In re the Marriage of: Christophe Traore Dit Labarere v. Fatima Lakehal ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1549
In re the Marriage of:
Christophe Traore Dit Labarere,
petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Fatima Lakehal,
Appellant
Filed August 10, 2015
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Ross, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-12-2687
Laurie A. Cylkowski, Ellen M. Windler, Cylkowski Law Office, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota
(for respondent)
Jay A. Tentinger, Tentinger Law Firm, Apple Valley, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Divorcing parents dispute child custody. Christophe Traore Dit Labarere and
Fatima Lakehal agreed that the district court could dissolve their marriage, and they
agreed to permanent joint legal custody of their two daughters. The district court
incorporated this agreement into an order it issued before trial. After Lakehal expressed
her dissatisfaction with this stipulation during trial, the district court found that she had
repudiated the agreement and granted Traore sole legal custody. It also awarded Traore
sole physical custody, mandated that Lakehal’s parenting time be supervised, and
awarded Traore conduct-based attorney fees. Because the district court decided legal
custody without having sufficiently notified the parties that it would reconsider the issue,
we reverse the legal-custody decision and reinstate the previously ordered and stipulated
joint-legal-custody arrangement. But because we are not persuaded by Lakehal’s
arguments urging us to reverse the district court’s decisions as to sole physical custody,
supervised parenting time, and attorney fees, we otherwise affirm.
FACTS
Christophe Traore Dit Labarere and Fatima Lakehal were married in November
2002 in France. They moved to the United States, where their two daughters were born in
February 2008 and March 2011. Traore served Lakehal with a dissolution petition in
August 2012, seeking sole legal and physical custody of the girls. Lakehal responded also
seeking sole custody.
Not long after the preliminary dissolution filings, Lakehal was hospitalized from
October to December 2012. She had engaged in an extreme Ramadan fast that so
weakened her body that she could not walk. She was hospitalized weighing only 98
pounds and was diagnosed with “[m]ajor depressive disorder, recurrent, severe with
psychosis.” She refused to consent to a feeding tube and agreed to psychiatric treatment
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only after civil commitment proceedings were initiated. She was released with
instructions to continue medical and psychiatric treatment with medication.
The district court addressed competing temporary-relief motions in March 2013.
The parties stipulated to joint legal custody, based on which the district court ordered,
“The parties are granted the permanent joint legal custody of their minor children.” They
had also stipulated to a temporary “nesting” schedule, in which the children would
remain at home with each parent alternately residing there for equal amounts of time. The
parties did not stipulate to the issue of physical custody, which the court reserved pending
the completion of a custody evaluation.
Dr. Michelle Millenacker conducted that evaluation, interviewing each parent and
visiting the home. Lakehal told Dr. Millenacker that she wanted sole physical custody
because she was the “primary parent” and “Traore never took care of the girls or was
involved in their care until she was hospitalized.” Traore also requested sole physical
custody, but he expressed that it was “not his intent to take the children away from their
mother but to make sure that she is mentally and physically stable . . . and that the
children will be safe with her.” Dr. Millenacker recommended joint legal and physical
custody. The parties met for three early neutral evaluation sessions, but that process did
not result in their written agreement about physical custody or parenting time.
The district court held a trial primarily on the reserved issue of physical custody.
During trial, however, Lakehal expressed regret over her agreement for joint legal
custody:
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Question: And as part of that hearing legal custody was, on a
permanent basis, was agreed to?
Answer: Yes, somewhat. Yes.
Question: What do you mean by somewhat?
Answer: So --
Question: I’m talking about legal custody.
Answer: Yeah, I guess, you know. It’s just difficult for me to
agree to anything since we are not able to communicate. I
guess we spent so much time in mediation and stuff like that,
you know, at some point the judge ordered something . . . .
She later elaborated that:
We didn’t make any agreement on custody, except on sole
legal custody. And even at that time, I don’t know why I -- I
don’t even think I agreed to it because me and Christophe
don’t agree on religion, don’t agree on education, don’t agree
on medical care of the kids. Even that shouldn’t have been
agreeable.
When Lakehal indicated that she disagreed with Dr. Millenacker’s recommendation of
joint physical custody, she stated that she also “wish[ed] that [she] could request sole
legal custody as well.”
Traore changed his position during trial too, but only as to physical custody.
