In the Matter of the Denial of the Child Foster Care License Application of Jennifer Gaffaney and Kenneth Hoffman. ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1924
In the Matter of the Denial of the
Child Foster Care License Application of
Jennifer Gaffaney and Kenneth Hoffman
Filed June 29, 2015
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Minnesota Department of Human Services
File No. 48-1800-30937
Michael L. Jorgenson, Charlson & Jorgenson, P.A., Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for
relators Jennifer Gaffaney and Kenneth Hoffman)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Alan G. Rogalla, Pennington County Attorney, Stephen R. Moeller, Assistant County
Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Commissioner of
Human Services)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Smith,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Relators challenge the denial of their application for a foster-care license by
respondent commissioner of human services, arguing that the commissioner’s decision is
not supported by substantial evidence and is arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2011, D.R., the mother of three young daughters, asked relator
Jennifer Gaffaney1 for help caring for her children because she had lost her job and home.
At that time the children were residing with their paternal grandparents, who were no
longer able or willing to care for them. Gaffaney brought D.R.’s two older children to
live with her, her five children, and her long-term partner, relator Kenneth Hoffman.2
After social services learned that D.R.’s children were not residing with her, an
emergency protective care hearing was held and D.R.’s children were removed from
relators’ home and placed in foster care. On the day of removal, relators were not present
and D.R.’s great-uncle was caring for the children. The social workers noted in their
report that the children were “extremely dirty,” had matted hair, and looked “tired or
drugged.” The children were taken to urgent care where they were cleared medically.
The attending doctor observed two red marks on the back of one of the children, but
could not determine their origin. Gaffaney claimed that the marks were not present when
the child was last in her care.
In January 2012, relators applied for a foster-care license to provide care for
D.R.’s three daughters. Later that year, Hoffman’s brother, sister-in-law, and their three
children, cousins to Gaffaney’s children, moved in with relators for several months. In
March 2013, Gaffaney’s 10-year-old daughter, M.R., asked her school nurse if it was
“normal for cousins to do it.” Upon questioning, M.R. disclosed sexual contact between
1
Although both parties refer to relators as “appellants,” because this is an administrative
agency appeal, the appealing parties are properly termed “relators.”
2
D.R.’s youngest daughter was taken in by another individual.
2
herself and her male cousin while playing truth or dare, and claimed that relators
observed this contact. M.R.’s female cousin stated that she observed the sexual contact
and informed relators, who then took the male cousin downstairs. M.R.’s school nurse
and principal admitted that M.R. has “told a lot of stories.” Child protection and law
enforcement closed the case because M.R.’s statements could not be corroborated.
M.R. was subsequently diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome and mood disorder, and her
psychologist noted that M.R.’s reporting tended “to suggest that [she] was not making the
story up.”
Relators’ initial caseworker had already completed home visits and “was just
waiting on some of the things to be fixed in the home” when she left her position and a
new child-foster-care licensor was assigned to relators’ application. The new licensor
contacted the department of human services (DHS) for advice because she was concerned
about D.R.’s children being “extremely dirty” when removed from relators’ home, D.R.’s
children not being taken to the hospital by relators, and the reports of inappropriate
sexual contact and Gaffaney’s belief that M.R. made up the story. The licensor sent a
denial letter to the commissioner after the consultation with DHS. On August 6, 2013,
DHS denied relators’ application for a child-foster-care license because they “failed to
demonstrate their ability to ensure the safety of, or meet the basic needs of, children in
their care” and because “denial was necessary to protect the health and safety of children
receiving services in DHS-licensed programs.” Relators timely appealed the license
denial, and after a hearing an administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended that relators’
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license application be denied.3 The commissioner ultimately affirmed the license denial,
making only minor changes to the ALJ’s findings. Relators requested reconsideration,
which the commissioner granted. In October 2014, the commissioner reaffirmed the
denial of the foster-care license. This certiorari appeal followed.
DECISION
Relators first argue that the commissioner’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence. We may reverse or modify an administrative agency’s decision
where it is “unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record.” In re
Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 277
(Minn. 2001); Minn. Stat. § 14.699(e) (2014). Substantial evidence exists when there is:
(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion;
(2) more than a scintilla of evidence;
(3) more than some evidence; [or]
(4) more than any evidence[.]
Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Dep’t, 783 N.W.2d 182, 189 (Minn. App. 2010). We will
affirm an agency’s decision if the agency engaged in reasoned decision making, even
though we may have reached a different result had we been the factfinder. Cable
Commc’ns Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Commc’ns P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 669 (Minn. 1984).
