State of Minnesota v. Shawn Patrick Rush ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                           This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A15-1981
    State of Minnesota,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    Shawn Patrick Rush,
    Appellant.
    Filed October 11, 2016
    Affirmed
    Stauber, Judge
    Ramsey County District Court
    File No. 62-CR-15-253
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
    John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
    Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
    Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and
    Reilly, Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    STAUBER, Judge
    On appeal from his conviction of possession of a theft tool, appellant argues that
    the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when he argued during his rebuttal
    closing argument that the jury could consider that appellant failed to call a witness
    referenced in appellant’s testimony when evaluating his credibility. Because the state
    demonstrated that there was no reasonable possibility that the misconduct significantly
    affected the jury’s verdict, we affirm.
    FACTS
    In January 2015, appellant Shawn Rush was charged with possession of a theft tool
    in violation of 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.59
     (2014). At trial, A.K.A. testified that he is the owner of
    an auto-body-repair shop in Maplewood. According to A.K.A., his business is “connected”
    to a car-wash business, and, depending on how busy he is, he may have anywhere from 10
    to 30 cars parked in the parking lot.
    A.K.A. testified that on November 7, 2014, he noticed something moving underneath
    one of his Jeep Grand Cherokees, but that he “didn’t pay attention” to it because he was
    moving a car for a customer. A few minutes later, however, when he returned with another
    vehicle, A.K.A. observed the Jeep “wobbling,” and when he looked down, he saw two legs
    sticking out from underneath the Jeep. According to A.K.A., a person later identified as
    appellant, was lying on his back with his “toes pointed up in the air.” A.K.A. could also
    hear sounds coming from under the Jeep like “something . . . metal to metal.”
    A.K.A. testified that he yelled at appellant, and when appellant stood up, he was
    holding a pipe cutter. Appellant then tried to run away, but A.K.A. and his employees were
    able to detain him until the police arrived. Further investigation revealed that one side of
    the Jeep’s catalytic converter had been “cut off,” and “the other side was almost cut off.”
    2
    A.K.A. claimed that “a lot” of catalytic converters had been stolen from his and a nearby
    business property and that a used catalytic converter can garner $100 to $150 in cash.
    Appellant denied possessing the pipe cutter or trying to steal the catalytic converter.
    Instead, appellant explained that he was at the car wash next to A.K.A.’s body shop with his
    friend B.P. According to appellant, he decided to walk home from the car wash because he
    was tired of waiting while B.P. cleaned his car. Appellant claimed that as he “cut between
    the cars” on A.K.A.’s lot, he dropped his cigarette lighter, and when he “crawled”
    underneath the car to pick it up, he noticed a tool next to his lighter. Appellant testified that
    as he was retrieving his lighter, he heard someone yelling at him and that when he crawled
    out from underneath the vehicle, A.K.A. and his employees detained him.
    Appellant did not call his friend B.P. as a witness in his defense. During rebuttal
    closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned B.P.’s absence from the proceedings and
    invited the jury to judge the credibility of appellant’s story based on B.P.’s absence from the
    trial. Appellant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments. The jury subsequently found
    appellant guilty of the charged offense. The district court then stayed imposition of
    sentence and placed appellant on probation. This appeal followed.
    DECISION
    This court reviews unobjected-to alleged prosecutorial misconduct under a
    modified plain-error test. State v. Carridine, 
    812 N.W.2d 130
    , 146 (Minn. 2012). Three
    prongs must be satisfied under this test: there must be error, that is plain, and that affected
    the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Ramey, 
    721 N.W.2d 294
    , 302 (Minn. 2006).
    The defendant must establish the first two prongs of the test before the burden shifts to
    3
    the state to prove that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.
    Carridine, 812 N.W.2d at 146. If we determine that a plain error affected the defendant’s
    substantial rights, we “may correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness,
    integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Mosley, 
    853 N.W.2d 789
    ,
    801 (Minn. 2014), cert denied 
    135 S. Ct. 1185
     (2015) (quotations omitted)
    A prosecutor has “considerable latitude” in a closing argument. State v. Williams,
    
    586 N.W.2d 123
    , 127 (Minn. 1998). But “[i]t is well settled that a prosecutor may not
    comment on a defendant’s failure to call a witness.” State v. Mayhorn, 
    720 N.W.2d 776
    ,
    787 (Minn. 2006). The supreme court has provided two reasons for this rule: “(1) the
    comment suggests that the defendant bears some burden of proof; and (2) the comment
    suggests that the defendant did not call the witness because his or her testimony would be
    unfavorable.” 
    Id.
    Appellant argues that it was plain error for the prosecutor to comment on
    appellant’s failure to call B.P. as a witness. The state concedes that the “prosecutor’s
    argument was plainly erroneous.” But the state argues that the error did not affect
    appellant’s substantial rights because the evidence against him was “overwhelming.”
    We agree. The state bears the burden to “show that there is no reasonable
    likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant
    effect on the verdict of the jury.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 (quotation omitted). We
    consider “the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the pervasiveness of the
    improper suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to (or made efforts
    to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Davis, 
    735 N.W.2d 674
    , 682 (Minn. 2007).
    4
    Here, the evidence against appellant was very strong. A.K.A. testified that on the
    date of the alleged offense, he initially observed movement under a Jeep while moving a
    vehicle, and, when he returned to the Jeep a few minutes later, he observed appellant
    underneath the vehicle. According to A.K.A., appellant was lying underneath the vehicle
    with his toes pointed in the air as if he was doing something to the undercarriage of the
    Jeep. A.K.A testified that when he yelled, appellant emerged from underneath the
    vehicle holding a pipe cutter and tried to flee the scene. A.K.A. testified that his body
    shop does not use pipe cutters and does not work on vehicles outside due to city
    regulations. Further evidence showed that the exhaust pipe next to the catalytic converter
    had fresh cut marks, and A.K.A testified that a used catalytic converter can garner $100
    to $150 in cash. A.K.A. also testified that “a lot” of catalytic converters had been stolen
    from his and a nearby business property. Thus, the prosecutor’s comment noting
    appellant’s failure to produce B.P. as a witness had very little impact on the case.
    Moreover, a review of the record demonstrates that the misconduct was not
    pervasive. The misconduct was brief, at the end of trial, and there are no other
    allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. Although appellant did not have the opportunity
    to rebut the argument because the misconduct occurred during rebuttal, the state’s
    demonstration that its case was very strong and that the misconduct was not pervasive
    show that the error did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Therefore, appellant is
    not entitled to a new trial.
    Affirmed.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A15-1981

Filed Date: 10/11/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/11/2016