Although he had requested joint physical custody at the start of trial, during trial he
requested sole physical custody because he believed that Lakehal’s behavior during the
trial, which extended over several months, had indicated her mental instability.
Lakehal testified about her mental health and her belief about voodoo. She said
that she was not experiencing symptoms of depression and that she was not prescribed
any medication. She testified about “black magic,” saying that her father was involved
with it and that his girlfriend killed her mother using witchcraft. Lakehal, who is Muslim,
stated that she had become very religious eight years before the trial. She had visited a
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psychic to protect her mother. According to Lakehal, God then soon killed eleven people
in her father’s girlfriend’s family on account of Lakehal’s deep spirituality:
And I believe that if God took 11 people in six weeks,
because I was praying, praying so much to protect me, protect
my mother, protect my kids, it’s because God was here and
listening. It’s very difficult for someone that have not high
spiritual level. But, God cannot kill 11 people in six weeks in
the same family of witchcraft.
She also claimed that a ring Traore wore protected him from black magic. Traore denied
that the ring had anything to do with black magic and stated that this was the first time he
heard Lakehal assert that it did.
The district court found that Lakehal had “repudiated this [joint legal custody]
agreement at trial.” It found her mental-health issues “very concerning.” It determined
that it was in the children’s best interests for Traore to be awarded sole legal and physical
custody and that Lakehal’s parenting time be supervised until she completed
psychological testing. The district court awarded Traore $30,000 in conduct-based
attorney fees because it determined that Lakehal’s “conduct . . . increased [the] length
and expense of this proceeding.” Lakehal unsuccessfully moved the district court to
amend the findings and judgment or grant a new trial.
Lakehal appeals.
DECISION
Lakehal contends that the district court abused its discretion by awarding Traore
sole legal and physical custody. She also asks this court to reverse the district court’s
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decision imposing supervised parenting time and awarding Traore conduct-based
attorney fees. We address each issue in turn.
I
Lakehal argues that the district court erroneously awarded Traore sole legal
custody after the parties stipulated to permanent joint legal custody and the court had
adopted that stipulation in its 2013 order for temporary relief. The argument is well
founded.
The record supports Lakehal’s position that she lacked notice that the district court
would decide the issue of legal custody in its judgment and decree. The parties in a
dissolution proceeding have a right to due process, which requires “notice, a timely
opportunity for a hearing, the right to be represented by counsel, an opportunity to
present evidence and argument, the right to an impartial decision maker, and the right to a
reasonable decision based solely on the record.” In re Marriage of Sammons, 642
N.W.2d 450, 457 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted); see also Halverson ex rel.
Halverson v. Taflin, 617 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Minn. App. 2000) (“The failure to grant a
parent an opportunity to be heard on custody issues is a denial of . . . due process.”). The
district court acknowledged the stipulation in its order, but it determined that Lakehal had
repudiated the stipulation at trial. We consider whether this determination is accurate and
sufficient for notice.
The record supports Lakehal’s assertion that neither party had notice that the
district court would consider legal custody. Traore does not claim that the trial record
shows us when the district court indicated that it would address legal custody. At oral
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argument, his counsel represented that an off-the-record conversation between the district
court judge and the attorneys occurred, during which the repudiation and notice may have
occurred. But the parties have not sought to supplement the record on appeal, see Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 110.05, and Lakehal does not concede that the off-record discussion
occurred as Traore’s counsel now represents. The district court did not suggest that it
made its determination based on an off-record discussion, but that Lakehal “repudiated
this agreement at trial.”
We do not consider Traore’s unsupported representation about an off-record notice
discussion, and we do not believe that the trial record supports the finding that Lakehal
repudiated the joint-legal-custody agreement. Lakehal argued during trial for sole
physical custody, not sole legal custody. It is true that she expressed her dissatisfaction
and even regret over the legal-custody stipulation, but she never asked the court to
change the extant legal-custody order. Given her express dissatisfaction about the
agreement, the district court had ample ground to suspect that she might want to
repudiate the agreement. On that suspicion it could have inquired whether she intended to
repudiate the agreement, inquired about Traore’s position about the repudiation, and
notified the parties of its intent to address legal custody because of the repudiation,
offering them the opportunity to present any evidence and be heard on the question of
legal custody. This did not occur.
