John Matheson, Relator v. Progressive Action - Minnesota, Department of Employment and Economic Development ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1943
John Matheson,
Relator,
vs.
Progressive Action - Minnesota,
Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.
Filed August 11, 2014
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 31238342-4
John Matheson, Hilltop, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Progressive Action - Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent)
Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Department of Employment and Economic Development)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Willis, Judge.*
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, pro se relator appeals the unemployment-law judge’s
decision that he is ineligible to receive employment benefits. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator John Matheson applied for unemployment benefits with respondent
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) after
quitting his job as a canvasser with Progressive Action - Minnesota (PAM), also referred
to as Take Action Minnesota. After DEED determined that Matheson is ineligible for
benefits because he quit his employment for other than a good reason caused by his
employer, Matheson appealed.
An unemployment-law judge (ULJ) conducted an evidentiary hearing at which
Matheson testified that he worked as a canvasser for approximately 30 years and, before
working at PAM, had worked full time as a motor-coach driver for approximately ten
years. At the time of the hearing, Matheson worked part time as a member of the Hilltop
city council. Matheson began working as a canvasser for PAM on December 15, 2012.
His primary job was to go door to door and encourage people to join the organization or
renew their membership. For two of his first four weeks on the job, Matheson had a quota
to make.
On January 17, 2013, Matheson was assigned to canvass an area with the
canvassing coordinator, Gordon Ferguson, and some other canvassers. The group
traveled by car. At one point, Matheson struggled with his seatbelt, which was not
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working properly, and Ferguson said, “[Y]ou’re acting helpless[,] John, stop acting
helpless.” Matheson felt that Ferguson’s tone was “extremely contemptuous” and that
Ferguson was attributing Matheson’s difficulty with the seatbelt “to some kind of
character deficiency.” Soon after, the car made a hard stop and some of Matheson’s
papers fell on the floor. Matheson had trouble collecting the papers in the dark, resulting
in Ferguson asking him whether he had been experiencing difficulty remembering things.
Matheson felt that Ferguson asked the question in an “extremely contemptuous tone of
voice.”
Although, according to Matheson, the canvassers usually decided their areas of
canvassing among themselves, Ferguson assigned Matheson the area in which he would
be canvassing without consulting him on the matter and then changed the area three
times. Matheson thought that Ferguson’s assignment was “suspicious” because Matheson
ended up canvassing an area that already had been canvassed within the preceding two
months. Matheson believed that Ferguson purposefully assigned him to an area in which
he believed that Matheson would not be successful. That evening, because Ferguson
forgot to file forms to canvas, the police stopped the canvassing until Ferguson returned
to St. Paul and faxed the requisite forms for a permit. Despite Ferguson’s forgetfulness,
Ferguson did not apologize to Matheson for making the comment to Matheson about his
memory. Matheson characterized Ferguson’s conduct as “a rather obscene double
standard.”
When the canvassing group left the canvassing area by car, Matheson noticed that
his seatbelt was caught in the door and opened the door to remove it. Another canvasser
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said, “John, don’t open the door while the car is in motion, stop it.” This comment upset
Matheson. And, finally, when Matheson exited the car, he broke a fingernail that
prevented him from playing guitar for a month and a half. At the end of the evening,
Matheson resigned, telling Ferguson that he had had “quite enough.” Matheson did not
go into further detail. Ferguson, who was the highest-level employee in the office, called
Matheson the next day. During that phone call, for the first time, Matheson confronted
Ferguson about his behavior. Matheson believes that Ferguson’s treatment of him the
previous night was an attempt to make him quit his employment. Although the chairman
of the board of directors stopped by the office once or twice a week, Matheson never
informed the chairman about his concerns regarding Ferguson’s conduct.
Matheson testified before the ULJ that he quit because (1) he experienced the
“extremely abusive” behavior of Ferguson on the evening he quit, (2) other canvassers
did not follow the canvassing plan, and (3) other canvassers asked him “inappropriate
questions.” Matheson felt that he was suited to the position because of his previous
experience with campaigning for election to the city council. He agreed that the issue was
not the job itself but was Ferguson.
The ULJ affirmed DEED’s determination of ineligibility, finding that Matheson
quit his employment for other than a good reason caused by his employer and that he did
not meet the criteria for the trial-job exception. Matheson sought reconsideration, and the
ULJ affirmed her decision. This certiorari appeal follows.
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DECISION
The purpose of chapter 268, Minnesota’s unemployment-insurance program, is to
assist those who are unemployed through no fault of their own. Minn. Stat. § 268.03,
subd. 1 (2012). This court may reverse or modify a ULJ’s decision if, among other
reasons, it is based on an error of law or on factual findings that are not supported by
substantial evidence. 2014 Minn. Laws, ch. 271, art. 1, § 1 (to be codified at Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d)(4)–(5) (2014)).1 We review de novo a ULJ’s determination that an
applicant is ineligible for unemployment benefits. Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck
Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. App. 2012). We view the ULJ’s factual
findings in the light most favorable to the decision and will not disturb those findings
when the evidence substantially sustains them. Peterson v. Nw. Airlines Inc., 753 N.W.2d
771, 774 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2008). Substantial evidence is
“(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more
than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety.” Minn. Ctr. for Envtl.
Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 466 (Minn. 2002).
Matheson argues that this court should reverse the ULJ’s decision because the ULJ
erroneously credited his testimony about his start and end dates and declined to consider
a background report from Allison & Taylor, a reference and background-check service.
1
We cite the most recent version of this statute in this opinion because it has not been
amended in relevant part. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617
N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as
it exists at the time they rule on a case”).
5
We are not persuaded. “A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the
employment was, at the time the employment ended, the employee’s.” 2014 Minn. Laws,
ch. 251, art. 2, § 14 (to be codified at Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (2014)). An
applicant who quits employment is ineligible for unemployment benefits unless one of
ten enumerated exceptions applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2012). One exception
occurs when the applicant quits “because of a good reason caused by the employer.” Id.,subd. 1(1). Another is when the applicant quits “within 30 calendar days of beginning the
employment because the employment was unsuitable for the applicant.” Id., subd. 1(3).
The ULJ concluded that Matheson did not quit for good reason caused by his
employer, reasoning that Ferguson’s treatment of Matheson on January 17 “would not
have caused the average reasonable person to quit,” and noted that Matheson did not
complain to his employer before quitting, as required by Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c)
(2012). “Whether an employee had good cause to quit is a question of law, which we
review de novo.” Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. App. 2012)
(quotation omitted). A good reason caused by the employer for quitting is a reason
“(1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible;
(2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable
worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” Minn.
Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2012). “If an applicant was subjected to adverse working
conditions by the employer, the applicant must complain to the employer and give the
employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working conditions before that
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may be considered a good reason caused by the employer for quitting.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 3(c).
The record is void of any evidence that Ferguson intentionally mistreated
Matheson or attempted to cause Matheson to fail at his job. We agree with the ULJ that
Ferguson’s treatment of Matheson on January 17 would not have caused a reasonable
person to quit. Moreover, Matheson admitted that he did not complain to Ferguson or the
chairman of the board before quitting. Assuming that Ferguson’s behavior required
correction, section 268.095, subdivision 3(c), required Matheson to give notice to his
employer of the offensive behavior to give the employer an opportunity to correct the
behavior. We hold that the ULJ did not err in concluding Matheson is ineligible for
unemployment benefits because he did not quit for good reason caused by his employer.
Matheson also argues that the ULJ erred by deciding that he is ineligible for
unemployment benefits under the trial-job exception to the general prohibition against
awarding benefits to employees who quit employment. For the trial-job exception to be
applicable, the employee must have quit employment “within 30 calendar days of
beginning the employment because the employment was unsuitable for the applicant.”
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(3); see Wiley v. Dolphin Staffing—Dolphin Clerical Grp.,
825 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. App. 2012) (holding that “for purposes of the 30-day
unsuitability exception, an employee who gives notice of quitting to an employer in
advance of separating from employment is deemed to have quit at the time of notice”),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 29, 2013). Whether work is suitable for an applicant is a
question of fact. Zielinski v. Ryan Co., 379 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn. App. 1985). Here,
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the ULJ found no evidence in the record that Matheson’s work at PAM was unsuitable
for him. Indeed, Matheson testified that he quit PAM because of Ferguson, not because
of the work. Because the work was not unsuitable for Matheson, he is not eligible for
unemployment benefits under the trial-job exception.
Matheson contends that he quit his employment with PAM within 30 calendar
days of beginning the employment on December 15, 2012. But at the hearing before the
ULJ, although Matheson revealed uncertainty about the date that he quit his employment,
he ultimately testified that his last day “probably would have been actually January 17.”
Matheson complains that the ULJ placed too much weight on his “uncertain” testimony
about his quit date and also erred by rejecting evidence related to his dates of
employment. This evidence consists of a background report obtained by Matheson from
Allison & Taylor after he quit his employment with PAM. According to the report, in a
May 21, 2013 phone call, Ferguson told Allison & Taylor that Matheson worked for
PAM from December 18, 2012, until January 9, 2013. According to Matheson’s
testimony, he learned of the report through a May 31, 2013 e-mail. The ULJ declined to
consider the background report on the basis that she only had authority to consider the
events leading up to the time when Matheson quit his job and that the evidence therefore
was irrelevant. The ULJ did not otherwise analyze the evidence on the basis of hearsay or
reliability. Because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ULJ’s finding
that Matheson quit his work with PAM on January 17, 2013, we conclude that any error
by the ULJ in not considering Allison & Taylor’s report is harmless and of no
consequence to this opinion.
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Because Matheson did not quit his employment for a good reason caused by his
employer and because his suitability for the canvassing position renders the trial-job
exception inapplicable, we affirm the ULJ’s decision that Matheson is ineligible for
unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.
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