State of Minnesota v. Scott Randall Baynes ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0202
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Scott Randall Baynes,
Appellant.
Filed November 16, 2015
Affirmed
Chutich, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-14-850
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Samuel J. Clark, St. Paul City Attorney, Tamara S. Larsen, Assistant City Attorney,
Yamy Vang, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Bradford W. Colbert, Danielle Thompson (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota
(for appellant)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Larkin, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Appellant Scott Baynes challenges his conviction of misdemeanor violation of an
order for protection following a stipulated-facts trial. Baynes argues that the district court
erred by finding that he knew of the existence of the order even though the person
protected by the order told him that it had been lifted. Because we conclude that the
district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous, we affirm his conviction.
FACTS
Baynes’s ex-fiancée, Sherry Rucker, obtained an order for protection in June 2013.
According to the terms of the order, it was to last for two years or “until modified or
vacated at a hearing.”
On January 21, 2014, Rucker went to Ramsey County Court and filed an affidavit
to lift the order for protection. A hearing was scheduled on the matter for February 10,
2014. After filing the affidavit but before the hearing, Rucker told Baynes that she had
gone to court to lift the order and invited him to stay with her and her two minor children.
Baynes had been staying with Rucker for about ten days when, on February 4,
2014, Saint Paul police received a call from a third party alleging that Baynes violated the
order for protection. When officers arrived, Baynes explained that Rucker had gone to
court to lift the order. Rucker confirmed Baynes’s assertion and explained that she had
asked Baynes to stay with her after she was assaulted by her ex-boyfriend.
The officers determined that the order for protection was still valid and took
Baynes into custody. The state charged Baynes with one count of misdemeanor violation
of an order for protection. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b)(2014).
At trial, the parties stipulated to the following facts: there was an existing court
order for protection; Baynes was served with and knew about the order for protection;
Rucker went to court to have the order dropped on January 21, 2014, and a hearing was
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set for the matter for February 10, 2014; Rucker told Baynes that the order had been
dropped and invited Baynes to stay with her; and Baynes had been staying with Rucker
and her minor children for about ten days. The parties also stipulated to three exhibits:
(1) the police reports, (2) the order for protection, and (3) the affidavit of service for the
order for protection.
After evaluating the evidence, the district court convicted Baynes of a
misdemeanor violation of an order for protection. It then sentenced Baynes to 90 days in
jail and stayed the sentence for one year. Baynes appeals.
DECISION
The statute under which Baynes was convicted provides, in relevant part, that,
“whenever an order for protection is granted by a judge . . . and the respondent or person
to be restrained knows of the existence of the order, violation of the order for protection
is a misdemeanor.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b). The parties stipulated that
Baynes violated the order for protection by staying with Rucker and her two children, so
the dispositive issue is whether Baynes knew of the existence of the order.
I. Knowledge of the Order for Protection
The parties raise two component questions, one factual and one legal, in
determining whether Baynes knew of the existence of the order. See id. The factual
question is whether Baynes had a good-faith belief at the time he visited Rucker that the
order was no longer in effect. The legal question posed is whether, even if Baynes had a
good-faith belief that the order had been lifted, the law only requires him to know of the
existence of the order when originally issued. Because we conclude that Baynes did not
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have a good-faith belief that the order was no longer in effect at the time he visited
Rucker, we do not reach the legal question.
A. District Court Order
The parties stipulated to most of the relevant facts, but did not stipulate to whether
Baynes had a good-faith belief at the time he visited Rucker that the order was no longer
in effect. Further, the parties seem to disagree on whether the district court believed
Baynes’s contention that he did not know that the order was still in effect. To resolve this
dispute, we examine the language of the district court order.
In reaching its decision, the district court emphasized that Baynes did not receive
any paperwork or verification from the court showing that the order had been vacated.
The district court articulated the elements of the crime as follows:
First, there was an existing court order for protection,
Second, [Baynes] knew of the existence of the order,
Third, [Baynes] violated a term or condition of the order, and;
Fourth, [Baynes’s] act took place on or about February 4,
2014 in Ramsey County.
