U. S. Bank National Association v. Blanca J. Sacta, John Doe ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1136
U. S. Bank National Association,
Respondent,
vs.
Blanca J. Sacta, et al.,
Appellants,
John Doe, et al.,
Defendants.
Filed June 15, 2015
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-HC-14-1726
Jared D. Kemper, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
William B. Butler, Butler Liberty Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Harten,
Judge.*
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent
in this eviction action following a mortgage foreclosure. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellants Blanca and Luis Sacta granted a mortgage on their home to Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for BNC Mortgage, Inc. The
mortgage became part of a securitized mortgage trust, for which LaSalle Bank, N.A.,
acted as trustee. Bank of America, N.A., became trustee when it merged with LaSalle;
respondent U.S. Bank, National Association (the bank), became the successor trustee to
Bank of America. The mortgage was assigned to the bank by MERS on February 24,
2012.
Because appellants defaulted on the mortgage, the bank began foreclosure
proceedings, which resulted in a sheriff’s sale on June 6, 2013, at which the bank
purchased the property. Appellants did not exercise their right to redeem the property
following the sheriff’s sale, but they continued to occupy the property. The bank filed an
eviction complaint after the redemption period expired.
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary
judgment to the bank. This appeal followed. In lieu of a bond under Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.371, subd. 3 (2014), appellants were ordered to pay a monthly deposit of $500
into court, but the monthly deposit was returned following an amendment to Minn. R.
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Civ. App. P. 107.01 that eliminated the need for a cost bond unless the district court
orders one after a motion and for good cause shown.
DECISION
“We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment to determine
whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in
applying the law.” Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, LLC, 829 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn.
2013).
I.
Appellants argue that because of various problems with the assignment of their
mortgage to the bank, the foreclosure was invalid and, as a result, the bank lacked
standing and legal capacity to bring this eviction action. The district court concluded that
appellants’ “claims regarding the validity of the underlying foreclosure are not defenses
to an eviction action, but claims they must bring in a non-eviction proceeding.” We
agree.
An eviction action is a summary proceeding intended to adjudicate the limited
question of who has a present possessory right to a property. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust
Co. v. Hanson, 841 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. App. 2014); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.001, subd. 4 (2014) (defining “eviction” as “a summary court proceeding to
remove a tenant or occupant from or otherwise recover possession of real property by the
process of law set out in this chapter”). “Parties generally may not litigate related claims
in an eviction proceeding,” but defendants may “raise defenses and counterclaims that fit
within the limited scope of an eviction proceeding.” Hanson, 841 N.W.2d at 164.
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Challenges to the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure process may be raised in a
separate proceeding, in which the party raising the challenges may seek a stay of the
eviction action. AMRESCO Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Stange, 631 N.W.2d 444, 445-46
(Minn. App. 2001); see also Real Estate Equity Strategies, LLC v. Jones, 720 N.W.2d
352, 359-60 (Minn. App. 2006) (identifying remedies a tenant may pursue outside of an
eviction action).
Furthermore, this court recently held that when the former owners of property that
is sold at a sheriff’s sale remain in possession of the property after the redemption period
expires, the holder of the sheriff’s certificate of sale suffers an injury in fact and has
standing and the legal capacity to bring an eviction action. See Fed. Home Mortg. Corp.
v. Mitchell, 862 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App. 2015), pet. for review filed (Minn. Apr. 30,
2015). Appellants’ challenges to the bank’s standing and legal capacity are meritless.
Appellants argue that Minn. Stat. § 504B.121 (2014) specifically permits them
to challenge the bank’s title in this eviction action because they obtained their interest in
the property before the bank obtained its interest. That statute states:
A tenant in possession of real property under a lawful
lease may not deny the landlord’s title in an action brought by
the landlord to recover possession of the property. This
prohibition does not apply to a tenant who, prior to entering
into the lease, possessed the property under a claim of title
that was adverse or hostile to that of the landlord.
Minn. Stat. § 504B.121. Because appellants have not entered into a lease and are not in
possession of the property under a lease, this statute does not apply to this eviction action.
See Mitchell, 862 N.W.2d at 72-73 (explaining that former owners who remain in
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possession of property following foreclosure and sheriff’s sale are not “tenants” within
meaning of Minn. Stat. § 504B.121).
II.
Appellants argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the
bank because the court failed to take judicial notice of facts set forth in appellants’
motion for judicial notice and other pleadings. Minn. R. Evid. 201(d) directs a court to
“take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.”
“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the [district] court or (2) capable
of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Minn. R. Evid. 201(b).
Judicially noticed facts must be relevant. See Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., 355 N.W.2d
157, 164 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that “Federal Register shall be judicially noticed
unless it is not relevant”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 6, 1985). The facts that appellants
requested the district court to judicially notice related to appellants’ claims regarding the
validity of the underlying mortgage foreclosure. Because these claims were not properly
raised in the eviction proceeding, the facts are not relevant, and the district court properly
denied appellants’ motion requesting that the court take judicial notice.
III.
Citing Bjorklund v. Bjorklund Trucking, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 312, 319-20 (Minn.
App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008), appellants argue that the district court
abused its discretion by denying them an unconditional stay of the eviction proceeding.
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In Bjorklund, this court held that when “counterclaims and defenses are necessary to a
fair determination of the eviction action, it is an abuse of discretion not to grant a stay of
the eviction proceedings when an alternate civil action that involves those counterclaims
and defenses is pending.” 753 N.W.2d at 318-19. Because Bjorklund does not address
whether conditions must, must not, or may be imposed on any stay granted, appellants’
argument that, under Bjorklund, they are entitled to an unconditional stay, is incorrect.
Moreover, because no alternate civil action was pending, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying appellants an unconditional stay of the eviction proceeding.
Affirmed.
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