Grant County Social Services, Natasha Kaiser, OBO A.C.R., Ward of the Commissioner of the State of MN v. S. J. M. ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1109
Grant County Social Services, Natasha Kaiser,
OBO A.C.R.,
Ward of the Commissioner of the State of MN,
Respondent,
vs.
S. J. M.,
Appellant.
Filed May 4, 2015
Affirmed
Hudson, Judge
Grant County District Court
File No. 26-CV-13-214
Justin R. Anderson, Grant County Attorney, Elbow Lake, Minnesota (for respondent)
Christopher J. Cadem, Cadem Law Group, PLLC, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and
Smith, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HUDSON, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to expunge the judicial records of an
ex parte harassment restraining order issued against him. Appellant argues that the
district court applied an incorrect standard of review to the expungement motion and that
the court should expunge the records using its inherent authority because his
constitutional rights are infringed by the retention of the records and the benefit of
expungement to him is commensurate with the disadvantages of eliminating the record.
We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Grant County Social Services filed a Petition for a Harassment
Restraining Order (HRO) against appellant S.J.M. on behalf of the minor child A.C.R.1
The petition alleged that S.J.M. was a middle-aged male who knew A.C.R. when she
resided with her biological mother and that S.J.M. sent A.C.R. gifts through social
services; attempted to obtain A.C.R.’s contact information; made inappropriate comments
to A.C.R.; and used a false name to send her a long Facebook message. The district court
issued a temporary ex parte HRO valid for two years unless S.J.M. requested a hearing
within 45 days, which S.J.M. did. At the hearing, the parties agreed that S.J.M. would
have no further contact with A.C.R. and the district court dissolved the HRO without
ruling on the merits.
S.J.M. subsequently moved the court to use its inherent authority to expunge the
HRO petition and the ex parte HRO, claiming that they were libelous. A.C.R. took no
position on the expungement. The district court denied S.J.M.’s motion, determining that
his constitutional rights were not implicated; that the benefit of expungement to S.J.M.
was not commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and the burden on the court;
1
For ease of reference, this opinion will refer to respondent as A.C.R.
2
and that S.J.M.’s claims that A.C.R.’s statements were libelous were not relevant to an
expungement request. This appeal follows.
DECISION
S.J.M. argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
expunge the HRO petition and the ex parte HRO. The district court has inherent power
that “governs that which is essential to the existence, dignity, and function of a court
because it is a court.” In re Clerk of Lyon Cnty. Court’s Comp., 308 Minn. 172, 176, 241
N.W.2d 781, 784 (1976). The court may exercise its inherent power to expunge records
where their retention seriously infringes a petitioner’s constitutional rights. State v.
M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Minn. 2013). Alternatively, the court may use its inherent
authority “to control court records . . . in order to reduce or eliminate unfairness to
individuals, even though the unfairness is not of such intensity as to give a constitutional
dimension.” State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1981). We review the “district
court’s exercise of its inherent authority to expunge records that are located within the
judicial branch [as] a matter of equity . . . under an abuse-of-discretion standard of
review.” State v. N.G.K., 770 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. App. 2009). The abuse-of-
discretion standard extends to the review of an expungement denial where the petitioner
claims his constitutional rights are violated by the retention of records. State v. H.A., 716
N.W.2d 360, 363 (Minn. App. 2006). We will set aside underlying findings of fact only
if they are clearly erroneous. N.G.K., 770 N.W.2d at 180.
Relying on Barlow v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 365 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1985),
the district court concluded that its inherent powers to expunge even a civil file “are
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properly exercised only where a person’s constitutional rights might be seriously
infringed by retention of public records.” S.J.M. argues that (1) the district court’s
conclusion misstates the law and (2) petitions seeking only judicial record expungement
are subject to a “lower standard” than those seeking to expunge executive level records.
S.J.M. cites no authority for his second proposition, and therefore we reject it. See
Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining to
address allegations unsupported by legal analysis or citation). As to his first claim, the
district court’s statement—standing alone—does misstate the law. See C.A., 304 N.W.2d
at 358 (stating that a court’s inherent authority to control records may apply even where
there is not a constitutional dimension). But we note that later in its order, the district
court correctly cites and addresses its inherent authority to expunge records, even when
the claim does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. In addition, we observe
that the district court was faced with an unusual procedural and substantive posture.
Unlike a motion for the expungement of criminal or eviction records, there is no statutory
basis for a petitioner to seek expungement of HRO records. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609A.01-
.04 (2014) (detailing the grounds and procedures for expunging certain types of criminal
records, including the violation, but not the issuance, of an HRO); Minn. Stat. § 484.014
(2014) (explaining the process for expunging eviction case court files). Nor have we
found any relevant caselaw regarding the expungement of civil HRO records. In the
absence of such guidance, the district court applied the criminal expungement standard
and we see no error requiring correction.
