Thomas James Mitchell v. $6,429 of US Currency ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-2018
Thomas James Mitchell,
Appellant,
vs.
$6,429 of US Currency, et al.,
Respondents
Filed August 3, 2015
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-13-2842, 73-CR-13-1419
Charles L. Hawkins, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Lotte R. Hansen, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Chutich,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that he failed to properly
serve a demand for judicial determination of a forfeiture. We affirm.
FACTS
On February 13, 2013, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the residence
of appellant Thomas James Mitchell for controlled substances. Officers seized
marijuana, methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, $6,429 in cash, $1,403 in collector
bills, $52 in collector coins, 19 foreign collector coins, and 4.62 ounces of gold jewelry.
The same day, the St. Cloud Police Department personally served upon Mitchell a Notice
of Seizure and Intent to Forfeit Property for the cash, the collector bills and coins, and the
gold jewelry.
Mitchell had 60 days—until April 15—to file a demand for judicial determination
of the forfeiture. On April 1, Mitchell filed, via U.S. mail, a demand for judicial
determination upon the Stearns County Court Administrator and the Stearns County
Attorney’s Office. The copy to the attorney’s office included only one
Acknowledgement of Service and did not include a prepaid, self-addressed envelope.
The Stearns County Attorney’s Office did not return the Acknowledgment of Service to
Mitchell.
Following the conclusion of criminal proceedings against Mitchell, Stearns
County moved to dismiss Mitchell’s demand on the grounds that the district court lacked
jurisdiction because service of the demand failed to meet the requirements of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.5314 (2012), which indicates that a demand must be filed in accordance with the
Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court agreed, concluding that Mitchell’s filing by
mail failed to comport with civil rules 4.05 and 4.06, which set out the requirements of
service of a complaint by mail, and dismissed Mitchell’s demand. He now appeals.
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DECISION
“Whether service of process was effective, and personal jurisdiction therefore
exists, is a question of law that we review de novo.” Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754
N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008). Mitchell offers two arguments as to why his attempted
service was valid.
2012 revision
Mitchell first argues that a 2012 revision to Minn. Stat. § 609.5314 has injected
ambiguity into the statute, and if that ambiguity is resolved in his favor it leads to the
conclusion that service was valid. The following language was added in 2012: “The
claimant may serve the complaint on the prosecuting authority by any means permitted
by court rules.” Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 3(a); see 2012 Minn. Laws ch. 128, § 19,
at 29. Mitchell focuses on the language that a complaint may be served “by any means”
permitted by court rules. He then contends that because he served his complaint in
accordance with Rules of Civil Procedure 5.01 and 5.02, his service was valid.
We do not agree that the language is ambiguous. The 2012 revision is specific to
complaints, and does not alter the fundamental difference between rule 4 and rule 5.
Rule 4 governs proper service of a complaint. Rule 5 governs submission of pleadings
and documents served after the complaint has been properly filed. Rule 5.01 is explicit
that it applies to “every pleading subsequent to the original complaint.” Minn. R. Civ. P.
5.01 (emphasis added). The language of both rules highlights the distinction between
them.
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Much of Mitchell’s argument is devoted to advancing the idea that recent statutory
revisions were intended to provide more leeway to those who wish to challenge an
administrative forfeiture. E.g., 2012 Minn. Laws ch. 128, § 18, at 28-29. But review of
the changes does not lead to Mitchell’s conclusion. A review of the changes indicates
that the language was modified so as to be more understandable and the consequences of
inaction more apparent to a layperson, not that a material change was intended.
Next, Mitchell asserts that Stearns County, via the St. Cloud Police Department,
initiated the action when it notified him of its intent to forfeit the property, and thus his
filing qualifies as a “response,” and therefore he need only comply with rule 5, and not
rule 4. But the district court has jurisdiction once the claimant has filed according to
Minn. Stat. § 609.5314; if the claimant fails to serve and file a demand, a forfeiture
proceeding is not initiated. Peterson v. 2004 Ford Crown Victoria, 792 N.W.2d 454, 458
(Minn. App. 2010). “This means that unless a plaintiff starts a lawsuit, there is no
proceeding.” Id.Mitchell’s mailing failed to fulfill the requirements for serving a complaint. The
text that Mitchell relies upon specifies that it applies to service of a complaint, and thus
does not permit him to employ rules of service that explicitly apply to filings other than a
complaint. And it was Mitchell’s responsibility to initiate an action to recover his
property; the courts are not involved until he acts, so his filing was not a response to an
action initiated by Stearns County.
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Service not subject to civil rules
Mitchell also argues that the rules of civil procedure do not apply at all to his
filing, and thus service was proper. He asserts that the civil rules apply only after his
demand is filed, not before or coincident with it.
Mitchell’s argument fails because he cites only civil rules 5.01 and 5.02 to support
his contention that his filing was proper. Mitchell cannot simultaneously argue that the
civil rules do not apply, and then validate his attempted service using those same rules.
Mitchell fails to identify which rules would be applicable if he is correct that the civil
rules do not govern. He does not indicate how a district court is to review the
acceptability of his filing if indeed the civil rules are inapplicable. As best can be
discerned from Mitchell’s brief, it seems that a district court is only to look to section
609.5314, subdivision 3(a), but that statute expressly states that “[t]he demand must be in
the form of a civil complaint,” and includes no details as to how that complaint must be
served.
The only statute at issue in this case is dispositive and clear: “The proceedings are
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id.Affirmed.
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