State of Minnesota v. Earl Anthony Fry ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1297
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Earl Anthony Fry,
Appellant
Filed June 29, 2015
Affirmed
Chutich, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-34342
Lori M. Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant State
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Chutich,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Appellant Earl Fry challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, arguing that his plea was invalid because it was not accurate or intelligent.
Because the record shows that Fry’s guilty plea was valid, we affirm.
FACTS
In October 2013, appellant Earl Fry was charged with first-degree burglary and
third-degree assault after punching a victim. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2012),
609.223, subd. 1 (2012). The victim lost consciousness and suffered from life-
threatening bleeding in his brain that required emergency surgery. The state later
amended the complaint by dismissing the burglary charge and changing the assault
charge to first-degree. Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2012).
In March 2014, Fry pleaded guilty to first-degree assault in a straight plea. The
factual basis for Fry’s guilty plea was established during the following exchange between
Fry and his attorney:
Q: Mr. Fry, on October 11, 2013 you were with a friend . . . ?
A: Yes.
Q: And at some point -- and that person’s initials were EB, is
that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: At some point you guys were drinking alcohol, is that
right?
A: Yes.
Q: A fight ensued between the two of you, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: But you are a large gentleman, is that right? And when you
punched him, you would agree that you caused great
bodily harm, is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And one of the reasons you may not have – at the time you
intended to [hit] him but you may not have intended to
cause that much damage but you learned later that he went
to the medical center and he had to have staples in his
scalp and there was bleeding on the brain, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Fry then moved to withdraw his guilty plea before his sentencing hearing began.1
The district court denied Fry’s motion and concluded, “[G]iven everything that’s on that
[written] plea petition, given my personal observations of you when you were responding
to my questions . . . I find that your plea was a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea.”
The district court further stated that it found “no basis to allow [Fry] to withdraw [his]
plea under either the fair and just standard or under the manifest injustice standard” and
sentenced him to 58 months in prison with 110 days of credit for time served. Fry
appealed.
DECISION
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). Guilty pleas may be withdrawn only if the
defendant meets one of two standards. State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. App.
2011). First, if the defendant attempts to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, a
court may allow withdrawal “if it is fair and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 2. Second, a court must allow withdrawal at any time if it is “necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.” Id., subd. 1. The fair-and-just standard is less demanding than the
manifest-injustice standard. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007).
Because Fry sought to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing, the lesser fair-
and-just standard applies here. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. We will, however,
analyze both standards because the district court applied both standards when it denied
1
At the beginning of Fry’s sentencing hearing, his attorney stated, “Mr. Fry just informed
me that he would like to . . . file a motion to withdraw his plea.”
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Fry’s withdrawal petition, and Fry argued that withdrawal was required under either
standard.
I. Fair and Just
We first examine whether the district court should have permitted Fry to withdraw
his guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard. A district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under this standard is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and we
will reverse “only in the rare case.” State v. Cubas, 838 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Minn. App.
2013) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2013).
To determine whether withdrawal of a plea is fair and just, a district court is
required to give due consideration to “(1) the reasons a defendant advances to support
withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the State given reliance on
the plea.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. The defendant bears the burden of advancing the
reasons that support withdrawal, and the state bears the burden of showing that
withdrawal would cause prejudice. Id.
Fry contends that his guilty plea should have been withdrawn because he was
distracted during the plea proceeding worrying about a missing portfolio and was not
aware of what he was doing.2 But the fair-and-just standard does not allow a defendant
to withdraw a guilty plea for any reason or without good reason because to do so would
“‘undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.’” State v. Crump, 826 N.W.2d 838,
2
Fry said that this portfolio contained his ideas for inventions and claimed that his
attorney promised to secure its release from police custody but failed to do so.
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841 (Minn. App. 2013) (quoting Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989)),
review denied (Minn. May 21, 2013).
Here, Fry’s portfolio was mentioned only once at the very beginning of the
proceeding, and throughout the entire proceeding, Fry was responsive and appeared to
understand the consequences of his plea. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97 (affirming the
district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because, in part,
nothing in the record showed that appellant did not understand the consequences of his
plea). Because Fry did not provide an adequate reason to show why withdrawal of his
guilty plea would be fair and just under the circumstances here, we conclude that he
failed to meet his burden and need not analyze the prejudice prong. Cubas, 838 N.W.2d
at 224 (“Even when there is no prejudice to the state, a district court may deny plea
withdrawal under rule 15.05, subdivision 2, if the defendant fails to advance valid reasons
why withdrawal is fair and just.”).
