Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Gary E. Mitchell, John Doe ( 2015 )


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  •                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A14-1037
    Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    Gary E. Mitchell, et al.,
    Appellants,
    John Doe, et al.,
    Defendants.
    Filed March 30, 2015
    Affirmed
    Smith, Judge
    Scott County District Court
    File No. 70-CV-13-18934
    Samuel R. Coleman, Schiller & Adam, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
    William B. Butler, Butler Liberty Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)
    Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
    Smith, Judge.
    SYLLABUS
    1. Holder of sheriff’s certificate of sale suffers injury-in-fact when former owners of
    the property sold at the sheriff’s sale remain in possession of the property after expiration
    of the redemption period, giving holder of sheriff’s certificate of sale standing to bring an
    eviction action.
    2. Former owners remaining in possession of property after a foreclosure and
    sheriff’s sale are not “tenants” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 504B.121 (2014) in
    the absence of a lease agreement with new owner.
    3. A district court’s discretion to grant a stay in an eviction action pending resolution
    of a related parallel civil action is only guided by Bjorklund v. Bjorklund Trucking, Inc.,
    
    753 N.W.2d 312
    (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008), when the
    parallel action involves a claim of a breach of the agreement that gave the present
    possessor the right of possession.
    OPINION
    SMITH, Judge
    We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent because
    appellants’ claims lie outside the scope of the summary nature of an eviction action. We
    also affirm the district court’s denial of an unconditional stay of the eviction because
    appellants do not contend that they did not default on their mortgage or that they lack an
    alternative forum to litigate their other claims.
    FACTS
    In March 2002, appellants Gary and Leila Mitchell executed a mortgage of their
    home in favor of Signal Bank. Shortly afterward, Signal Bank assigned its interest to
    Wells Fargo Home Mortgage.
    Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure proceedings against the property in November
    2012. Wells Fargo posted a newspaper advertisement of the foreclosure, and it notified
    the Mitchells of the impending foreclosure in December 2012. It also notified them that
    2
    the property would be sold at a sheriff’s sale on February 5, 2013 unless they brought
    their mortgage payments up-to-date.
    The property was sold to Wells Fargo at a sheriff’s sale on February 5, 2013.
    Wells Fargo obtained the sheriff’s certificate of sale, and the Mitchells did not redeem.
    Wells Fargo then conveyed its interest in the mortgage to the Federal Home Loan
    Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) on August 7, 2013. The Mitchells remained in
    possession of the property.
    On October 3, 2013, Freddie Mac filed an eviction action in district court, citing
    its receipt of Wells Fargo’s interest in the property as its interest.       The Mitchells
    answered, arguing that Freddie Mac lacked standing and that the foreclosure was void.
    Noting that the Mitchells’ counsel based their answer solely on arguments that had
    been repeatedly rejected by multiple state and federal courts, Freddie Mac moved the
    district court for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion on June 5,
    2014, ruling that the Mitchells’ claims were outside the scope of an eviction action. The
    district court also denied the Mitchells’ motion for an unconditional stay of the eviction.
    ISSUES
    I.     Did Freddie Mac have standing and legal capacity to bring an eviction action?
    II.    Did the district court err by granting summary judgment to Freddie Mac?
    III.   Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying an unconditional stay of the
    eviction?
    3
    ANALYSIS
    I.
    The Mitchells first challenge Freddie Mac’s standing and legal capacity to bring
    an eviction action. “Standing is a legal requirement that a party have a sufficient stake in
    a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.” Enright v. Lehmann, 
    735 N.W.2d 326
    , 329 (Minn. 2007). A party may gain standing either by suffering an injury-in-fact or
    by virtue of a legislative enactment granting standing. 
    Id. We review
    de novo whether a
    party has standing. Builders Ass’n of Minn. v. City of St. Paul, 
    819 N.W.2d 172
    , 176
    (Minn. App. 2012).
