Corey James Wright v. Commissioner of Public Safety ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-2178
Corey James Wright, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.
Filed August 17, 2015
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CV-14-595
Charles A. Ramsay, Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Roseville,
Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Rachel E. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The commissioner of public safety revoked Corey James Wright’s driver’s license
after he was arrested for driving while impaired and a urine test showed that his alcohol
concentration exceeded .08. Wright sought judicial review of the commissioner’s
revocation. The district court denied his petition to rescind the revocation on the ground
that Wright voluntarily consented to chemical testing. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 13, 2014, Bemidji Police Officer Mark Pinoniemi responded to a
report of a vehicle that was weaving and being driven erratically. Officer Pinoniemi
stopped the vehicle. Officer Pinoniemi noticed that the driver, who was identified as
Wright, appeared to be intoxicated. After administering field sobriety tests, Officer
Pinoniemi arrested Wright for driving while impaired.
At the Beltrami County Jail, Officer Pinoniemi read the implied-consent advisory
to Wright and requested that he submit to a breath test. Wright agreed and provided a
sample of his breath, but the breath-testing device did not register a result. Officer
Pinoniemi and his sergeant determined that Wright did not refuse the test, so they offered
him the alternative of a urine test. Wright asked whether he could talk to an attorney
before agreeing to take the urine test. Officer Pinoniemi returned Wright’s cell phone to
him. Wright called and spoke with an attorney and then informed Officer Pinoniemi that
the attorney would visit him at the jail. Officer Pinoniemi allowed Wright to meet with
the attorney in a conference room. After the meeting, Wright provided a urine sample,
which revealed an alcohol concentration of .134.
The commissioner of public safety revoked Wright’s driver’s license. See Minn.
Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4 (2014). Wright petitioned the district court to rescind the
revocation of his driver’s license. In a memorandum accompanying his petition, Wright
argued that he did not consent to the urine test. The district court held a hearing on the
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petition. Officer Pinoniemi and a Beltrami County deputy sheriff testified for the
commissioner. Wright did not testify and did not present any other evidence. The
district court found that Wright “freely and voluntarily consented to alcohol
concentration testing after a valid reading of the Advisory.” Accordingly, the district
court sustained the revocation of Wright’s driver’s license. Wright appeals.
DECISION
Wright argues that the district court erred by finding that he provided valid
consent to the urine test. This court applies a clear-error standard of review to a district
court’s finding that a driver validly consented to a chemical test. See Jasper v.
Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Minn. 2002).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A test of a person’s urine
constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Skinner v. Railway Labor
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 (1989); see also State v. Netland,
762 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Minn. 2009), abrogated in part by Missouri v. McNeely, 133
S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013), as recognized in State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). As a general rule, a search requires either a
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558; Brooks,
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838 N.W.2d at 568. The consent of the person whose urine is tested is an exception to
the warrant requirement. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568. In an implied-consent case, the
commissioner of public safety bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that a driver consented to chemical testing. Johnson v. Commissioner of Pub.
Safety, 392 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Minn. App. 1986).
A person’s consent to a search is valid if the consent is freely and voluntarily
given. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. 1997). In Brooks, the supreme
court held that “[w]hether consent is voluntary is determined by examining the totality of
the circumstances.” 838 N.W.2d at 568 (quotation omitted). The relevant circumstances
include “‘the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was
said and how it was said.’” Id. at 569 (quoting State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 880
(Minn. 1994)). When considering the nature of the encounter, a court should ask how the
police came to suspect the driver was under the influence, whether police read the driver
the implied-consent advisory, and whether the driver had an opportunity to consult with
an attorney. Id. The supreme court identified three primary reasons why Brooks’s
consent was voluntary and not coerced. First, Brooks was read the implied-consent
advisory, which “made clear to him that he had a choice of whether to submit to testing.”
Id. at 572. The supreme court reasoned that “[w]hile an individual does not necessarily
need to know he or she has a right to refuse a search for consent to be voluntary, the fact
that someone submits to the search after being told that he or she can say no to the search
supports a finding of voluntariness.” Id. Second, Brooks had “the ability to consult with
counsel,” which the supreme court reasoned supports the conclusion that a defendant
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made a voluntary decision. Id. Third, Brooks “was neither confronted with repeated
police questioning nor was he asked to consent after having spent days in custody.” Id. at
571 (citing State v. High, 287 Minn. 24, 27-28, 176 N.W.2d 637, 639 (1970)). The
supreme court reasoned that “nothing in the record suggests that Brooks was coerced in
the sense that his will had been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the totality of the circumstances indicates that Wright’s consent to
chemical testing was voluntary. First, like the appellant in Brooks, Wright was read the
implied-consent advisory, which “made clear to him that he had a choice of whether to
submit to testing.” See id. at 572. Second, Wright had the opportunity to consult with
counsel and actually did so, both by telephone and in person, and his face-to-face
consultation occurred immediately before he provided a urine sample. See id. Third, like
the appellant in Brooks, Wright “was neither confronted with repeated police questioning
nor was he asked to consent after having spent days in custody.” Id. at 571. In short,
“nothing in the record suggests that [Wright] was coerced in the sense that his will had
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.” See id.
