Colleen M. Doyle v. Keith R. Klein ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0989, A14-1280
Colleen M. Doyle, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Keith R. Klein,
Respondent.
Filed May 26, 2015
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Judge
Washington County District Court
File No. 82-F5-06-007572
Alan C. Eidsness, Melissa J. Nilsson, Henson & Efron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)
Kathleen M. Newman, Joshua M. Benson, Kathleen M. Newman + Associates, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Smith, Presiding Judge; Chutich, Judge; and Minge,
Judge.*
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, Judge
We affirm the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to adjust her spousal-
maintenance award because the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to
consider tax consequences of the award. We also affirm the district court’s denial of
respondent’s motion for amended findings regarding appellant’s monthly expenses and
expected future salary increases because of respondent’s failure to timely appeal the
district court’s factual findings regarding appellant’s monthly expenses and because its
findings regarding future salary increases are not clearly erroneous. We reverse,
however, the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to implement a cost-of-living
adjustment, and we remand solely for the district court to implement such an adjustment.
FACTS
The district court dissolved appellant Colleen Doyle’s and respondent Keith
Klein’s 19-year marriage in 2008. Its judgment and decree has been the subject of
lengthy litigation spanning almost seven years. The present matter is the consolidated
third and fourth appeals after two prior remands from this court.
Doyle and Klein had two teenaged children at the time of the dissolution, the
youngest of which emancipated in 2012. During the marriage, Doyle maintained a
license to practice law, but worked only intermittently outside the home. She also
experienced significant health issues. Notwithstanding her health issues, the dissolution
court found that Doyle was “physically and mentally capable of being employed at a
minimum in a flexible part-time capacity” as an attorney. It found that Doyle’s
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reasonable monthly budget was $10,223. Based on its determination that Doyle could
become self-sufficient after five years, it ordered Klein to pay temporary spousal
maintenance until May 2013.
After Doyle appealed, we remanded for the district court to make more detailed
findings regarding Doyle’s expected future income. Doyle v. Klein, No. A09-200, 2010
WL 771628, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 9, 2010) (Doyle I). Although we stated that “the
district court’s findings regarding [Doyle’s] expenses are sufficient,” we also observed
that that the district court had “never specifically indicated what portion of [the] total
amount [of Doyle’s expenses] was for [her] personal monthly expenses” versus expenses
for the children, but, “by subtracting from the total the $2,208 the [district] court awarded
her in monthly child support,” we opined that “it is clear that the [district] court
essentially found appellant’s [post-emancipation] reasonable monthly expenses to be
$8,015.” Id.
On remand, Klein argued that the court of appeals had misinterpreted the district
court’s factual findings, and he urged the district court to clarify that it did not intend to
find that Doyle’s reasonable monthly expenses exceeded her own proposed amount. But
the district court adopted the court of appeals calculations, stating that “[t]he Court of
Appeals held the findings related to said expenses are sufficient.” Klein did not move the
district court for amended findings on this point.
Based on its assessment of Doyle’s earning potential and the limitations imposed
by her childcare responsibilities, the district court found that “she [would] experience a
shortfall of $5,418” per month until February 2011, $4,169 per month by May 2011,
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$2,689 per month by May 2012, and $1,520 per month by June 2013. It ordered Klein to
pay Doyle $7,225 per month in spousal maintenance for the period of August 10, 2007
through January 31, 2011, $5,560 per month for the period of February 1, 2011 through
April 30, 2012, and $3,586 per month for the period of May 1, 2012 through May 31,
2013, after which spousal maintenance payments would cease. It noted that these
payments, when combined with Doyle’s expected income, would exceed her reasonable
monthly expenses, but it explained that this was necessary to account for the tax impact
of Doyle’s receipt of spousal maintenance.
Doyle appealed again, challenging the district court’s finding that she would
become capable of full-time employment and that the district court’s estimates of the tax
impacts of her receipt of spousal maintenance were insufficiently detailed and not
supported by the record. Doyle v. Klein, No. A12-0751, 2013 WL 2922755, at *1, 9-11
(Minn. App. June 17, 2013) (Doyle II). Klein did not file a notice of related appeal, nor
did he challenge the district court’s adoption of the $8,015 figure in his responsive brief.
This court reversed in part and remanded, critiquing the district court’s reliance on
unfounded and unrealistic expectations of salary increases for entry-level attorneys, and
directing the district court to reconsider Doyle’s expected income increases and to more
clearly spell out the basis for its tax-burden calculations. Id. at *9-11. Specifically, this
court noted that the evidence presented to the district court did not support its calculations
of yearly salary increases based on experience, especially given evidence in the record
indicating that attorney salaries in the Twin Cities “only increased 2%” each year
between 2006 and 2010. Id. at *8-9. When describing the Doyle I decision, we stated
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that “[w]e affirmed the district court’s finding regarding [Doyle’s] monthly expenses,
which were $10,233 for [Doyle] and the children, and $8,015 for [Doyle] after the
children emancipated.” Id. at *2.
On remand from Doyle II, the district court denied Klein’s motion to “adjust or
reconsider” Doyle’s reasonable monthly expenses, citing this court’s “affirmation” of its
finding. It found “a 25% tax burden for [Doyle] to be appropriate.” Citing “the Court of
Appeals’ rejection of Ms. Lowe’s calculations and the only other evidence in the record,”
it decided “to use a 2% annual salary increase to determine [Doyle’s] annual salary.” It
awarded Doyle permanent spousal maintenance of $3,771 per month.
