Todd Anderson v. Patricia Lloyd ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0147
Todd Anderson,
Appellant,
vs.
Patricia Lloyd,
Respondent.
Filed August 17, 2015
Reversed and remanded
Schellhas, Judge
Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CV-13-2250
Jodi S. Exsted, Exsted Legal Services LLC, Shakopee, Minnesota (for appellant)
Timothy L. Warnemunde, Warnemunde Law Office, Montgomery, Minnesota (for
respondent)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges summary judgment on his claims of unjust enrichment and
promissory estoppel, arguing that the district court erred in determining that his claims
were based on a breach of promise to marry and in failing to recognize the existence of
genuine issues of material fact. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In or about December 2000, appellant Todd Anderson and respondent Patricia
Lloyd began dating. In or about July 2001, Anderson moved in with Lloyd in a house that
Lloyd owned in Prior Lake (Prior Lake house). While living in the Prior Lake house,
Anderson made mortgage payments, paid for some of the household utilities, made
improvements to the house, ran his concrete business out of the house, and exercised
parenting time with his children at the house. In 2001 or 2002, Anderson proposed
marriage to Lloyd, who “accepted to be engaged to [Anderson]” and wore an engagement
ring that Anderson gave her.
In or about the spring of 2003, Lloyd sold the Prior Lake house and began
constructing a house on land that she owned in Webster Township (Webster house).
Anderson did some of the concrete and other construction work for the Webster house
and paid for some aspects of the construction. Lloyd and Anderson moved into the
Webster house in or around November 2003, after which Anderson made mortgage
payments, paid for some of the household utilities, and ran his concrete business out of
the Webster house until about 2008. Anderson’s children sometimes stayed at the
Webster house.
During their relationship, the parties argued and experienced conflicts that led to
breakups and temporary separations, when Anderson would move out. Lloyd returned the
engagement ring to Anderson “several times” and “told him several times that [she] was
never marrying him.” But the parties reconciled, resumed living together, and Lloyd
resumed wearing the engagement ring at Anderson’s request. In mid-2010, the parties
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ended their relationship; Anderson left the Webster house and took the engagement ring
with him.
In September 2013, Anderson sued Lloyd, asserting claims of breach of contract,
constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel arising from his financial
and labor contributions to the Prior Lake and Webster houses. The district court granted
summary judgment to Lloyd and denied Anderson’s subsequent motion for amended
findings.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
“Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Citizens State Bank
Norwood Young Am. v. Brown, 849 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Minn. 2014); see also Minn. R. Civ.
P. 56.03. The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law “when the party
opposing summary judgment bears the burden of proof on an element essential to that
party’s case, and the party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish that essential
element.” Eng’g & Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co., 825 N.W.2d 695, 704
(Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted). “The purpose of summary judgment is to determine
whether issues of fact exist, not to resolve issues of fact.” Fain v. Andersen, 816 N.W.2d
696, 702 (Minn. App. 2012) (citing Albright v. Henry, 285 Minn. 452, 464, 174 N.W.2d
106, 113 (1970)), review granted and stayed (Minn. Sept. 25, 2012), stay vacated and
review denied (Minn. May 21, 2013). “[Appellate courts] review a district court’s grant
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of summary judgment de novo to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact
exists and whether the district court erred in applying the law.” Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2014).
Minnesota has abolished “[a]ll civil causes of action for breach of promise to
marry, alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction.” 1 Minn. Stat.
§ 553.02 (2014). Section 553.02 reflects the legislature’s judgment that “[a]ctions based
upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of
contract to marry have been subject to grave abuses, have caused intimidation and
harassment, to innocent persons and have resulted in the perpetration of frauds,” such that
“the best interests of the people of the state will be served by the abolition of these causes
of action.” Minn. Stat. § 553.01 (2014).
“Minnesota law not only bars specific claims for breach of a promise to marry, it
also bars any other claim for damages that is predicated on a promise to marry.” M.N.,
616 N.W.2d at 287; cf. R.E.R. v. J.G., 552 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Minn. App. 1996) (stating that
“[b]ecause [plaintiff’s] losses flow from the alienation of his former wife’s affections,
they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm
actions,” even though plaintiff asserted claim of breach of fiduciary duty rather than
claim of alienation of affections). To determine whether a claim is barred as predicated
on a promise to marry, courts “analyze the specific allegations [a plaintiff] makes to
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These actions are sometimes referred to as “heart-balm actions.” See, e.g., M.N. v. D.S.,
616 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2000).