    The purchaser of a sheriff’s certificate acquires a vested ownership interest in the
    property, subject to divestment arising from the exercise of any redemption rights held by
    the foreclosed owner. See Harbal v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul, 
    449 N.W.2d 442
    , 447
    (Minn. App. 1989) (stating this principle in the context of an agricultural-land
    foreclosure), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 1990). Under Minn. Stat. § 580.12 (2014),
    “[w]hen any sale of real property is made under a power of sale contained in any
    mortgage, the officer shall make and deliver to the purchaser a certificate” and, after the
    certificate has been recorded and the redemption period has expired, it “shall operate as a
    conveyance to the purchaser or the purchaser’s assignee of all the right, title, and interest
    of the mortgagor in and to the premises named therein.” Further, “[e]very sheriff’s
    certificate of sale made under a power to sell contained in a mortgage shall be . . . prima
    facie evidence of title in fee thereunder in the purchaser at such sale . . . .” Minn. Stat.
    § 580.19 (2014) (emphasis added).
    4
    The Mitchells assert that Freddie Mac lacked standing to bring the eviction action
    because its foreclosure was void. They acknowledge that a certificate of a sheriff’s sale
    is prima facie proof of title, but cite Casey v. McIntyre, 
    45 Minn. 526
    , 
    48 N.W. 402
    (1891), and Nelson v. Johnson, 
    167 Minn. 430
    , 
    209 N.W. 320
    (1926), to argue that
    defects in the sheriff’s sale rebut that presumption. But these cases do not support the
    Mitchells’ argument. Casey involved a plaintiff who had not received notice of the
    foreclosure proceedings and resulting sheriff’s sale; it did not hold that a properly noticed
    foreclosure and sheriff’s sale was void based on the title challenges the Mitchells raise
    here. 
    See 45 Minn. at 529-30
    , 48 N.W. at 403. And the Nelson court held only that a
    defendant can overcome the presumption of title validity from a sheriff’s-sale certificate
    by affirmatively proving that no default occurred and that any foreclosure was therefore
    “wholly unauthorized and void;” it does not support the Mitchells’ claim that a
    certificate-holder lacks standing whenever a plaintiff challenges its title on the basis of a
    defective assignment. 
    See 167 Minn. at 435
    , 209 N.W. at 322. Neither case applies here.
    The record contains no claim that the Mitchells did not default on their mortgage, and it
    is undisputed that they received proper notice of both the foreclosure and the sheriff’s
    sale. By remaining in possession of the property after the expiration of the redemption
    period, the Mitchells invaded Freddie Mac’s legally protected interest in the property.
    We therefore hold that Freddie Mac suffered an injury-in-fact that gave it standing to
    commence an eviction action against the Mitchells.
    Related to their standing argument, the Mitchells also assert that Freddie Mac
    lacked legal capacity to bring an eviction action, alleging that Freddie Mac had failed to
    5
    prove that it had properly acquired or recorded its interest.        But “[e]very sheriff’s
    certificate of sale made under a power to sell contained in a mortgage shall be prima facie
    evidence that all the requirements of law in that behalf have been complied with . . . .”
    Minn. Stat. § 580.19 (emphasis added). Since an eviction action “merely determines the
    right to present possession and does not adjudicate the ultimate legal or equitable rights
    of ownership possessed by the parties,” Dahlberg v. Young, 
    231 Minn. 60
    , 68, 
    42 N.W.2d 570
    , 576 (1950); cf. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Hanson, 
    841 N.W.2d 161
    , 166
    (Minn. App. 2014) (“Resolving a challenge to the validity of [a] foreclosed mortgage is
    not essential to an eviction action.”), their challenge to Freddie Mac’s legal capacity to
    bring an eviction action is meritless.
    The Mitchells also argue that the district court was required to accept the validity
    of their standing and defective-title arguments as “adjudicative facts” under Minn. R.
    Evid. 201(d). A district court’s decision whether to take judicial notice of proffered facts
    is an evidentiary ruling that we review only for abuse of discretion. See In re Zemple,
    
    489 N.W.2d 818
    , 820 (Minn. App. 1992). A district court is only required to accept
    adjudicative facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute” or are “capable of accurate
    and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
    questioned.” Minn. R. Evid. 201(b).
