State of Minnesota v. Joel Thomas Samuelson ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1811
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Joel Thomas Samuelson,
Appellant.
Filed October 31, 2016
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-14-876
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Assistant County Attorney,
Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Joel Thomas Samuelson was found guilty of violating a harassment restraining
order. On appeal, he argues that his conviction should be reversed on the ground that the
harassment restraining order violated his constitutional right to travel. We conclude that
Samuelson is precluded from challenging the constitutionality of the harassment
restraining order in this criminal case. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2013, W.C. and R.C. petitioned the Kandiyohi County District Court for a
harassment restraining order (HRO) against Samuelson. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2012).
Their petition alleged that Samuelson threatened them on several occasions at their home
in Swift County and at their lake cabin in Kandiyohi County. The district court issued an
ex parte temporary HRO, which, among other things, prohibited Samuelson from being
within 1,000 feet of W.C.’s and R.C.’s home or lake cabin for two years. The ex parte
temporary HRO included the following notice: “Respondent can ask the court to change or
vacate the Restraining order by filing a Request for Hearing within 45 days of the date of
this Order.” Samuelson did not request such a hearing.
In August 2014, W.C. and R.C. observed Samuelson in a vehicle at the intersection
of state highway 23 and county road 32, which is between New London and Spicer. That
intersection is approximately 300 feet from the nearest boundary of the property on which
W.C.’s and R.C.’s lake cabin is located, on the shore of Green Lake.
The state charged Samuelson with violating an HRO, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 6(c). In January 2015, Samuelson moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the HRO was invalid because it violated his constitutional right to travel. The
district court denied Samuelson’s motion for two independent reasons. First, the district
court determined that Samuelson’s failure to challenge the constitutionality of the HRO in
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the case in which it was issued precludes him from asserting such a challenge in a
subsequent criminal case. Second, in the alternative, the district court determined that the
HRO does not violate Samuelson’s constitutional right to travel because the state’s
legitimate interest in protecting W.C. and R.C. from harassment justifies the minimal
burden imposed on Samuelson.
Samuelson stipulated to the prosecution’s case to obtain appellate review of the
district court’s pre-trial ruling. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. After a court trial,
the district court found him guilty and imposed a sentence of 365 days of imprisonment,
with 275 days stayed for two years. Samuelson appeals.
DECISION
Samuelson argues that the district court erred by denying his pre-trial motion to
dismiss the complaint. He challenges both bases of the district court’s decision. We begin
by considering his argument that the district court erred by determining that he is precluded
from challenging the constitutionality of the HRO in this case.
As a general rule, a person against whom an HRO is issued must challenge the
validity of the HRO, if at all, in the case in which the HRO is issued. This rule is illustrated
by State v. Harrington, 504 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Sept.
30, 1993), a case in which the defendants, Harrington and Friberg, were, like Samuelson,
convicted of violating an HRO. Id. at 502. When the HRO was issued, Harrington and
Friberg argued that the HRO violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech,
but the district court in that civil action rejected the challenge, and Harrington and Friberg
did not appeal. Id. at 501-02. On direct appeal from their subsequent criminal convictions,
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Harrington and Friberg again challenged the HRO on the ground that it violated their First
Amendment right to freedom of speech. Id. at 502-03. This court noted that Harrington
and Friberg had not challenged the constitutionality of the HRO in an appeal in the case in
which it was issued. Id. at 503. Accordingly, we concluded that Harrington and Friberg
were “precluded from attacking [the HRO] in this subsequent action.” Id.Similarly, in State v. Romine, 757 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 17, 2009), the defendant was convicted of violating an order for protection
(OFP). Id. at 889 (citing Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b) (2004)). After the OFP was
issued, Romine filed an appeal but later voluntarily dismissed it. Id. at 888. On direct
appeal from his subsequent criminal conviction, Romine challenged the constitutionality
of the OFP. Id. at 889. This court noted that Romine had not challenged the
constitutionality of the OFP in an appeal in the case in which it was issued. Id. at 890. We
reasoned, “As a consequence, the OFP is a final judgment, and ‘the constitutional validity
of the [OFP] stands as law of the case.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Harrington,
504 N.W.2d at 503). Thus, we concluded that Romine could not collaterally attack the
constitutionality of the OFP in a subsequent criminal case concerning a violation of the
OFP. Id.This court’s opinion in Romine is based in part on the supreme court’s opinion in
State v. Cook, 275 Minn. 571, 148 N.W.2d 368 (1967), a case in which the defendant was
convicted of driving with a suspended license and sought to challenge the validity of the
underlying suspension in a direct appeal from his conviction. Id. at 571, 148 N.W.2d at
369. The supreme court concluded that Cook “cannot collaterally attack the [suspension
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order] in an appeal arising out of its violation.” Id. at 571-72, 148 N.W.2d at 369. The
supreme court reasoned that, after his license was suspended, Cook “was entitled to a
hearing in the district court where he had a right to challenge the propriety of” the
suspension order but “failed to pursue that remedy.” Id. at 572, 148 N.W.2d at 369.