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S.J.M. next asserts that the creation and retention of the HRO records infringes
upon his constitutional rights. We disagree. S.J.M. alleges that the retention of the
records violates his right to due process because the harassment claims were not proven
and he had no opportunity to rebut the claims. But the HRO statute specifically allows
for the issuance of an ex parte HRO on “reasonable grounds to believe that [a party] has
engaged in harassment” prior to a hearing on the merits. Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 4(b), (c) (2014) (allowing the court to issue an ex parte HRO without notice to the
responding party). And S.J.M. does not contest the constitutionality of this statute. He
next claims that his constitutional rights are infringed upon because the statements are
libelous and he contends that an expungement is the only available remedy to address the
infringement. But S.J.M. has not proven that the statements were libelous—or even
false—such that he is entitled to any remedy. Instead, the ex parte HRO was dismissed
with the agreement that S.J.M. would “have no contact whatsoever” with A.C.R.; no
decision was made on the merits of those allegations.
For the first time on appeal, S.J.M. also argues that the HRO violated his
constitutional interest in freedom of association with A.C.R. But freedom of association
is not relevant to the retention of records and we generally do not address constitutional
issues raised for the first time on appeal. See In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555,
557 (Minn. 1981) (declining to address a constitutional issue raised for the first time on
appeal from a termination of parental rights).
As noted earlier, even where a constitutional right is not infringed upon, the court
may use its inherent authority to expunge records, including civil case records. See
5
Barlow, 365 N.W.2d at 234 (applying the inherent-authority expungement basis to
appellant’s request to expunge records of his driver’s license revocation). In making this
determination, we first consider whether the requested relief is necessary to the
performance of the judicial function. State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 275 (Minn. 2008).
“Inherent judicial power governs that which is essential to the existence, dignity, and
function of a court because it is a court.” C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358 (quotation omitted).
The court does not “resort to inherent authority to serve the ‘relative needs’ or ‘wants’ of
the judiciary, but only for ‘practical necessity in performing the judicial function.’”
S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at 275 (quoting In re Clerk of Lyon Cnty., 308 Minn. at 181, 241
N.W.2d at 786).
The court’s judicial function includes the power to “control court records and
agents of the court in order to reduce or eliminate unfairness to individuals, even though
the unfairness is not of such intensity as to give a constitutional dimension.” C.A., 304
N.W.2d at 358. The court may use its inherent authority to expunge judicial records
when “the relief requested by . . . the aggrieved party [is] necessary to the performance of
the judicial function as contemplated in our state constitution.” S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at
275 (quotation omitted). Here, we conclude that a request for expungement of judicial
records related to an ex parte HRO can be a type of relief necessary for the performance
of a judicial function and therefore that a request for an expungement can be an
appropriate circumstance for the court to invoke its inherent authority to control its own
records.
6
We must then decide whether S.J.M.’s request for expungement, if granted, “will
yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from
the elimination of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing and
monitoring the order.” Barlow, 365 N.W.2d at 234 (quotation omitted). There are five
factors for the district court to consider in determining whether the benefits are
commensurate with the disadvantages. H.A., 716 N.W.2d at 364. But only three of those
factors apply to HRO records: (1) “the extent that a petitioner has demonstrated
difficulties in securing employment or housing as a result of the records sought to be
expunged,” (2) “the potential risk that the petitioner poses and how this affects the
public’s right to access the records,” and (3) “other objective evidence of hardship under
the circumstances.” Id.
In Barlow, the petitioner sought to expunge his driver’s license revocation records
after the revocation was rescinded. 365 N.W.2d at 233. The supreme court observed that
even though the petitioner’s license was reinstated, there may have been grounds for the
initial revocation. Id. at 234; see also S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at 277 (noting the difference
between the unfairness of retaining harmful records after a conviction has been set aside
as opposed to where a conviction was not challenged). The court held that petitioner’s
potential increased insurance expenses did not rise to a constitutional violation and that
there was “no basis for the intrusion of inherent judicial power.” Barlow, 365 N.W.2d at
234.
S.J.M. argues that the benefit to him of expunging the HRO records is
commensurate with the disadvantage to the public in eliminating the record and the
7
burden on the court in monitoring the order. While he claims that it is common
knowledge that an HRO record will affect his housing and employability—more so than
the Barlow petitioner who only speculated that his insurance rates would increase—we
are not persuaded. S.J.M. has not submitted any evidence demonstrating that his housing
or employment has actually been affected. See N.G.K., 770 N.W.2d at 180 (“[A]
petitioner may not justify expungement with ‘speculative’ evidence.”).
S.J.M. also argues that it is unfair for the court to maintain the HRO petition
because it contains false facts and it does not allege that S.J.M. was previously asked to
stop contacting A.C.R. But the record is clear that the ex parte HRO was vacated by
agreement of the parties; the district court made no decision on the merits. And while
S.J.M. claims that his contact with A.C.R. was innocuous, there is an advantage to the
public in keeping records of an adult male’s seemingly inappropriate contact with a
teenage girl. Additionally, the dismissal included the agreement that S.J.M. would not
contact A.C.R., an important record. S.J.M. does not document any other hardships
associated with maintaining the record, other than speculative claims that the allegedly
false statements will result in “embarrassment, ridicule, and defamation of character.”
While S.J.M. is correct that it would likely not burden the court to monitor the
expungement, this does not tip the balancing test in his favor. We thus conclude that the
benefit to S.J.M. is not commensurate with the disadvantage to the public and his request
does not overcome the presumption of access to the records. See Star Tribune v. Minn.
Twins P’ship, 659 N.W.2d 287, 295 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding that a presumption of
access to judicial records exists under common law and the First Amendment).
8
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the expungement
request.
Affirmed.
9