    Although the Mitchells proffered records and statements from Freddie Mac’s
    website that might (if relevant within the limited scope of an eviction action) have
    qualified as adjudicative facts, the inferences they draw regarding Freddie Mac’s
    standing, legal capacity, and the validity of its interest in the property are arguments, not
    6
    facts.   Those arguments have been vigorously disputed in this and numerous other
    proceedings involving the Mitchells’ attorney. Moreover, the lengthy list of appellate
    opinions rejecting similar or identical arguments made by the Mitchells’ attorney amply
    demonstrates that the merits of the Mitchells’ arguments can be reasonably questioned.
    See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Lee, No. A11-1890, 
    2012 WL 3023437
    (Minn. App.
    July 23, 2012); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. McGlory, No. A12-0415, 
    2012 WL 3641360
    (Minn. App. Aug. 27, 2012); Wells Fargo Bank, NA, v. Rother, No. A12-0003,
    
    2012 WL 3641292
    (Minn. App. Aug. 27, 2012); Value Props. v. Dunbar, No. A12-0646,
    
    2012 WL 5896824
    (Minn. App. Nov. 26, 2012); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Forseth, No.
    A12-0691, 
    2013 WL 141698
    (Minn. App. Jan. 14, 2013); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Cordes,
    No. A12-0869, 
    2013 WL 400142
    (Minn. App. Feb. 4, 2013); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v.
    Lysne, No. A12-1385, 
    2013 WL 599464
    (Minn. App. Feb. 19, 2013); Nationwide
    Advantage Mortg. Co. v. Pehlke, No. A13-0569, 
    2013 WL 5976082
    (Minn. App. Nov.
    12, 2013); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Perez, No. A13-1418, 
    2014 WL 1126415
    (Minn.
    App. Mar. 24, 2014); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Briggs, No. A13-2089, 
    2014 WL 3397124
    (Minn. App. July 14, 2014); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Smith, No. A13-2299, 
    2014 WL 3801306
    (Minn. App. Aug. 4, 2014); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Ass’n v. Robinson,
    No. A14-0023, 
    2014 WL 3802216
    (Minn. App. Aug. 4, 2014); Great S. Bank v. Guzman,
    No. A14-0248, 
    2014 WL 4056254
    (Minn. App. Aug. 18, 2014); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
    Twigg, No. A13-2237, 
    2014 WL 4289194
    (Minn. App. Sept. 2, 2014); Fed. Home Loan
    Mortg. Corp. v. Mikelson, No. A14-0915, 
    2015 WL 134166
    (Minn. App. Jan. 12, 2015);
    CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Kraus, No. A14-0922, 
    2015 WL 134180
    (Minn. App. Jan 12,
    7
    2015). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by implicitly denying their
    request to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
    II.
    The Mitchells contend that the district court erred by granting summary judgment
    to Freddie Mac. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
    “determin[ing] whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the district
    court erred in its application of the law.” Dahlin v. Kroening, 
    796 N.W.2d 503
    , 504
    (Minn. 2011).
    The Mitchells assert that the district court’s basis for granting summary
    judgment—that the Mitchells’ claims were outside the scope of an eviction action—was
    erroneous. “Eviction actions are summary proceedings that are intended to adjudicate
    only the limited question of present possessory rights to the property.” 
    Hanson, 841 N.W.2d at 164
    . “Parties generally may not litigate related claims in an eviction [action].”
    
    Id. The purpose
    of an eviction action is only to determine “present possession” and “not
    to adjudicate the ultimate legal or equitable rights of ownership.” 
    Dahlberg, 231 Minn. at 68
    , 42 N.W.2d at 576. Challenges to the validity of a foreclosure may be litigated in
    an eviction action “only” when it is the sole forum available. Fraser v. Fraser, 
    642 N.W.2d 34
    , 40-41 (Minn. App. 2002) (emphasis added).
    The Mitchells do not claim that the eviction action is the only forum available to
    them to litigate their challenges to the foreclosure.      Rather, they cite Minn. Stat.
