Kimbel R. Raden d/b/a Walen R. Farms v. William L. Hess d/b/a Hess Farms ( 2016 )


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  •                            This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A16-0169
    Kimbel R. Raden d/b/a Walen R. Farms,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    William L. Hess d/b/a Hess Farms,
    Respondent
    Filed August 8, 2016
    Affirmed
    Worke, Judge
    Roseau County District Court
    File No. 68-CV-15-318
    Andrew Carlson, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Dennis H. Ingold, Roseau, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Toussaint,
    Judge.*
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    WORKE, Judge
    Appellant lessee challenges the summary judgment dismissal of his claims of
    conversion, civil theft, and unjust enrichment against respondent subsequent lessee. We
    affirm.
    *
    Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
    Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
    FACTS
    In April 2009, M.W. leased 1,848 acres of farmland (the property). In May 2011,
    M.W. subleased the property to appellant Kimbel R. Raden d/b/a Walen R. Farms. M.W.
    and Raden signed four sublease agreements between May and July 2011. The first two
    subleases state that the sublease was for the “2011 season.” The last two subleases state
    that the sublease was “for the year 2011.” Raden did not reside on the property. In the
    fall of 2011, Raden planted winter wheat on the property.
    In April 2012, M.W. subleased the property to respondent William L. Hess d/b/a
    Hess Farms. While preparing the property for planting, Hess noticed that approximately
    10% of the property contained winter wheat that was not maintained or fertilized.
    Because he did not want the acres to go to waste, Hess subsequently fertilized the winter
    wheat and harvested a small amount.
    Hess stated that he was listed at the Farm Service Agency as the “operator” of the
    property for 2012 and that he was never aware of a sublease between M.W. and Raden
    for 2012. In April 2015, Raden filed a complaint against Hess alleging conversion, civil
    theft, and unjust enrichment. Hess moved for summary judgment, and the district court
    granted Hess’s motion. This appeal follows.
    DECISION
    Raden argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment. “When
    reviewing a decision to grant summary judgment, [an appellate court] examine[s]
    whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether a party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Hegseth v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Grp., 
    877 N.W.2d 191
    ,
    2
    193 (Minn. 2016). An appellate court reviews de novo whether a genuine issue of
    material fact exists and whether the district court erred in its application of the law.
    Commerce Bank v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 
    870 N.W.2d 770
    , 773 (Minn. 2015). Evidence
    is viewed “in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
    granted.” 
    Id.
     “[T]here is no genuine issue of material fact for trial when the nonmoving
    party presents evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue
    and which is not sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the
    nonmoving party’s case . . . .” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 
    566 N.W.2d 60
    , 71 (Minn. 1997).
    Holdover tenant
    Raden first argues that the district court erred by concluding that he was not a
    holdover tenant. A holdover tenant is “[s]omeone who remains in possession of real
    property after a previous tenancy . . . expires, thus giving rise to a tenancy at sufferance.”
    Black’s Law Dictionary 1695 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). Raden’s claim that he
    was a holdover tenant is unpersuasive.
    Here, Raden failed to remain in “possession” of the property after his lease for the
    year 2011 ended. “Possession” means: “The fact of having or holding property in one’s
    power; the exercise of dominion over property.” Id. at 1351. Contrary to Raden’s
    argument, the presence of his unharvested winter wheat did not establish power to hold
    the property or exercise dominion over it after the lease for 2011 ended.
    In Mehl v. Norton, the supreme court stated:
    Growing crops are part of the land, and whether tenant or
    trespasser, an occupant’s title to grown crops is dependent
    upon possession of the land, in the absence of special
    3
    contract. Loss of possession in law terminates his right to the
    land and the crops. An owner who obtains possession of his
    land acquires title to all crops growing on the land at the time
    without liability to the former occupant as in the case of
    improvements and similar cases . . . .
    
