In re: The Burial of Irina Kurdyumova (Deceased). ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0530
In re: The Burial of Irina Kurdyumova (Deceased)
Filed November 30, 2015
Affirmed
Smith, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-13-21529
Yelena Kurdyumova, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Michael D. Sharkey, Cousineau McGuire Chartered, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent Crescent Tide, LLC)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Smith, Judge; and Minge,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, Judge
We affirm the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to remove the district-
court judge because appellant’s attempt to remove was untimely and failed to establish
bias. We also affirm the denial of appellant’s motion to find respondent in contempt
because appellant failed to show that respondent violated the order of the district court.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
FACTS
Appellant Yelena Kurdyumova’s mother died on May 22, 2012. Kurdyumova had
contracted with respondent Crescent Tide, LLC to cremate her mother’s remains.
Through her own actions, Kurdyumova delayed that process for over a year.
Subsequently, under pressure from the Minnesota Department of Health, Crescent Tide
sought judicial approval for the burial of Kurdyumova’s mother’s remains. On
January 23, 2014, the district court ordered that the remains be buried and that Crescent
Tide could seek reimbursement from Hennepin County. On January 29, 2014, Crescent
Tide buried Kurdyumova’s mother.
The case lay dormant until December 30, 2014, when Kurdyumova moved the
district court to find Crescent Tide in contempt of the January 2014 order. Kurdyumova
also requested, as part of the contempt proceeding, that the district-court judge be
removed as a matter of right and for bias. The district court denied Kurdyumova’s
motions.
DECISION
I.
Kurdyumova first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
her request to remove the district court judge as a matter of right and for bias. Whether a
district court should recuse itself from a case is discretionary with the district court.
Carlson v. Carlson, 390 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 20, 1986). A reviewing court will not reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
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Under Minn. Stat. § 542.16, subd. 1 (2014), a party must file notice of removal
“within ten days after the party receives notice of which judge or judicial officer is to
preside at the trial or hearing . . . .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 63.03 prohibits any such notice
being filed “against a judge or judicial officer who has presided at a motion or any other
proceeding of which the party had notice.”
The district court properly determined that Kurdyumova’s notice of removal as a
matter of right was untimely. The same district-court judge was to preside over
Kurdyumova’s contempt motion as had presided at all stages of the case. Therefore,
Kurdyumova filed her notice of removal months after the expiration of the ten-day period
prescribed by section 542.16, subdivision 1.
Alternatively, Kurdyumova contends that the district court erred in refusing to
remove the district-court judge for bias. “A judge . . . who has presided at a motion or
other proceeding . . . may not be removed except upon an affirmative showing of
prejudice . . . .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 63.03. “A showing that the judge or judicial officer
might be excluded for bias from acting as a juror in the matter constitutes an affirmative
showing of prejudice.” Id. But “[a] judge who feels able to preside fairly over the
proceedings should not be required to step down upon allegations of a party which
themselves may be unfair or which simply indicate dissatisfaction with the possible
outcome of the litigation.” Carlson, 390 N.W.2d at 785 (quotation omitted).
Kurdyumova’s bias allegations fail. Kurdyumova first attempts to equate her
many defeats at the district-court level with bias. But it is well settled that adverse
rulings alone are insufficient to establish bias. Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341
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(Minn. App. 1986) (“Prior adverse rulings, however, clearly cannot constitute
bias . . . .”). Kurdyumova also alleges facts that were not part of her attempt to remove
for bias below and makes additional arguments that are unsupported by legal authority.
This court will not consider such arguments. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1998) (stating the rule that an appellate court will not consider matters not argued
to and considered by the district court); Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919
n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining to address allegations unsupported by legal analysis or
citation).1
Because Kurdyumova’s notice of removal was untimely and she failed to establish
bias, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kurdyumova’s request to
remove the district-court judge.
II.
Kurdyumova’s final argument is that the district court abused its discretion in
denying her contempt motion. On appeal, we review the factual findings of a civil
contempt order under the clearly-erroneous standard. In re Welfare of Children of J.B.,
782 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Minn. 2010). We reverse a district court’s decision to invoke its
contempt powers only if we find an abuse of discretion. Id. The party seeking a
1
Kurdyumova also finds fault with the targeted district court judge considering her
motion to remove for bias, but such procedure is exactly what the rules require. See
Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 106 (“All motions for removal of a judge . . . on the basis of actual
prejudice or bias shall be heard in the first instance by the judge sought to be removed.”).
We also note that Kurdyumova had the option of having that decision reconsidered by the
chief judge of the district court but did not pursue that avenue of relief. See id.
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contempt order must present “facts constituting the contempt.” Minn. Stat. § 588.04(a)
(2014).
Kurdyumova contends that Crescent Tide was in contempt of the January 2014
order because it failed to place a nameplate on her mother’s grave. Our review of the
January 2014 order and the law cited by the parties shows that not only did the January
2014 order not obligate Crescent Tide to place a nameplate on Kurdyumova’s mother’s
grave, but also that no Minnesota law creates such an obligation.
Kurdyumova also contends that Crescent Tide was in contempt because it sought
reimbursement from her. The record shows that Crescent Tide first sought
reimbursement from Hennepin County and was denied, and has only subsequently
attempted to recover from Kurdyumova what it believes it is owed. We agree with the
district court’s conclusion that “[t]here is . . . no legal basis to find Crescent Tide in
contempt or to restrain them because they are sending a bill for services they believe they
are owed.”
The merit of a claim is based on its logic. Here, the claim lacks logic and
therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kurdyumova’s
contempt motion.
Affirmed.
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