II. Manifest Injustice
We next examine whether Fry was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under the
manifest injustice standard. A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is invalid.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A constitutionally valid guilty plea must be (1) accurate, (2)
voluntary, and (3) intelligent. Id. The defendant bears the burden of showing that his
plea was invalid. Id. Whether a defendant’s guilty plea is valid is a question of law that
we review de novo. Id. Because Fry does not argue that his guilty plea was involuntary,
we analyze only the accuracy and intelligence prongs.
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Accurate
For a plea to be accurate, it must be supported by a proper factual basis. Lussier v.
State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). A proper factual basis requires “sufficient
facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the
charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335, 338
(Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted).
Fry argues that his guilty plea was inaccurate because its factual basis rested solely
on his responses to leading questions and the facts elicited were insufficient to prove
first-degree assault. The record, however, does not support his argument.
The record confirms that the factual basis for Fry’s guilty plea rested entirely on
leading questions. Courts have long discouraged the use of leading questions to establish
the factual basis for a guilty plea. See, e.g., Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (“The court
should be particularly wary of situations in which the factual basis is established by
asking a defendant only leading questions.”). But “a defendant may not withdraw his
plea simply because the court failed to elicit proper responses if the record contains
sufficient evidence to support the conviction.” Id. Here, Fry admitted to punching the
victim and causing great bodily harm, and we conclude that this admission was sufficient
to support his conviction. See id.
Fry further contends that his guilty plea was inaccurate because it did not satisfy
the elements of first-degree assault. Specifically, he argues that the victim’s injuries did
not meet the statutory requirements for first-degree assault. We disagree.
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First-degree assault occurs when a person “assaults another and inflicts great
bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1. “Great bodily harm” is defined as “bodily
injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2014). “Bodily harm” is defined as “physical pain or injury,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Id., subd. 7 (2014).
Here, Fry admitted to causing “great bodily harm” and admitted that the victim
had bleeding in his brain and staples in his scalp. This testimony, standing alone, may
not meet the definition of “great bodily harm” under first-degree assault. But this court
can also consider the sworn complaint when evaluating the factual basis for Fry’s plea.
See State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that a defendant’s plea
had a sufficient factual basis because, in part, the record contained a copy of the
complaint, and the defendant in effect judicially admitted to the allegations in the
complaint by pleading guilty); see also Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Minn.
2011) (“It is well established that a defendant, by his plea of guilty, in effect judicially
admit[s] the allegations contained in the complaint.” (alteration in original) (quotation
omitted)).
The complaint states that the victim lost consciousness, had a brain bleed from
which he “could [have] die[d],” and underwent emergency brain surgery. These injuries
were life-threatening and therefore meet the definition of “great bodily harm” under first-
degree assault. See State v. Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 669, 670 (Minn. 1983) (“Arguably,
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great bodily harm is inflicted if one knocks someone out briefly.” (quotation omitted));
State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 1978) (concluding that sufficient evidence
existed to find that the victim suffered great bodily harm when she was found
unconscious, on the verge of shock, lost consciousness for a day, was hospitalized for a
week, and almost suffered a miscarriage). Accordingly, we determine that Fry’s guilty
plea satisfied the elements of first-degree assault and was accurate.
Fry also argues that his guilty plea was inaccurate because it lacked causation: he
did not admit that his actions caused the victim’s subsequent brain bleed and staples. We
reject this argument because causation can be inferred from the chain of events.
Intelligent
Fry next argues that his plea was not intelligent because he did not understand or
engage in the plea hearing. We disagree.
An intelligent guilty plea ensures that the defendant understands the charges
against him, the rights to be waived, and the plea’s consequences. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
at 96. For a plea to be intelligent, a defendant need not be advised of every consequence;
a defendant need only be advised of those direct consequences that flow definitely,
immediately, and automatically from the plea. Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 578
(Minn. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480 (Minn.
2012).
During Fry’s plea hearing, the district court explained the straight-plea process and
asked if Fry had any questions. Fry answered, “No.” Fry’s attorney then explained the
rights that Fry was giving up by pleading guilty and affirmed that Fry had signed the
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four-page guilty plea petition after the attorney had carefully reviewed it with Fry. The
district court again asked whether Fry had any questions. Fry again replied, “No.” The
district court then concluded that Fry knew his rights, understood them, and was giving
them up voluntarily. At no point during the hearing did Fry exhibit any confusion or
voice any objections. Because the record shows that Fry understood these charges, the
rights that he waived, and the consequences, we conclude that his plea was intelligent.
See Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Apr.
21, 2009). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Fry’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.
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