside. The operation of the business is a mechanical shop.
Items used in the operation of the business generally include[]
lifts, tools, air guns, oil and automotive canisters, vehicle
parts, and tires. We do not find that fully operational and
licensed vehicles parked outside, while they may eventually
be worked on inside of the structure, are a part of the ongoing
business as contemplated under section 741(3). [Fischer’s]
business is only centered on one or two vehicles at a time and
those vehicles are always inside the structure. Vehicles
parked outside are regulated by WCZO section 703 not
[s]ection 741.
The planning commission determined that customers’ vehicles are more appropriately
governed by WCZO § 703 (2015), which prohibits storage of inoperative or unlicensed
vehicles as refuse. This led the planning commission to issue a specific condition to the
amended CUP that “all vehicles and trailers on the property must have current
registration and/or licensure unless otherwise exempt by law.”
The planning commission was careful to consider the Hortians’ concern about an
accumulation of vehicles on the property. But even the Hortians acknowledge that the
outdoor storage of vehicles is not the main concern, conceding that a property owner is
permitted to store an unrestricted number of personally owned vehicles on his or her
property. The Hortians urge this court to adopt an overly narrow reading of “equipment”
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and “work-related items”—one that would rigidly limit Fischer’s ability to work from
home. We decline to do so because the text of the ordinance is unambiguous.
“Equipment” is commonly defined as “[s]omething with which a person, organization, or
thing is equipped.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 602 (5th
ed. 2011) (noting that the central meaning shared by “equipment” and all synonyms of
the word is “the materials needed for a purpose such as a task or a journey”). Any
interpretation that forces Fischer to experience technical violations of the CUP each and
every time a customer vehicle exits the shop is simply not reasonable.
We conclude that there is only one reasonable interpretation of WCZO § 741(3)—
one that allows customers’ vehicles to be parked outside while awaiting repair or pickup.
The planning commission diligently took into consideration testimony from all affected
parties before concluding that customers’ trucks are more appropriately governed by
WCZO § 703. We therefore conclude that the planning commission did not err in
interpreting “equipment” and “work-related items” under WCZO § 741(3) to mean tools
and implements utilized in the operation of a mechanical shop.
II.
The Hortians argue that the planning commission erred by granting the amended
CUP to Fischer because his business is injurious to neighboring property owners. The
zoning ordinance requires that the planning commission consider “the effect of the
proposed use upon the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of occupants of
surrounding lands.” WCZO § 505.1 (2015). Additionally, the planning commission shall
make the following findings, where applicable:
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(1) That the Conditional Use will not be injurious to the
use and enjoyment of other property in the immediate
vicinity . . . ;
(2) That the establishment of the Conditional Use will not
impede the normal and orderly development and
improvement of surrounding vacant property for uses
predominant in the area;
(3) That adequate utilities, access roads, drainage and
other necessary facilities have been or are being
provided;
(4) That adequate measures have been or will be taken to
provide sufficient off-street parking and loading space
to serve the proposed use;
(5) The use is not in conflict with the Policies Plan of the
County; and
(6) That adequate measures have been taken or will be
taken to prevent or control offensive odor, fumes, dust,
noise, and vibration . . . .
Id.
The Hortians maintain that Fischer’s business is injurious because of the
additional wear on the roads, the high sound levels from the use of tools, and the bright
lighting installed around the building. Because of the rural nature of the community,
there are only two properties on Fischer’s road that could be immediately impacted by his
shop. The surrounding property is farmland. During the hearings, the planning
commission questioned Fischer about the Hortians’ concerns and ultimately heard from
the Hortians and the other resident on the road before concluding that a site visit was
warranted. All of the planning commissioners attended the site visit and found that,
contrary to the Hortians’ complaints, Fischer’s use of mechanical tools was not
“obnoxious or injurious.” In fact, they did not
observe anything on the site inspection that would raise
concerns with the road or the location of neighboring houses
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relative to [Fischer’s] property. The Planning Commission
also observed and heard [Fischer] as he operated some of his
tools. The tools were not found to create any sort of injurious
situation.
The Hortians also assert that an AG zoning district does not include Fischer’s type
of business. They maintain that they contributed to the development of the current land-
use plan and claim that Fischer’s diesel repair shop “flies in the face” of the current plan.
They argue that Fischer’s business would more appropriately be located in a business or
industrial district. But the planning commissioners concluded that Fischer
is providing an agricultural based service in an agricultural
setting. [The] Land Use Plan specifies that we are to promote
and support agriculture. While [Fischer’s] Home Extended
Business may be more industrial/commercial in nature, it is
still properly situated in this area because the use primarily
serves the agricultural community, by providing mechanical
services for farm implements.
This finding was based partly on extensive feedback during the hearings from local
residents who spoke to the need for this type of business in an agricultural setting. It also
relied on feedback from the township, finding:
The Township also expressed support for this request
because it fits well within the objectives of the land use
plan—which is preserving agricultural land. Buffalo
Township is primarily agricultural. [Fischer’s] customers are
members of the agricultural community and the equipment he
fixes includes tractors and other items used in the agricultural
industry.
After hearing testimony and consulting the Buffalo Township land-use plan, the planning
commission determined that Fischer provides an agricultural service. And the planning
commission included discussion of this in its formal findings of fact.
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The planning commission’s determination to grant the amended CUP is not in
error. The findings constitute a sufficient legal basis for the decision because they
demonstrate that the planning commission considered multiple pieces of factual evidence
in determining that the amended CUP is permissible under WCZO § 505.1. This court
will not substitute its judgment for that of the planning commission’s when its decision
was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
Affirmed.
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