Karla Kay Edenloff v. Maxistorage, LLC, a/k/a Maxistorage 1801, LLC, Maxistorage 1807, LLC and Maxistorage 1711, LLC d/b/a Maxistorage, LLC ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1050
Karla Kay Edenloff,
Appellant,
vs.
Maxistorage, LLC, a/k/a Maxistorage 1801, LLC,
Maxistorage 1807, LLC
and
Maxistorage 1711, LLC d/b/a Maxistorage, LLC, et al.,
Respondents.
Filed December 7, 2015
Affirmed
Randall, Judge*
Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-CV-14-622
Michael A. Bryant, Stacey M. Lundeen, Bradshaw & Bryant, PLLC, Waite Park,
Minnesota (for appellant)
Kevin F. Gray, Katherine O. Fossey, Rajkowski Hansmeier, Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota
(for respondents)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RANDALL, Judge
Appellant challenges summary judgment, arguing respondent owed her a duty to
inspect and maintain the door of a storage unit that appellant’s employer rented from
respondent. We find respondent did not owe appellant a duty of care as the landlord of
the storage unit. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2009, appellant Karla Edenloff was injured when she tripped and fell
while inside a storage unit that her employer, Lakes MediVan, rented from respondent
Maxistorage. Lakes MediVan is a medical transport company, and it used the storage
unit to store equipment and supplies. Edenloff typically went to the storage unit two to
four times a week to pick up or drop off items for her employer. She described the
storage unit as approximately “three people wide,” and not large enough to fit a car in.
The storage unit had a manual roller-type door that Lakes MediVan kept locked with a
key padlock.
At the time of the incident, Edenloff was walking to the back of the storage unit to
place a sheet on a table when the door unexpectedly closed behind her. This startled
Edenloff, causing her to turn towards the door, hit her leg on a box and fall to the ground.
Edenloff sustained several physical injuries from the accident. According to Edenloff,
this was not the first time the door had closed unexpectedly.
Edenloff testified that prior to her accident she had reported the door issue to
Lakes MediVan’s safety manager, Dennis Cielinski, quality control inspector, Rob
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Turcotte, owner, Jeff Nustad, and another dispatch driver, but never informed
Maxistorage about the door. Nustad testified that he had no recollection of Edenloff or
any other employee reporting a problem with the storage unit, and Lakes MediVan had
not reported any issues to Maxistorage. Edenloff’s employment records include an
“Employee Warning Notice” signed by both her and Turcotte, acknowledging Edenloff’s
violation of company safety policy by failing to report the door issue to management
prior to her accident.
Maxistorage’s owners, Dennis and Rebecca Conn, also testified that they had not
received any reports regarding the storage unit’s door prior to Edenloff’s injury. Dennis
Conn explained that storage unit doors were only inspected if a customer complained or
when a customer moved out of a unit. After the accident, Maxistorage called a garage
door repair company to “check the door.” The repair company ultimately replaced four
feet of header seal and re-wound the door spring.
Edenloff brought this action alleging that Maxistorage was negligent in failing to
regularly inspect and maintain the storage unit’s door. Maxistorage moved for summary
judgment dismissing Edenloff’s claims, arguing that, as a landlord, it did not owe a
blanket duty to inspect and maintain the door. The district court granted summary
judgment, concluding that Maxistorage had not retained control of the unit or agreed to
undertake any repairs, and as such it did not owe a duty to inspect or maintain the door.
Edenloff appeals.
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DECISION
On appeal from summary judgment, this court must determine whether there are
genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law.
Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d 216, 218-19 (Minn. 1998).
This court reviews the evidence de novo, in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. 2009).
Edenloff must prove four elements to establish a negligence claim: (1) existence of
a duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) injury. Bjerke v.
Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Minn. 2007). The district court concluded that
Maxistorage, as landlord of the storage unit, did not owe Edenloff a duty of care. “The
existence of a duty of care is a threshold question because a defendant cannot breach a
nonexistent duty.” Doe 169 v. Brandon, 845 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn. 2014). Whether a
duty exists is a legal question, which this court reviews de novo. Glorvigen v. Cirrus
Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 581 (Minn. 2012).
Generally, a landlord does not owe a duty of care to his or her tenants and is not
liable for damages caused by defective conditions on the leased property. White v. Many
Rivers W. Ltd. P'ship, 797 N.W.2d 739, 744 (Minn. App. 2011). But a duty may arise if
the landlord (1) negligently repairs the premises; (2) retains control of certain areas of the
premises; or (3) is aware of a hidden danger on the premises but the tenant is not.
Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Minn. 2002).
Edenloff asserts that the second exception applies. As evidence that Maxistorage
retained control of the storage unit, Edenloff notes that the lease permits Maxistorage to
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“enter this unit at any time without notice to inspect, etc.” According to Edenloff, this
right to inspect the premises amounts to the retention of control, and the only logical
reason for Maxistorage to retain the right to enter the storage unit was to maintain its
door. We disagree.
First, the exception arising from landlord control generally applies when a
landlord “retains possession of . . . common areas, like stairs, halls, elevators, or yard
space.” White, 797 N.W.2d at 744-45 (emphasis added); see also Rosmo v. Amherst
Holding Co., 235 Minn. 320, 324, 50 N.W.2d 698, 701 (1951) (concluding that where
landlord controlled private alleyway that tenants had a right to use, landlord was required
to maintain it in a “reasonably safe condition”); Nubbe v. Hardy Cont'l Hotel Sys. of
Minn., Inc., 225 Minn. 496, 499, 31 N.W.2d 332, 334 (1948) (concluding that evidence
supported verdict for tenant where landlord retained control of common stairway and did
not inspect steps for faulty condition). Here, it is undisputed that the private storage unit,
which Lakes MediVan used exclusively and kept locked, was not open to common use.
Second, we do not find that Maxistorage “retained control” of the storage unit just
by reserving the right to inspect it. Maxistorage’s right to inspect here connotes a limited
right to access the storage unit for an investigatory purpose, whereas retaining control
would otherwise allow unlimited access to, and use of, the unit while Lakes MediVan
leased it. Further, Maxistorage did not routinely, if ever, enter or inspect the storage unit,
which otherwise might have indicated that it did retain some measure of control. This is
evidenced by Dennis Conn’s testimony that he never inspected Lakes MediVan’s storage
unit during its tenancy, and generally only inspected storage units or made repairs when
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requested by tenants or after the units were vacated. Edenloff’s assertion that the only
reason Maxistorage would retain the right to inspect the storage unit was to inspect its
door is unsupported by the lease. The inspection provision in the lease is included with
an express prohibition against the manufacture, sale or use on controlled substances
within the unit. On its face, this indicates that at least one of the many conceivable
reasons Maxistorage reserved the right to inspect the storage unit was to investigate
suspicious or prohibited activities.
We reject the assertion that Maxistorage should have known that the door was
likely to be defective because it made requested repairs to other units during the course of
Lakes MediVan’s tenancy, and, therefore owed a duty to inspect and repair this specific
storage unit’s door. On summary judgment, we are required to make all inferences in
favor of the non-moving party, which means we must assume that Edenloff reported the
defective door to her employer, as she testified. But even with the benefit of this
inference, Edenloff has presented no evidence that would allow us to similarly conclude
that she or Lakes MediVan took the additional step of informing Maxistorage of the
problem. Aside from the fact that Maxistorage has repaired other units when asked,
Edenloff has offered no evidence that Maxistorage had knowledge of the storage unit
door’s defective condition. See DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997)
(“[T]here is no genuine issue of material fact for trial when the nonmoving party presents
evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue and which is not
sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions”).
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We conclude Maxistorage did not owe Edenloff a duty of care, and affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Affirmed.
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