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support” that claim to determine whether its “essence” is a promise to marry. See M.N.,
616 N.W.2d at 287.
Unjust enrichment
“Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine that allows a plaintiff to recover a
benefit conferred upon a defendant when retention of the benefit is not legally
justifiable.” Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 838 (Minn.
2012). The elements of an unjust-enrichment claim are that: “(1) a benefit be conferred
by the plaintiff on the defendant; (2) the defendant accept the benefit; (3) the defendant
retain the benefit although retaining it without payment is inequitable.” Zinter v. Univ. of
Minn., 799 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Aug. 16, 2011).
“[T]o prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must establish an implied-in-
law or quasi-contract in which the defendant received a benefit of value that unjustly
enriched the defendant in a manner that is illegal or unlawful,” Caldas, 820 N.W.2d at
838, or “morally wrong,” Schumacher v. Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729–30 (Minn.
App. 2001).
In this case, the district court found that Lloyd made “only one promise or
inducement: the promise to marry” and, despite Anderson’s argument to the contrary, that
“the promise to marry [wa]s the basis for [Anderson]’s unjust enrichment claim.” The
court reasoned that Anderson did not allege any illegal or unlawful act by Lloyd apart
from the empty marriage promise, noted that Minnesota law bars any claim for damages
that is predicated on a promise to marry, and concluded that Lloyd therefore was entitled
to summary judgment on the unjust-enrichment claim.
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The district court correctly determined that, under section 553.02, Anderson
cannot use Lloyd’s marriage promise to “show[] that [Lloyd] was unjustly enriched in the
sense that the term ‘unjustly’ could mean illegally or unlawfully,” see ServiceMaster of
St. Cloud v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 1996) (quotation
omitted), or immorally, see Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d at 729–30, as required to support
his unjust-enrichment claim. See Minn. Stat. § 553.01 (announcing public policy against
“[a]ctions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction,
and breach of contract to marry” (emphasis added)); cf. R.E.R., 552 N.W.2d at 29 (stating
that “allowing recovery for damages relating to the alienation of a spouse’s affections
would defeat the legislature’s stated purpose in abolishing the heart balm actions”
(emphasis added)). Yet, citing Schumacher, Anderson also argues that his unjust-
enrichment claim need not be founded on any illegal or immoral act by Lloyd beyond her
retention of the benefit of Anderson’s financial and labor contributions.
In Schumacher, we stated that “[a]n action for unjust enrichment does not lie
simply because one party benefits from the efforts of others; instead, it must be shown
that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term ‘unjustly’ could mean
illegally or unlawfully,” or in the sense that “the [enriched party’s] conduct in retaining
the benefit is morally wrong.” 627 N.W.2d at 729–30 (emphasis added) (quotation
omitted). We reasoned that “[a]ppellant has provided evidence that he made substantial
improvements on respondents’ land, that respondents knew of those improvements and
either encouraged them or did nothing to discourage them and that respondents have
benefited from them,” and we concluded that “[t]his evidence is sufficient to create
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genuine issues of material fact for the jury” on appellant’s unjust-enrichment claim. Id. at
730.
Under Schumacher, an unjust-enrichment claim need not be founded on any
affirmative wrong by a defendant beyond her retention of a plaintiff-conferred benefit
under circumstances that render her retention of the benefit immoral. See id. at 729–30.
When a plaintiff produces evidence that he conferred a benefit upon a defendant who
knew of the benefit and either encouraged the plaintiff to confer it or failed to discourage
the plaintiff from conferring it, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the
defendant’s retention of the benefit is immoral. See id. at 730. As a result, section 553.02
does not defeat Anderson’s unjust-enrichment claim, because Lloyd’s retention of the
benefit of Anderson’s financial and labor contributions may be found to be “immoral”
without regard to Lloyd’s allegedly fraudulent promise of marriage.
Lloyd argues that “Schumacher is readily distinguishable from the subject case in
that Schumacher concerned a claim of unjust enrichment based upon promises of
employment and property ownership between a parent and child.” According to Lloyd,
“Schumacher is neither relevant nor instructive in the subject case as it contains no
discussion as to the application of Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 553, which is the central
issue in this case.” But chapter 553 applies only to heart-balm actions and claims that are
“predicated on” one or more of the heart-balm actions. See Minn. Stat. §§ 553.01–.03
(2014); M.N., 616 N.W.2d at 287. Anderson’s unjust-enrichment claim is predicated on
Lloyd’s purportedly immoral retention of the benefit of his contributions, rather than a
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breach of promise to marry or any other heart-balm action, and section 553.02 does not
apply to bar that claim.
