In the Matter of the Temporary Immediate Suspension of the Family Child Care License of Angie Mattison. ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1169
In the Matter of the Temporary Immediate Suspension
of the Family Child Care License of Angie Mattison.
Filed May 23, 2016
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Department of Human Services
OAH File No. 20-1801-32519
Jonathan Geffen, Arneson & Geffen, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant
Angie Mattison)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Kristine Hartman Word, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Karin Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Susan E. Cooper, Assistant County
Attorney, Winona, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Department of Human
Services)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Relator challenges respondent commissioner of human service’s temporary
immediate suspension of her child-care license based on findings of improper
supervision, arguing that the commissioner’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 6, 2015, relator Angie Mattison was caring for four young children,
including her 25-month-old son, M.M., in the licensed daycare that she operated out of
her home. Around 9:00 a.m., Mattison took the children outside to the fully fenced yard.
She remained in the front yard with three of the children, while M.M. played in the
backyard. Mattison believed that she could see and hear M.M. from the front corner of
the front yard. At some point, M.M. left the backyard through a gate that was not fully
secured. When Mattison realized that M.M. was missing, she left the three other children
alone in the yard and ran to a neighbor’s house, seeking assistance. Meanwhile, two to
two-and-a-half blocks away, a driver spotted M.M. running toward a busy street. The
driver pulled over, stopped M.M., called the police, and walked M.M. home to Mattison.
Later that day, a child-protection worker and a licensing worker from Winona County
Community Services made an unannounced visit to Mattison’s home, and respondent
Minnesota Department of Human Services ordered the temporary immediate suspension
of Mattison’s child-care license.
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Mattison appealed, and a hearing was held. The administrative law judge
recommended that the temporary immediate suspension remain in effect. The
commissioner of human services subsequently issued a final order affirming the
temporary immediate suspension of Mattison’s license. This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
Administrative-agency decisions are presumed to be correct and “may be reversed
only when they are arbitrary and capricious, exceed the agency’s jurisdiction or statutory
authority, are made upon unlawful procedure, reflect an error of law, or are unsupported
by substantial evidence in view of the entire record.” In re Revocation of the Family
Child Care License of Burke, 666 N.W.2d 724, 726 (Minn. App. 2003); see also Minn.
Stat. § 14.69 (2014). Substantial evidence is “(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of
evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence
considered in its entirety.” Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control
Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 466 (Minn. 2002).
“A reviewing court must defer to the agency’s fact-finding process and be careful
not to substitute its findings for those of the agency.” Burke, 666 N.W.2d at 726. We
will not retry facts or make credibility determinations. In re Appeal of Rocheleau, 686
N.W.2d 882, 891 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2004). But we are
not bound by the agency’s ruling on matters of law. Burke, 666 N.W.2d at 726.
By statute, the commissioner shall immediately temporarily suspend the license of
a child-care provider if the provider’s actions, failure to comply with law or regulations,
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or program conditions “pose an imminent risk of harm to the health, safety, or rights of
persons served by the program.” Minn. Stat. § 245A.07, subd. 2(a)(1) (Supp. 2015). A
provider may demand an expedited hearing to consider whether the commissioner has
shown reasonable cause for the immediate suspension. Id., subd. 2a(a) (Supp. 2015).
“Reasonable cause” requires “specific articulable facts or circumstances which provide
the commissioner with a reasonable suspicion that there is an imminent risk of harm to
the health, safety, or rights of persons served.” Id.
Minnesota law requires that a provider must be “within sight or hearing of an
infant, toddler, or preschooler at all times so that the caregiver is capable of intervening
to protect the health and safety of the child.” Minn. R. 9502.0315, subp. 29a (2015). The
commissioner found that Mattison did not provide proper supervision because she was
not in sight or hearing of M.M., which allowed him to leave the backyard and wander
into the community. Therefore, the commissioner concluded, reasonable cause existed to
believe that Mattison failed to act in compliance with the law and posed an imminent risk
of harm to the children in her care. Minn. Stat. § 245A.07, subd. 2a(a).
Mattison argues that the commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. She contends that the commissioner’s determination on imminent risk of harm
cannot be reconciled with the child-protection investigator’s decision not to recommend
immediate removal of M.M. or his siblings from the home. We disagree. Although the
child-protection worker and licensing worker conducted their visit together, they served
different functions and applied different standards. Compare Minn. Stat. § 245A.07,
subd. 2a(a) (requiring “reasonable cause” to believe the daycare provider poses an
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imminent risk to the health, safety, or rights of the persons served to affirm an order for
the temporary immediate suspension of a family child-care license), with Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.151, subd. 6 (2014) (allowing a court to order an officer to take a child into
immediate custody if “there are reasonable grounds to believe the child is in surroundings
or conditions which endanger the child’s health, safety, or welfare that require that
responsibility for the child’s care and custody be immediately assumed by the responsible
social services agency and that continuation of the child in the custody of the parent or
guardian is contrary to the child’s welfare”).
Mattison also argues that there is no “imminent risk of harm” because her back
gate has been rendered inoperable. The commissioner disagreed, concluding that
securing the back gate was less important than improvements to supervision practices,
which Mattison had no plans to make. This conclusion is supported by Mattison’s own
testimony that, despite this experience, she would not change her supervision practices
and would continue to allow the children to play in the backyard and the front yard at the
same time. Mattison also argues that there is no threat of imminent harm because she
was not planning to resume daycare operations until December 2015. But without the
temporary immediate suspension of her license, Mattison could have elected to reopen
her daycare at any time.
Finally, Mattison argues that the suspension of her license is essentially an
imposition of strict liability, because M.M. left the yard despite being within Mattison’s
sight and hearing. But the commissioner found, based on Mattison’s testimony, that she
did not see M.M. leave the yard. And although Mattison testified that she thought she
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could hear what was happening in the backyard, she did not hear M.M. leave the yard.
Thus, the conclusion that Mattison was not in sight or hearing of M.M. is supported by
substantial evidence.
The commissioner concluded that Mattison’s inadequate supervision coupled with
her refusal to change her supervision practices provided reasonable cause to believe that
her failure to comply with the applicable standard for supervision poses an imminent risk
of harm to the health, safety, or rights of the children in her care. Because the
commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record,
we affirm.
Affirmed.
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