State of Minnesota v. Larry Maurice Taylor ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0938
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Larry Maurice Taylor,
Appellant.
Filed April 20, 2015
Affirmed
Smith, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-13-7548
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, Judge
We affirm appellant’s convictions for pattern of stalking conduct, aggravated
stalking, and terroristic threats because the district court properly admitted history-of-
relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (Supp. 2013) and because appellant’s
pro se arguments lack merit.
FACTS
Appellant Larry Maurice Taylor was charged with (1) pattern of stalking conduct,
(2) aggravated stalking, and (3) terroristic threats. Before trial, the state noticed its intent
to introduce history-of-relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 regarding
Taylor’s past domestic abuse of a former girlfriend, D.W. Taylor moved to preclude the
introduction of this evidence. Citing State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. App.
2010), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010), the district court allowed the state to
introduce the relationship evidence under section 634.20. The district court found that
the evidence was admissible and that “the probative value outweigh[ed] unfair prejudice
to [Taylor].”
DECISION
I.
Taylor argues that the district court committed reversible error by admitting
evidence of his prior relationship with D.W. under Minn. Stat. § 634.20. We review a
district court’s admission of evidence under section 634.20 for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. App. 2008) (citing State v. McCoy,
682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). On appeal,
the appellant has the burden to show that the district court abused its discretion and that
the appellant was prejudiced by the evidentiary ruling. Id.
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Evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is generally not admissible to show that a
person acted in conformity with prior behavior. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). But
[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the
victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Minn. Stat. § 634.20. “Domestic conduct” includes “evidence of domestic abuse” and
evidence of the violation of an order for protection or a harassment restraining order. Id.
In Valentine, we stated that section 634.20 “unambiguously authorize[s] the
admission of similar-conduct evidence against the accused’s (not the victim’s) family or
household members.” 787 N.W.2d at 637. We explained that “evidence showing how a
defendant treats his family or household members, such as his former spouses or other
girlfriends, sheds light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in
turn suggests how the defendant may interact with the victim.” Id. As a result, we
concluded that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of the appellant’s abuse
of another girlfriend under section 634.20. Id. at 638.
As in Valentine, the district court properly admitted evidence of Taylor’s abuse of
a previous girlfriend under section 634.20. See id. But Taylor argues that the supreme
court has not yet adopted this court’s interpretation of section 634.20, and that, therefore,
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the district court erred by admitting the evidence.1 Taylor suggests that we should
instead rely on McCoy, in which the supreme court adopted section 634.20 “as a rule of
evidence for the admission of evidence of similar conduct by the accused against the
alleged victim of domestic abuse.” 682 N.W.2d at 161. But McCoy only addressed the
admissibility of evidence of prior domestic abuse between the accused and the victim.
The supreme court did not address the admissibility of evidence of prior domestic abuse
against someone other than the victim, which is the issue addressed in Valentine. And,
because the supreme court denied review, Valentine is binding on both this court and the
district court. See State v. Collins, 580 N.W.2d 36, 43 (Minn. App. 1998) (explaining
that an opinion of this court has precedential effect once the deadline for granting review
has expired), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998). We therefore apply Valentine and
conclude that the district court properly admitted evidence of Taylor’s relationship with
D.W. under section 634.20.
Taylor also argues that the probative value of D.W.’s testimony was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Taylor again relies on McCoy and argues
that the evidence of Taylor’s prior relationship with D.W. lacked probative value because
it could not illuminate the history of Taylor’s relationship with A.D. See McCoy,
682 N.W.2d at 159 (“[E]vidence of prior conduct between the accused and the alleged
victim . . . may be offered to illuminate the history of the relationship.”). But, as we
1
The supreme court recently declined to determine whether a district court erred by
admitting evidence of domestic abuse against someone other than the victim under
section 634.20 because the evidence did not significantly affect the verdict in the case.
See State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Minn. 2015).
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stated in Valentine, evidence concerning abuse of a former spouse or girlfriend “sheds
light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests how
the defendant may interact with the victim.” 787 N.W.2d at 637. As in many other
domestic abuse cases, only A.D. could testify to the events that occurred between her and
Taylor in their homes. See McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161 (explaining that domestic abuse
generally occurs “in the privacy of the home,” goes underreported, and lacks eyewitness
testimony). D.W.’s testimony therefore provided a context for the relationship between
A.D. and Taylor, and had significant probative value. See Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 756
(“Evidence that helps to establish the relationship between the victim and the defendant
or which places the event in context bolsters its probative value.” (quotation omitted)).
The testimony also assisted the jury in assessing A.D.’s credibility. See id. at 757.
Even though D.W.’s testimony created a danger of prejudice to Taylor, it did not
persuade the jury by illegitimate means or give the state an unfair advantage. See State v.
Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006) (“[U]nfair prejudice is not merely damaging
evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that
persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” (quotation
omitted)). Taylor had notice before trial that the state intended to introduce history-of-
relationship evidence under section 634.20. In addition, D.W.’s testimony was limited to
the incident in which Taylor choked her and his subsequent phone calls in violation of the
no-contact order. Finally, the district court twice gave the jury a cautionary instruction
that D.W.’s testimony was “being offered for the limited purpose of demonstrating the
nature and the extent of the relationship between [Taylor and A.D.]” and that the jury
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must not convict Taylor based on his previous conduct toward D.W. We presume that
the jury followed the district court’s cautionary instructions. State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d
661, 675 (Minn. 1998).2 Contrary to Taylor’s assertion, no evidence suggests that the
cautionary instructions were confusing to the jury, and Taylor did not object to the
instructions at trial. The district court’s cautionary instructions lessened any danger of
unfair prejudice to Taylor. See State v. Waino, 611 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. App. 2000)
(stating that the prejudicial effect of prior-relationship evidence “is mitigated by the
[district] court’s cautionary instruction to the jury”).
We conclude that the district court did not err in admitting D.W.’s testimony under
section 634.20 and in concluding that the probative value of the testimony outweighed
the danger of unfair prejudice to Taylor. In addition, there is no evidence that D.W.’s
testimony significantly affected the verdict. See Benton, 858 N.W.2d at 541. Even
though the prosecutor compared the testimonies of A.D. and D.W. in his closing
argument, he repeated the district court’s cautionary instructions regarding the purpose of
D.W.’s testimony. The prosecutor did not discuss D.W.’s testimony as “propensity
evidence,” as Taylor suggests. Because both the district court and the prosecutor
cautioned the jury regarding the purpose of D.W.’s testimony and because other evidence
(including A.D.’s testimony and the text-message exhibits) provided sufficient evidence
of Taylor’s guilt, the relationship evidence did not significantly affect the verdict. See id.
2
Taylor cites previous caselaw doubting the jury’s ability to follow cautionary
instructions. See State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 590-91 (Minn. 1982). But “doubts
about instructions have not held sway,” and we now presume that jurors follow
instructions. State v. McCurry, 770 N.W.2d 553, 558-59 (Minn. App. 2009), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009).
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at 542 (concluding that the relationship evidence did not significantly affect the verdict
when the prosecutor “made sparse use of the relationship evidence in closing argument,”
the prosecutor and district court provided several cautionary instructions regarding the
purpose of the evidence, and the other evidence of guilt was overwhelming).
II.
Taylor also raises several arguments in his pro se supplemental brief. Even though
Taylor fails to cite legal authority, we will briefly discuss the merits of his arguments.
Taylor first argues that his trial attorney was ineffective. In making this argument,
Taylor cites facts that are not in the record. Because we do not have the record to review
Taylor’s argument, we decline to consider it. See State v. Alvarez, 820 N.W.2d 601, 626
(Minn. App. 2012) (“[A]n ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should typically be
raised by a postconviction petition for relief.”), aff’d sub. nom. State v. Castillo-Alvarez,
836 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2013).
Taylor also argues that the district court erred in allowing reference to his gang
membership. Before trial, the district court stated that it was “concerned” about
references to gang membership, but would not preclude reference to Taylor’s statements
in his text messages to A.D. that he was in a gang. The district court explained that the
statements were not being introduced to establish that Taylor was in a gang, but were
relevant to show “how the statements were meant to have been perceived” and “how they
were in fact perceived by [A.D.]” Taylor is correct that the references to his gang
membership created a danger of prejudice to him. But the state was required to prove
that Taylor intended to or had reason to know that he would cause A.D. to feel threatened
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or terrorized and that A.D. actually felt that way. See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG
13.56 (2006) (stalking); 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 13.58 (2006) (pattern of
stalking conduct); 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 13.107 (2006) (terroristic threat).
Taylor’s text-message references to his gang membership were therefore relevant to the
elements of the three charges, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing reference to Taylor’s gang membership. See State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201,
203 (Minn. 2003) (“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district]
court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”).
Finally, Taylor appears to suggest that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of pattern of stalking conduct because he and A.D. lived together and “were together
until the day of [his] arrest.” But a pattern of stalking conduct can be proven by showing
two or more acts of domestic assault or terroristic threats within five years, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.749, subd. 5(b) (2012), and domestic assault is committed against a family or
household member, Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1 (2012). Contrary to Taylor’s
assertion, the evidence that Taylor and A.D. lived together as a couple supports Taylor’s
conviction for pattern of stalking conduct.
Affirmed.
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