    § 504B.122 and Real Estate Equity Strategies, LLC v. Jones, 
    720 N.W.2d 352
    (Minn.
    App. 2006), to support a claim that they are holdover tenants statutorily permitted to
    8
    challenge Freddie Mac’s title as a defense to its eviction action. But no section 504B.122
    exists in the Minnesota Statutes.
    Assuming that the Mitchells intended to cite Minn. Stat. § 504B.121 (as applied in
    Jones), their argument fails because they are not tenants within the meaning of that
    section. Minn. Stat. § 504.121 generally prohibits tenants “under a lawful lease” from
    defending against an eviction action based on a claim that the landlord lacks title. But it
    creates an exception for tenants who, “prior to entering into the lease, possessed the
    property under a claim of title that was adverse or hostile to that of the landlord.” 
    Id. Chapter 504B
    defines a “residential tenant” as “a person who is occupying a dwelling . . .
    under a lease or contract . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 12 (2014) (emphasis
    added).   It also defines “tenancy at will” as “a tenancy in which the tenant holds
    possession by permission of the landlord.” 
    Id., subd. 13
    (2014) (emphasis added).
    Unlike the tenants in Jones, the Mitchells did not enter into a lease with the
    owners of the property after the foreclosure. 
    Cf. 720 N.W.2d at 353-54
    (describing
    tenancy arrangement after foreclosure). Since the Mitchells did not enter into a lease
    with either Wells Fargo or Freddie Mac after foreclosure and did not have either Wells
    Fargo’s or Freddie Mac’s permission to remain in possession of the property after
    foreclosure, they are not tenants for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 504B.121. See Fed. Land
    Bank of St. Paul v. Obermoller, 
    429 N.W.2d 251
    , 258 (Minn. App. 1988) (holding under
    a precursor to Minn. Stat. § 504B.121 that former owners are not “tenants” after a
    foreclosure), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 1988). The provisions of Minn. Stat. §
    504B.121 therefore do not apply here, and the district court did not err by granting
    9
    summary judgment to Freddie Mac. Cf. 
    Jones, 720 N.W.2d at 358
    (holding that Minn.
    Stat. § 504B.121 does not deprive the district court subject-matter jurisdiction over
    ownership claims in an eviction action when a tenant “challenges a landlord’s title”).
    III.
    The Mitchells next argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying
    their motion for a stay of the eviction pending resolution of a parallel proceeding
    addressing their title challenges.1 “District courts have discretion when deciding whether
    to grant a stay in an eviction.” 
    Hanson, 841 N.W.2d at 164
    . “We review [its] decision
    not to grant a stay only for abuse of discretion.” 
    Id. “[A] party
    attempting to stay an
    eviction action must provide a case-specific justification for granting a stay.” 
    Id. “A dispute
    regarding the underlying mortgage is not such a reason.” 
    Id. “And the
    district
    court is not obligated to grant a stay even when the party does provide a case-specific
    reason.” Id.; see also Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Nedashkovskiy, 
    801 N.W.2d 190
    ,
    192 (Minn. App. 2011) (“Even where a moving party provides the district court with a
    reason for a stay, a stay is not required.”).
    The Mitchells cite 
    Bjorklund, 753 N.W.2d at 319-20
    , to support their argument
    that a district court is required to grant a stay in an eviction action pending the resolution
    of a pending civil action involving a title challenge. In Hanson, this court rejected an
    1
    The existence of this parallel proceeding addressing the Mitchells’ title claims
    reinforces our holding that their title claims are outside the scope of an eviction
    proceeding because another forum is available to them. See 
    Fraser, 642 N.W.2d at 40
    .
    10
    interpretation of Bjorklund identical to that asserted by the Mitchells’ attorney2 here,
    noting that “Bjorklund presented an unusual factual scenario that emerged from a dispute
    about the ownership of shares in a family-run corporation.” 
    Hanson, 841 N.W.2d at 165
    .
    We observed that the Bjorklund district court’s refusal to grant a stay was an abuse of
    discretion only because the “alleged agreement to sell the property” that was at issue in
    the pending proceeding “was central to the eviction” and the eviction court could not
    determine whether there was any basis for eviction until the terms of the parties’
    agreement had been determined by the district court in the parallel civil action. 