Anderson produced testimonial and documentary evidence in support of his
assertions that he conferred a benefit on Lloyd through his financial and labor
contributions to the Prior Lake and Webster houses, and that Lloyd both knew of the
benefit and actively encouraged Anderson to confer it. A genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether Lloyd’s retention of the benefit is immoral; thus, Lloyd was not
entitled to summary judgment on Anderson’s unjust-enrichment claim.
Promissory estoppel
“Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that implies a contract in law where
none exists in fact.” Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 746 (Minn.
2000) (quotation omitted). “To state a claim for promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must
show that (1) there was a clear and definite promise, (2) the promisor intended to induce
reliance and such reliance occurred, and (3) the promise must be enforced to prevent
injustice.” Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Minn. 2011). “[The
supreme court] ha[s] . . . described the first element of promissory estoppel as requiring
that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
the promisee.” Martens, 616 N.W.2d at 746.
In this case, the district court found that “the only promise between the parties was
the promise to marry.” Applying the statutory bar on any claim for damages that is
predicated on a promise to marry, the court concluded that Lloyd’s promise of marriage
was not a valid basis for Anderson’s promissory-estoppel claim. Because “[t]here [wa]s
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. . . no valid clear and definite promise to support a claim for promissory estoppel,” the
court granted summary judgment for Lloyd on that claim.
The district court correctly determined that no promissory-estoppel claim may
arise from Lloyd’s promise of marriage. See Minn. Stat. § 553.01 (announcing public
policy against “[a]ctions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to marry” (emphasis added)); cf. R.E.R.,
552 N.W.2d at 29 (stating that “allowing recovery for damages relating to the alienation
of a spouse’s affections would defeat the legislature’s stated purpose in abolishing the
heart balm actions” (emphasis added)). But Anderson argues that the court “improper[ly]
resol[ved] . . . a disputed fact issue” by ignoring or discounting evidence of additional
promises that “the parties . . . would build the [Webster] house together” and would
“spend the rest of their lives” there. We agree.
Anderson testified that “[he and Lloyd] were going to spend the rest of [thei]r lives
[at the Webster house]” and that, sometime prior to 2006, “[Lloyd] mentioned to
[Anderson’s] dad . . . that [Anderson] would get what was due to [him] if [he and Lloyd]
split up.” Furthermore, Lloyd testified as follows:
Q: . . . Why did [Anderson] pay for the stucco [on the
Webster house]?
A: Because I wanted . . . [s]iding and couldn’t afford [stucco].
That’s why I went with . . . [s]iding. It’s beautiful and kept
me within this budget that I wanted to keep. [Anderson] said,
“I want stucco.” I said, “I can’t afford it.” So he said, “Well,
if I pay it, can we have a stucco house?” I said, “If you want
to pay it, you can have a stucco house.”
Q: He wanted to pay it if we [sic] could have a stucco house?
....
A: “If you want to live in a stucco house with me, fine.”
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This testimony constitutes evidence of a clear and definite promise by Lloyd that
Anderson’s contributions to the Webster house would entitle him to permanent residence
in that house. Cf. Faimon v. Winona State Univ., 540 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn. App.
1995) (stating that university’s announcement, ‘“If a tenure track position should be
approved, it would not be before 1994–95,’ [wa]s a clear and definite commitment” that
“trigger[ed] promissory estoppel analysis of its enforcement”), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 9, 1996). The district court improperly weighed and disregarded evidence at the
summary-judgment stage. See Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 736 N.W.2d
313, 320 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “[w]eighing the evidence and assessing credibility on
summary judgment is error”).
Because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Lloyd made
Anderson promises that were independent of the marriage promise, section 553.02 does
not bar Anderson’s claim of promissory estoppel. See M.N., 616 N.W.2d at 287 (stating
that section 553.02 applies only to heart-balm actions and claims that are “predicated on”
one or more heart-balm actions). The district court therefore erred in granting summary
judgment for Lloyd on Anderson’s promissory-estoppel claim.
Reversed and remanded.
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