A foster-care provider must be licensed and provide basic services to the child.
Minn. Stat. § 245A.03, subd. 1(2) (2014), Minn. R. 2960.3080, subp. 5A (2013). Basic
services are “food, shelter, clothing, medical and dental care, personal cleanliness,
privacy, spiritual and religious practice, safety, and adult supervision.” Minn. R.
3
Prior to this order, D.R. voluntarily terminated her parental rights.
4
2960.3010, subp. 5 (2013). A foster-care-license applicant must also “demonstrate the
ability to . . . . nurture children, be mature . . . and meet the needs of foster children in the
applicant’s care.” Minn. R. 2930.3060, subp. 4J (2013). The commissioner shall deny a
license application:
if the applicant fails to fully comply with laws or rules
governing the program or fails to cooperate with a placing or
licensing agency. Failure to fully comply shall be indicated by:
A. documentation of specific foster home deficiencies
that may endanger the health or safety of children;
B. failure to be approved by fire, building, zoning, or
health officials;
....
D. any other evidence that the applicant is not in
compliance with applicable laws or rules governing the
program.
Minn. R. 2960.3020, subp. 11 (2013). The applicant who is denied a license “bears the
burden of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that [he or she has]
complied fully with this chapter and other applicable law or rule and that the application
should be approved and a license granted.” Minn. Stat. § 245A.08, subd. 3(b) (2014). Here,
the ALJ found that relators did not meet their burden and recommended that their license
application denial be affirmed by the commissioner, noting that the evidence raised “serious
concerns about whether the [relators] can meet the basic needs of additional children in their
care” because M.R. has special needs, D.R.’s daughters were “extremely dirty” when
removed from relators’ care, and there were allegations of inappropriate sexual contact
between relators’ child and another child living in relators’ home.4
4
Relators assert that the ALJ erred by reasoning that the 10-year-old’s Asperger’s
disorder raised additional concerns for relators’ ability to care for the three girls. But
after relators took exception to this finding, the commissioner stated in its order for
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Relators claim that when D.R.’s daughters were removed from their home they had
just finished lunch and were dirty because of typical young children’s eating habits. But this
is inconsistent with the documentation. A worker is unlikely to describe children as
“extremely dirty” with matted hair from normal lunchtime activities. This description, along
with the allegation that the daughters appeared tired or even drugged, provides evidence
relators were not meeting D.R.’s daughters’ basic needs. See Minn. R. 2960.3010, subp. 5.
While there was testimony that relators are good parents who take excellent care of
Gaffaney’s five children, this does not undermine the findings that there were significant
safety concerns regarding D.R.’s daughters. While relators correctly assert that the cause of
the red marks on one daughter’s back was not determined, there was enough concern about
the daughters’ states that they were taken to urgent care after they were removed from
relators’ home.5
Relators next claim that the findings regarding the inappropriate sexual contact are
not supported by substantial evidence because M.R. “had a history of telling false stories”
and because child protection and law enforcement “could not corroborate the story and
closed their files.” But the allegations were corroborated: M.R.’s female cousin reported that
she observed M.R. and her male cousin together in a top bunk without underwear on and the
male cousin admitted that he slept in the same room as the 10-year-old. While there may not
reconsideration that “[n]o presumption was made by the [c]ommissioner that [Gaffaney]
lacks the ability to provide for the basic needs of children . . . simply on the basis of
[M.R.’s] diagnosis.” Therefore we need not address this claim.
5
We acknowledge that D.R.’s daughters were not removed from relators’ care because of
safety concerns but because social services was notified the daughters were not residing
with their biological mother. The children were removed because relators were not
licensed-foster-care providers and were not blood relatives of the children.
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have been sufficient corroboration for law enforcement or child protection to take further
action, there was substantial evidence on which the commissioner based its decision.
While relators dispute the characterization and interpretation of the evidence in this
matter, we grant great deference to the agency. Cable Commc’ns Bd., 356 N.W.2d at 668.
The agency affirmed the license application denial based upon specific concerns raised by
the testimony and evidence submitted. We therefore conclude that the agency’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.
Relators next argue that the commissioner’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
An agency’s decision is not arbitrary and capricious so long as there is a rational
connection between the facts found and the decision. In re Review of 2005 Annual
Automatic Adjustment of Charges, 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 2009). A decision is
arbitrary and capricious if it represents an agency’s will, rather than its judgment. In re
Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 624 N.W.2d at 278. Here, the
commissioner denied the license application based on substantial evidence of safety
concerns for D.R.’s daughters while in relators’ care. Thus, there was a rational
connection between the facts found and the decision.
Affirmed.
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