But in the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court concluded that
Baynes was guilty of violating an order for protection because the state proved the
following beyond a reasonable doubt:
that there was a valid [order for protection] in existence, that
the defendant knew of the order and had not received any
notification from the court that the order was vacated, [and]
that the defendant was having contact with Sherry Rucker on
or about February 4, 2014, in Ramsey County.
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(Emphasis added.) The district court added the phrase “and had not received any
notification from the court that the order was vacated” onto the second element of the
crime. Baynes assumes that the facts are undisputed and reads the phrase as making a
legal conclusion that the statute only requires the state to prove that he knew about the
order when it was issued. The state disagrees and reads the phrase as explaining a factual
finding that Baynes did not actually have a good-faith belief that the order was no longer
valid.
We conclude that the district court’s decision was based on a factual finding that
Baynes did not have a good-faith belief that the order had been lifted. Accordingly, we
review the district court’s finding for clear error. See State v. Berrios, 788 N.W.2d 135,
140 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that a district court’s factual determinations are reviewed
for clear error), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Baynes maintains that he had a good-faith belief that the order had been lifted and
therefore did not know of the existence of the order when he violated it. Baynes notes
that the order for protection did not require him to be in court for the order to be dropped
or inform him that he would receive notice or any communication from the district court
if the order was lifted. The order only stated that it would be in effect “for a period of
two years from the date of this order, or until modified or vacated at a hearing.” Baynes
argues that he relied on Rucker’s information that the order for protection was vacated,
and because the statute requires knowledge, it does not matter whether that belief was
reasonable.
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On sufficiency-of-the-evidence review, we review the record “in a light most
favorable to the conviction” to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to allow the
fact-finder to reach the verdict that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.
1989). We “assume that the [fact-finder] believed all of the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 477
(Minn. 1999). “We will not disturb the verdict if the [fact-finder], acting with due regard
for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense
charged.” State v. Nelson, 812 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Here, Baynes’s conviction results from the district court’s factual finding that he
did not have a good-faith belief that the order for protection had been lifted. This finding
is not clearly erroneous. The district court could reasonably find, based on the stipulated
facts, that Baynes did not have such a good-faith belief.
The parties stipulated that Baynes was served with the order and knew of its
contents, including its period of effectiveness, and had not received any notification from
the court that the order was vacated. The order itself states that it will be effective for
two years unless modified or vacated at a hearing. Tellingly, it specifically warns Baynes
that he “must not enter or stay at [Rucker]’s residence for any reason, even if invited to
do so.” The district court reasonably found that “[b]eing misled by a protected party is
not enough to overcome the language contained in the [order for protection].”
Given that factual finding, sufficient evidence in the record supports the district
court order. We conclude that a fact-finder acting with due regard for the presumption of
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innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could reasonably
conclude that Baynes was guilty of the charged offense.
II. Due Process Claim
Baynes finally contends that he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the
stipulated facts support a good-faith mistake-of-fact defense. Baynes supports this claim
by asserting a due-process right to present an affirmative defense, citing this court’s
precedent in State v. Wiltse. 386 N.W.2d 315, 318 (Minn. App. 1986) (reasoning that “it
is difficult to imagine a situation where, when an essential element of a crime turns on the
presence of a defendant, the defendant could be prevented from explaining his presence
at the scene to the jury”), review denied (Minn. June 30, 1986).
Baynes’s argument is unavailing. As discussed above, the parties did not actually
stipulate to all the facts required for Baynes’s good-faith mistake-of-fact defense. The
district court reasonably found that Baynes did not have a good-faith belief that the order
had been lifted.
In addition, Wiltse does not apply because Baynes was not prevented from
presenting his defense to the fact-finder. Baynes explained his presence at Rucker’s
house and stipulated to facts relevant to his defense. Due process does not require that
the district court believe his defense or grant him a judgment of acquittal.
Affirmed.
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