Traore maintains that the 2013 order for temporary relief provided Lakehal notice
that the district court may decide the issue of legal custody despite the stipulation. He
points to the “Notice” section that lists various rights each party has in relation to the
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minor children. These rights include access to copies of informational records about the
children, access to the children’s health and dental insurance information, and reasonable
contact with the children. After listing these rights, the notice reads, “The Court may
waive any rights under this section if it finds it necessary to protect the welfare of a party
or the child,” citing Minnesota Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 3. Traore argues that,
in context, this final sentence informed Lakehal that the district court may reject the
stipulation. The argument overreaches. The sentence specifies its scope, which is the
“rights under this section.” Those rights were listed, and none involves legal custody. The
statute cited in support of the sentence also identifies the same rights just listed. See
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(b)(1), (2), (7) (2014). The “Notice” section did not give the
parties notice that the district court would reconsider its order of “permanent joint legal
custody.”
Because the district court did not give the parties notice that it was deciding legal
custody, it did not satisfy the parties’ due process rights. It therefore decided legal
custody prematurely. The 2013 order assigning joint legal custody should have remained
in force until the parties were heard on the issue of legal custody. We reverse the award
of sole legal custody to Traore and reinstate joint legal custody between the parties based
on the order purportedly assigning permanent legal custody. Although this order was not
a final judgment and decree resolving all aspects of the dissolution as required by
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, neither party argued the impact of this rule to
the district court and that issue is not properly before us now. Nor are we reaching the
merits of the legal custody determination. Nothing in this opinion precludes either party
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from seeking to modify custody. We hold only that the lack of notice under the
circumstances requires us to reverse the order as to legal custody.
II
Lakehal challenges the district court’s determination that it is in the children’s best
interests for Traore to be assigned sole physical custody. Our primary objective in child-
custody disputes is to advance the children’s best interests. In re Child of Evenson, 729
N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. June 19, 2007); see also
Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (2014). The law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to
question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.” Vangsness v.
Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000). We ask only whether the district
court abused its discretion by making findings that lack evidentiary support or by
improperly applying the law. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985).
The district court analyzed the statutory best-interest factors and determined that
six of the factors weighed in Traore’s favor. Two of them were substantially contested.
The parties mostly disputed who served the primary-caretaker role. The district
court found that Traore was the primary caretaker. The finding is sufficiently supported
by evidence. Traore took the girls to and from daycare every day, and he often cared for
them alone until 7:00 or 8:00 at night because Lakehal worked late. Although Lakehal
claimed that she “was like a single mom already” and took care of the children the
“whole time,” the district court considered evidence that was inconsistent with these
assertions and found them incredible. On appeal, we do not reweigh conflicting evidence
or remake credibility findings, which are matters in the exclusive province of the district
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court as fact finder. Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004). Because
the district court’s finding is supported by facts in the record, the finding stands.
The district court also expressed concern regarding Lakehal’s mental health and
found that this weighed in favor of Traore’s sole physical custody as well. The court
considered Lakehal’s recent hospitalization and her observable behavior throughout the
trial. Although her stated belief in “black magic” and “voodoo” might be a matter of her
protected right to exercise religion freely, the district court considered whether the
expression of her beliefs included a mental-illness component as it bears on the children.
We cannot say that the consideration in this case was improper. The evidence indicated
that Lakehal’s religious beliefs were entwined in her extreme fasting to the point of her
inability to care for herself or her children and to her being hospitalized and diagnosed
with psychosis. Her testimony was peppered with references to voodoo in areas where the
district court reasonably questioned the relevance to the issues under discussion. The
district court found that “[h]er beliefs and actions are not consistent with mental
wellness” and that she “lacks any insight into her mental health issues.” The district
court’s concerns about Lakehal’s mental health and its potential danger to the children
appear to be well-founded, and the court did not abuse its discretion by considering these
circumstances in favor of assigning sole physical custody to Traore.
The district court’s other best-interest conclusions are also supported by the record
and properly based on the law. The district court considered each factor thoroughly, and,
given its broad discretion, we have no ground to reverse its sole-custody decision.
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III
Lakehal asks us to reverse the supervisory restriction on her parenting time. The
district court ordered Lakehal to undergo “psychological and psychiatric evaluations by
experts approved by the Court” and restricted her to supervised parenting time until those
evaluations are completed. Like custody, the district court has “extensive discretion” in
making parenting-time decisions. Gregory v. Gregory, 408 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn. App.