In this case, Samuelson had opportunities to challenge the constitutionality of the
HRO before he was charged with a crime, but he did not do so. The ex parte temporary
HRO advised Samuelson that he could request a hearing within 45 days. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 4(f). At such a hearing, Samuelson could have challenged the
constitutionality of the HRO. See, e.g., Harrington, 504 N.W.2d at 501 (noting that district
court ruled that underlying HRO “did not unconstitutionally infringe upon their First
Amendment rights to free speech”). After preserving a challenge to the HRO in the district
court, Samuelson could have raised that issue in an appeal to this court. See Kush v.
Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843-46 (Minn. App. 2004) (reviewing HRO granted after
contested hearing); Beach v. Jeschke, 649 N.W.2d 502, 503 (Minn. App. 2002) (same).
But Samuelson did not take either of those steps. He did not request a hearing in the district
court within 45 days, and he did not attempt an appeal. As a consequence, the district
court’s ex parte temporary HRO ripened into a final judgment, which is binding on
Samuelson. See Romine, 757 N.W.2d at 890; Harrington, 504 N.W.2d at 503. In light of
this court’s precedent, Samuelson’s failure to successfully challenge the constitutionality
of the HRO in the case in which it was issued is conclusive on that issue. See Cook, 275
Minn. at 572, 148 N.W.2d at 369; Romine, 757 N.W.2d at 890; Harrington, 504 N.W.2d
at 503.
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Samuelson contends that the district court’s reasoning is flawed on the ground that
he did not have a right to appeal from the ex parte temporary HRO in the prior case. In
response, the state contends, without citation to caselaw, that the ex parte temporary HRO
was immediately appealable. Samuelson is correct that an ex parte temporary HRO is not
immediately appealable. See Fiduciary Foundation, LLC v. Brown, 834 N.W.2d 756, 761
(Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). But Samuelson nonetheless had
a means of obtaining appellate review. He could have requested a hearing pursuant to
section 609.748, subdivision 4(f), in which event a subsequent adverse ruling would have
been an appealable final judgment. See Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 843-46 (reviewing HRO
granted after contested hearing); Beach, 649 N.W.2d at 503 (same). For that reason, this
case is different from State v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. App. 2012), in which we
permitted a collateral attack on a pre-trial domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO) that
was issued in a prior criminal case because the appellant had no opportunity under the rules
of criminal procedure to appeal immediately after the issuance of that order. Id. at 222-24.
Samuelson also contends that the district court’s reasoning is flawed on the ground
that a subsequent opinion of this court permitted an appellant in a criminal case to assert a
collateral attack on an OFP that had been issued in a prior civil case. In the case cited by
Samuelson, we considered whether an OFP was unconstitutionally vague and concluded
that it was not, thereby upholding the appellant’s conviction of violating the OFP. State v.
Phipps, 820 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. App. 2012). We considered the appellant’s collateral
attack in Phipps because, as we noted in a footnote, “The state did not argue that Phipps’s
constitutional challenge is barred on the ground that it is an impermissible collateral attack
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. . . .” Id. at 285 n.1. In this case, however, the issue was raised and considered in the
district court, and the state argued on appeal that Samuelson may not assert a collateral
attack on the HRO. Thus, our opinion in Phipps is not inconsistent with our opinion in
Romine.
In sum, the district court did not err by determining that Samuelson is precluded
from challenging the constitutionality of the HRO that was issued in a prior civil case. For
that reason, we will not consider the substance of Samuelson’s constitutional challenge.
Affirmed.
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