    201 Minn. 203
    , 205–06, 
    275 N.W. 843
    , 844–45 (1937) (emphasis added) (citations
    omitted).
    In Crain v. Baumgartner, the supreme court also analyzed whether the presence of
    crops constitutes possession of real estate. See 
    192 Minn. 426
    , 429–30, 
    256 N.W. 671
    ,
    673 (1934). The supreme court stated that a former tenant’s rights to a rye crop would
    remain the same “so long as he remained in possession” of the land. See 
    id. at 429
    , 
    256 N.W. at 673
    ; see also Gallager v. Nelson, 
    383 N.W.2d 424
    , 426 (Minn. App. 1986)
    (recognizing that a person may lose possession of real estate before his crops are
    harvested), review denied (Minn. May 22, 1986). The court in Crain further described
    that “occasional entrance upon parts of the land other than the field of rye” and “placing
    locks upon some of the gates . . . is not sufficient to show actual possession of the land
    sowed to rye.” 
    192 Minn. at 430
    , 
    256 N.W. at 673
    .
    Following Mehl and Crain, the presence of Raden’s crops did not establish his
    possession of the real property after his lease for the year 2011 ended. Therefore,
    because Raden lost title to his crops when his lease expired and because neither Raden,
    nor his representatives, visited the property until August 2012, seven months after his
    lease expired, Raden was not a holdover tenant.
    4
    Tenancy at will
    Raden next argues that the district court erred by concluding that he did not have a
    tenancy at will in 2012. A tenancy at will is “a tenancy in which the tenant holds
    possession by permission of the landlord but without a fixed ending date.”
    Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 13 (2014).
    Raden argues that he had a tenancy at will in 2012 because M.W. gave him
    permission to remain on the property. We are not persuaded because even if M.W. orally
    agreed to lease the property to Raden for 2012, the lease still contains a “fixed ending
    date.” See id. (stating that a tenancy at will must be “without a fixed ending date”).
    Here, Raden states that M.W. agreed to continue the lease with Raden into 2012.
    An associate of Raden stated that he believed Raden “had a [two] year lease” for the
    years 2011 and 2012. Another associate of Raden stated: “I knew [Raden] had a lease for
    2012.” These statements support the conclusion that Raden had a lease with a “fixed
    ending date” of December 31, 2012. The record does not indicate that the alleged
    agreement would apply to the year 2013 or beyond, or that the parties were operating on
    a year-to-year basis. See State Bank of Loretto v. Dixon, 
    214 Minn. 39
    , 43, 
    7 N.W.2d 351
    , 353 (1943) (stating that “a tenancy from year to year . . . is substantially a tenancy at
    will”). Therefore, the district court did not err by concluding that Raden did not have a
    tenancy at will.
    Promissory estoppel
    Raden also relies on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel
    “requires proof that . . . a clear and definite promise was made, . . . the promisor intended
    5
    to induce reliance and the promisee in fact relied to his or her detriment, and . . . the
    promise must be enforced to prevent injustice.” Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.,
    
    616 N.W.2d 732
    , 746 (Minn. 2000).          One party must have reasonably relied on
    statements or promises by the other party. BankCherokee v. Insignia Dev., LLC, 
    779 N.W.2d 896
    , 903 (Minn. App. 2010) (emphasis added), review denied (Minn. May 18,
    2010). Here, M.W. made the alleged promise, not Hess, so Raden’s promissory estoppel
    claim fails.
    Relying on Dale v. Fillenworth, Raden argues that his argument does not fail
    despite the fact that Hess never made a promise to Raden. See 
    282 Minn. 7
    , 
    162 N.W.2d 234
     (1968). Raden argues that “Dale states that the crucial question is not who made the
    promise upon which the tenant relied, but rather who benefited from the tenant’s services
    and material.”    Raden’s reliance on Dale is misplaced.          First, Dale is not a
    promissory-estoppel case. See generally 
    id.
     Second, in Dale, the plaintiff entered into an
    oral lease with an attorney acting on behalf of the farm and its owner. Id. at 8-9, 
    162 N.W.2d at 235-36
    . Here, Raden is attempting to hold Hess to a promise that was never
    made by Hess or someone acting on Hess’s behalf.
    Raden’s argument also fails because the alleged oral promise need not be enforced
    to prevent injustice. The question of whether a promise must be enforced to prevent
    injustice is a question of law for an appellate court. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
    479 N.W.2d 387
    , 391 (Minn. 1992). “[T]he test is not whether the promise should be
    enforced to do justice, but whether enforcement is required to prevent an injustice.” 
    Id.
    6
    Here, Raden could attempt to recover damages from M.W. Therefore, the district court
    did not err by denying Raden’s promissory-estoppel argument.
    Affirmed.
    7