(quotation marks omitted). Rather, the record indicates that the officers accommodated
every request he made to them. Furthermore, his attorney was present at the jail before
Wright provided a urine sample, which makes it much less likely that Wright would have
been subjected to overbearing law-enforcement tactics. All of these circumstances
support the district court’s finding that Wright “freely and voluntarily consented to
alcohol concentration testing after a valid reading of the Advisory.”
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Wright contends that his consent is invalid because Officer Pinoniemi did not read
the implied-consent advisory a second time before requesting a urine test. Wright’s
contention is inconsistent with the caselaw. This court has held that “a police officer is
not required to reread the entire implied-consent advisory when an alternative test is
necessary” after a driver is unable to complete the initially-offered test due to a
malfunction or physical inability. State v. Fortman, 493 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Minn. App.
1992) (citing Hansen v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 393 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Minn. App.
1986)). Accordingly, Officer Pinoniemi’s reading of the implied-consent advisory before
Wright’s consent to a breath test is sufficient for purposes of the implied-consent statute.
Furthermore, Wright was allowed to consult with an attorney after being asked to submit
to a urine test, and he provided a urine sample while his attorney was at the jail. It
appears that Wright was allowed to exercise his limited right to counsel in a manner that
goes beyond the minimum requirements. See Nelson v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety,
779 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Minn. App. 2010) (concluding that police were not required to
allow suspect to consult with attorney after being asked to provide second blood sample).
Thus, the absence of a second reading of the implied-consent advisory does not invalidate
Wright’s consent.
Wright further contends that the district court’s finding of valid consent is
erroneous because there is no evidence that he verbally expressed his consent to a urine
test (as opposed to a breath test) before the urine test was performed. Wright is correct
insofar as he describes the testimony at the implied-consent hearing. But the absence of
verbal consent does not mean that the district court erred by finding that Wright
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consented to a urine test. Consent to a warrantless search need not be express or verbal;
consent may be implied from a person’s conduct. See State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218,
222 (Minn. 1992). The “critical fact” in determining whether a person has consented to a
warrantless search of a residence is whether the person provided some “manifestation of
consent, either verbally or by welcoming actions.” Id. at 223; see also State v. Ulm, 326
N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1982). In this case, the evidentiary record does not reveal any
oral communication between Officer Pinoniemi and Wright after Wright’s meeting with
his attorney in the conference room. The record reveals that Wright provided a urine
sample, apparently without incident. Officer Pinoniemi testified that there was nothing
unusual in the collection of the urine sample; he described it as “pretty standard.” There
is no evidence that Wright resisted or openly questioned a urine test in any way.
Considered as a whole, the record reveals that Wright expressly consented to a breath
test, asked to speak with an attorney after being asked to submit to a urine test, actually
consulted with an attorney, and then provided a urine sample. In the absence of any
contrary evidence, these facts are sufficient to support the district court’s finding that
Wright provided valid consent to a urine test.
Wright last contends that the revocation of his driver’s license is invalid because
the implied-consent statute required him to relinquish his constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches. Wright appears to argue that the implied-consent statute
violates the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine by imposing a civil penalty on an
individual who is arrested for DWI and refuses to submit to chemical testing. This court
rejected such an argument in Stevens v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 850 N.W.2d 7177
(Minn. App. 2014), in which the appellant challenged the revocation of her driver’s
license following her refusal to submit to a breath test. Id. at 721. We concluded that the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine did not invalidate the license-revocation provision of
the implied-consent statute. Id. at 724-31. Unlike the appellant in Stevens, Wright did
not refuse chemical testing. Wright does not explain why the unconstitutional-conditions
doctrine should apply or how this court could reach a conclusion other than the
conclusion in Stevens. He consented to a urine test, and we have concluded that his
consent is valid. Thus, we reject his unconstitutional-conditions argument.
In sum, the district court did not err by concluding that Wright provided valid
consent to the urine test and by denying Wright’s petition to rescind the revocation of his
driver’s license.
Affirmed.
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