1987). And a district court must restrict parenting time “if the court finds, after a hearing,
that parenting time with a parent is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional
health or impair the child’s emotional development.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(b)
(2014). A district court must make particularized findings regarding the reasons for a
restriction and how the restriction is in the children’s best interests. See Courey v.
Courey, 524 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Minn. App. 1994).
Traore concedes that the district court did not make an explicit finding of likely
endangerment, but he argues that such a finding is amply supported by the record. We
agree. Where the district court fails to make a finding of likely endangerment, we need
not reverse if the district court’s order as a whole would support the finding. See, e.g.,
Gregory, 408 N.W.2d at 698. After observing Lakehal throughout six days of trial, which
was spread out over a three-month span, and hearing testimony about her mental-health
issues, the district court found that her “behavior and testimony during the trial are not
consistent with a diagnosis of good mental health.” The court further found that Lakehal
lacked any insight into her mental-health issues and described Traore’s “legitimate”
concerns that if Lakehal’s “mental health issues accelerate, and she is unable or unwilling
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to understand this is happening, her inability to care for herself will also cause an
inability to care for the children.” The district court therefore mandated, “For the safety
of the children, [Lakehal’s] parenting time should be supervised by a professional
parenting time supervisor.”
The district court’s findings regarding Lakehal’s mental health are supported by
evidence in the record. Lakehal had previously allowed her mental health to deteriorate to
the point of being unable to care for herself or her children. She underwent treatment for
her depression, but at the time of trial she was no longer receiving any therapy or other
treatment. Her trial testimony was scattered and the district court reasonably summarized
that she “repeatedly launched off on repetitive diatribes regarding alleged infidelity on
the part of [Traore], safety gates, voodoo, missing photographs and other topics.” After
observing Lakehal on the stand, Traore testified:
Hearing her testimony, I still believe she’s the same -- I don’t
know, it’s the same pattern I’ve been seeing for years, since
2009, is still there. And, therefore, I don’t know what to
believe now, if she’s really well or if she’s, you know, just
trying to make us believe she is well. Now I have a doubt. I
don’t think she is well.
The record supports the finding that Lakehal may continue to suffer from the kind
of mental-health condition that rendered her unable to care for the children in the past and
that may endanger them in her unsupervised care. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by ordering Lakehal to complete mental-health evaluations before she may
exercise unsupervised parenting time.
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IV
Lakehal also challenges the district court’s award to Traore of $30,000 in conduct-
based attorney fees. A district court has the discretion to award attorney fees against a
party “who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding,” Minn.
Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2014). The party moving for conduct-based fees has the burden to
establish that the adverse party’s conduct during the litigation process justifies an award.
Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 818–19 (Minn. App. 2001). Lakehal does not
apparently contest any of the district court’s fact findings that underlie the conduct-based
fee award. She argues only that the findings are not sufficient to establish that she
unreasonably contributed to the length or expense of the proceeding. The argument does
not convince us to reverse.
In support of its award of conduct-based fees, the district court found:
Respondent has unreasonably contributed to the length and
expense of this proceeding. The three ENE sessions were a
waste of time. The parties’ assets and liabilities were readily
quantifiable. There were no premarital or nonmarital issues.
[Traore’s] counsel began sending spread sheets and
settlement proposals regarding the property issues to
[Lakehal’s] counsel in January 2013. [Lakehal’s] refusal
during the trial to stay on point turned what should have been
no more than a two day trial into a six day trial.
Traore documented that he incurred approximately $50,000 in attorney fees throughout
this litigation. Since September 2013, when Dr. Millenacker issued her custody
evaluation, he incurred $31,527 in fees. The district court traced the fees that Traore
incurred after the custody evaluation to Lakehal’s conduct because Lakehal unreasonably
“rejected the physical custody recommendations of the expert selected by the parties;
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hired Dr. Shea to critique Dr. Millenacker’s report, causing increased fees to [Traore] in
reviewing the critique and questioning Dr. Shea at trial; and extensive but necessary trial
preparation and the trial itself.” The court also observed that the first day of the six-day
trial was “wasted” because Lakehal took unreasonable positions on the division of assets.
We have reviewed the record and the findings, and we hold that the findings
adequately support the district court’s determination. We affirm the district court’s
attorney-fee award.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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