State of Minnesota v. Kevin Ryan ( 2017 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0473
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Kevin Ryan,
Appellant.
Filed February 13, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge
Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-VB-15-9930
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark Berglund, Blaine City Attorney, Michael J. Scott, Assistant City Attorney, Anoka,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Kevin Ryan, Forest Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Kevin Ryan appeals his petty misdemeanor conviction for operating a
motor vehicle without proof of insurance. On appeal, Ryan argues (1) that Minn. Stat.
§ 169.791, subd. 2 (2014), violates the Minnesota Constitution and (2) that the state
unconstitutionally destroyed evidence material to his defense. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 29, 2015, a Blaine police officer was patrolling the Lino Lakes/Centennial
Lakes area as part of a cooperative assignment to increase traffic-law enforcement. At
approximately 10:37 p.m., the officer observed a vehicle without both headlights
illuminated and stopped the vehicle. The officer asked the driver of the vehicle, Ryan, for
his proof of insurance. Ryan provided the officer with an outdated insurance card. The
officer cited Ryan for operating a motor vehicle without proof of insurance.
A bench trial took place on February 16, 2016. Ryan submitted no formal discovery
requests before trial. At trial, the district court asked the prosecutor if Ryan had a police
report, and the prosecutor responded that there was a citation notation, which he then
provided to Ryan. Ryan presented no evidence at trial, but asked for the officer’s recording
of the stop after the state rested its case. The prosecutor explained to the court that these
tapes are destroyed after six months and that the prosecutor had “no access to it.” Ryan
objected to the destruction of the tape in his closing arguments. The district court
concluded that Ryan was guilty of operating a motor vehicle without proof of insurance
and sentenced him to pay a $285 fine.
Ryan appeals.
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DECISION
I. Ryan forfeited his constitutional arguments because he did not raise them
before the district court.
Ryan challenges the constitutionality of the automotive-insurance requirement of
Minn. Stat. § 169.791, subd. 2. Ryan did not raise his constitutional arguments before the
district court.
A reviewing court will generally not consider constitutional questions not argued
before the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996); In re Welfare
of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (declining to address a constitutional issue
raised for the first time on appeal). An appellate court may choose to consider pro se
arguments in a criminal case, Dale v. State, 535 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn. 1995), or address
questions where required in the interests of justice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11.
The interests of justice do not require us to address Ryan’s constitutional arguments.
Nonetheless, we note that this court has already considered whether the statute’s
automobile-insurance requirement impedes the right to travel or violates due process rights.
State v. Cuypers, 559 N.W.2d 435, 436 (Minn. App. 1997). With respect to the right to
travel, this court concluded that the statute “merely regulates one mode of transportation”
and therefore does not implicate the right to travel. Id. at 437. With respect to due process
rights, this court concluded that the statute provides sufficient notice and review for
aggrieved parties. Id. Ryan raises many of the same constitutional arguments considered
by this court in Cuypers, and to the extent that his arguments differ from those presented
in Cuypers, his arguments are unpersuasive.
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We therefore do not consider Ryan’s constitutional arguments because they were
not presented to the district court. Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357.
II. The state did not commit a discovery violation by destroying the officer’s
recording of the stop.
Ryan also argues that the state committed a discovery violation by destroying the
officer’s recording of the stop. While the state did not address this argument in its brief, it
stated at trial, “There is no tape available, Your Honor. They are destroyed after six
months. We have no access to it.” Ryan argues that the destruction of the tape deprived
him of his constitutional rights. We interpret Ryan’s argument as raising either an alleged
constitutional violation or an alleged violation of discovery obligations under Minn. R.
Crim. P. 9.04.
As for an alleged constitutional violation, the U.S. Constitution imposes a duty on
the government to deliver exculpatory evidence into “the hands of the accused, thereby
protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984). When reviewing a destruction-of-evidence claim,
we consider “whether the exculpatory value of lost or destroyed evidence was apparent and
material before the evidence was destroyed.” State v. Hawkinson, 829 N.W.2d 367, 372
(Minn. 2013). Absent a showing that the destroyed evidence had apparent and material
exculpatory value, we consider whether the potentially useful evidence was destroyed in
bad faith. Id. In assessing whether evidence was destroyed in bad faith, we consider
(1) whether the state had incentives to “hide, suppress, or destroy evidence favorable to a
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defendant” and (2) whether the state followed normal procedures in destroying the
evidence. Id. at 374.
Ryan makes no showing that the tape had apparent and material exculpatory value,
and therefore we evaluate the tape as potentially useful evidence. First, Ryan does not
argue, and we have no reason to suspect, that the state had an improper motive in destroying
the evidence. And second, Ryan waited until trial to ask for the officer’s recording of the
stop, but the tape had already been destroyed by the time of trial. The prosecutor’s
statement that the tapes are routinely destroyed after six months demonstrates that the state
acted in accordance with standard procedure. We therefore conclude no constitutional
violation occurred.
As for an alleged discovery violation, the state’s discovery obligations are outlined
in Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.04. Ryan was charged with a petty misdemeanor for failure to
provide proof of insurance. See Minn. Stat. § 169.791, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 609.131,
subd. 1 (2014) (permitting certification of a misdemeanor as a petty misdemeanor). In
misdemeanor cases, “all that is required under the rules is that a defendant be allowed to
‘inspect the police investigatory reports,’ and ‘[u]pon request, the prosecutor must also
disclose any material or information within the prosecutor’s possession and control that
tends to negate or reduce the guilt of the accused.’” Hawkinson, 829 N.W.2d at 378
(quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.04). “Any other discovery must be by consent of the parties
or by motion to the court.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.04.
At trial, the prosecutor provided Ryan with the citation notation, which the district
court described as “the only discovery that’s available.” Again, Ryan waited until trial to
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ask for the tape. The prosecutor stated that the state had no access to the tape because it
had been destroyed in accordance with standard procedures. The record shows that the
prosecutor complied with the requirements of Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.04. We therefore
conclude that no discovery violation occurred.
Affirmed.
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