    Id. 2 Although
    this court has rejected the arguments raised by the Mitchells’ attorney more
    than 20 times in unpublished and order opinions, he continues to bring identical claims to
    this court. When asked at oral argument whether he could recall any positive outcome
    for any of his clients, he cited a case where the delay caused by pursuing the appeal had
    allowed his clients to remain in possession of the property for a few more months. We
    note that Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02 requires attorneys to certify that they are not filing
    actions “for any improper purpose, such as . . . to cause unnecessary delay,” and that
    Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03 authorizes district courts to sanction attorneys who violate rule
    11.02. The Mitchells’ attorney conceded during oral argument that this court has similar
    authority to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals. Without deciding the issue here, we
    note that a statute authorizes “a court,” either by motion of a party or on its own motion,
    to impose sanctions for filings made for the purpose of causing delay or that are based on
    frivolous arguments. See Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subds. 2, 4 (2014); see also Minn. R.
    Civ. App. P. 138 (authorizing the court of appeals to award double costs to respondent
    when “an appeal delays proceedings on a judgment of the trial court and appears to have
    been taken merely for delay”); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.06, subd. 1 (allowing the court
    of appeals to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees to any party” on its own motion). Further
    iterations of frivolous arguments rejected as meritless by this court may compel this court
    to consider the full extent of its sanctioning authority.
    We also note that the Mitchells’ attorney conceded during oral argument that he
    has charged clients a total of at least $50,000 for pursuing the arguments that have been
    repeatedly rejected by this court. Cf. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a)(4) (requiring that
    attorneys consider “the results obtained” when charging clients), 3.1 (mandating that
    attorneys “not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
    unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous”).
    11
    The situation in Bjorklund was thus similar to that in Nelson, where the merits of
    an eviction action depended entirely on whether the current possessor of the property was
    in breach of an agreement allowing them to possess it. Cf. Nelson, 167 Minn. at 
    435, 209 N.W. at 322
    . In both cases, determining whether the actual terms of the agreement had
    been violated (either by addressing the issue in the eviction action itself, as in Nelson, or
    by staying the eviction action pending a parallel action, as in Bjorklund) was an essential
    prerequisite to resolving the eviction action because the eviction action otherwise risked
    dispossessing a party that had never been legitimately subject to dispossession at all.
    Bjorklund does not, however, support the Mitchells’ argument that other issues—such as
    the legitimacy of an assignment, whether an assignment has been properly recorded, and
    which among several possible parties may bring the eviction action—must be resolved
    before resolving an eviction action brought by a holder of a sheriff’s certificate of sale.
    See 
    Hanson, 841 N.W.2d at 165
    (“A dispute over ownership alone does not show
    necessity under Bjorklund.”); accord Amresco Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Stange, 
    631 N.W.2d 444
    , 446 (Minn. App. 2001) (“Using the alternate procedure instead of
    expanding the eviction proceeding accords with the appellate courts’ prior determinations
    that the district court should uphold the summary nature of eviction proceedings.”).
    Rather, “a stay is not necessary in an eviction action when adequate alternatives are
    available, such as filing a notice of lis pendens or seeking an injunction from the court
    where other claims are pending.” 
    Hanson, 841 N.W.2d at 166
    .
    The Mitchells do not contend that they were not in default on their mortgage, nor
    do they contend that they lack alternatives for addressing their challenges to Freddie
    12
    Mac’s title. We therefore conclude that Bjorklund does not apply here, and the district
    court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Mitchells’ motion for a stay of the
    eviction.
    DECISION
    Because the Mitchells’ challenges to Freddie Mac’s property interest were outside
    the scope of an eviction action, the district court did not err by granting summary
    judgment to Freddie Mac. And because the issues the Mitchells raise do not involve a
    claim that they had not defaulted on their mortgage or that they lacked alternatives for
    pursuing their challenges to Freddie Mac’s title, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion by denying their motion for a stay of the eviction.
    Affirmed.
    13