Doyle moved the district court for amended findings, arguing that the district
court’s permanent spousal maintenance award failed to account for the consequences of
the 25% tax burden she incurred as a result of its spousal maintenance award. Klein also
moved the district court for amended findings, arguing that the district court had
misinterpreted this court’s use of the $8,015 figure for Doyle’s reasonable monthly
expenses, and that this figure contradicted the district court’s own factual findings. The
district court denied both motions, stating that the court of appeals had decided both
issues.
Klein moved the district court to preclude enforcement of the cost-of-living
adjustment provision from the original dissolution decree, arguing that it was not
authorized under Minn. Stat. § 518A.75 (2012) because two years had not elapsed since
the district court’s action on remand after Doyle II. Doyle moved the district court to
enforce the cost-of-living adjustment provision. The district court granted Klein’s
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motion, and denied Doyle’s, ruling that its intention when awarding permanent spousal
maintenance after remand from Doyle II had been to “provide a level of maintenance not
subject to yearly cost-of-living adjustments.”
Doyle appealed both the district court’s denial of her motion for amended findings
and its denial of her motion to implement the cost-of-living adjustment provision. By
order of July 30, 2014, this court consolidated the appeals. Klein filed a timely notice of
related appeal.
DECISION
I.
Doyle challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to “gross up” her
permanent spousal maintenance award to account for the tax consequences of her receipt
of spousal maintenance. We review a district court’s spousal maintenance award for
abuse of discretion. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 2997). It is within a
district court’s discretion to consider tax consequences, but the district court is not
required to do so. See Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. 2001) (holding
that a “bright-line rule would leave little, if any, room for the exercise of discretion”); cf.
id. at 608 (holding that “it would be inequitable to preclude a [district] court from
considering future tax consequences” (emphasis added)).
Doyle cites no authority requiring the district court to consider the tax
consequences of a permanent spousal maintenance award. Instead, she argues that the
district court’s practice of considering tax consequences in its other calculations requires
that it continue to do so when awarding permanent spousal maintenance. But Doyle also
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cites no authority requiring a district court to continue considering tax consequences if it
has considered them in the past. As such, her argument amounts to an assertion
unsupported by legal authority, and we therefore affirm the district court’s denial of
Doyle’s motion. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 518,
519-20, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971) (“[A]ssignment of error based on mere assertion
and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will
not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”).
II.
Klein challenges the district court’s permanent spousal maintenance award,
arguing that it erroneously used a 2% annual salary increase for Doyle. District courts
have “broad discretion” when determining how to proceed on remand, Janssen v. Best &
Flanagan, LLP, 704 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 2005), but “[i]t is the duty of the [district]
court on remand to execute the mandate of this court strictly according to its terms,”
Halverson v. Vill. of Deerwood, 322 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. 1982), and “[t]he [district]
court may not vary the mandate . . . or decide issues beyond those remanded,” In re
Estate of Boysen, 351 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Minn. App. 1984).
On remand after Doyle II, the district court stated that its use of the 2% annual
wage-increase amount was based on the court of appeals’ remand instructions. In Doyle
II, we noted that a witness had testified that Twin Cities attorneys generally were
expected to experience “2% wage inflation increases between 2011 and 2013” as well as
between 2007 and 2010. 2013 WL 2922755, at *8. Although we did not specifically
instruct the district court to use the 2% wage-inflation figure as the sole factor in
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predicting Doyle’s future income, we held that the district court’s predictions that Doyle
would receive “aggressive” salary increases were unsupported by the record. Id. Based
on this holding, the district court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding on remand
based solely on the 2% annual wage-increase evidence that remained unchallenged in the
record.1
III.
Klein also challenges the district court’s use of $8,015 as the amount of Doyle’s
post-emancipation reasonable monthly expenses. As a threshold matter, we consider
whether our statements in Doyle I and Doyle II addressing the $8,015 figure should
preclude Klein from raising it here. The law-of-the-case doctrine “applies where an
appellate court has ruled on a legal issue and has remanded the case to the [district] court
for further proceedings.” Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 744 n.1 (Minn. 1994). “Issues
determined in a first appeal will not be relitigated in the [district] court nor reexamined in
a second appeal.” Mattson v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 414 N.W.2d 717, 720
(Minn. 1987). “[T]he underlying principle [is] that an adjudication of the merits of an
issue is conclusive, and should not be relitigated . . . .” Loo, 520 N.W.2d at 744. The
doctrine “is based upon the ground that there would be no end to a suit if every obstinate
litigant could, by repeated appeals compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions
1
We also note that, if Doyle’s future wage increases exceed the district court’s 2%
annual prediction, Klein may bring a motion to modify the permanent spousal
maintenance award in light of Doyle’s actual income. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd.
2(a)(1) (2014) (allowing a motion for modification of spousal maintenance to address
“substantially increased . . . income of an . . . obligee”).
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. . . .” Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc., 116 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn. 1962)
(quotation omitted).
Klein contends that, notwithstanding our statements in Doyle I and Doyle II, his
challenge to the district court’s post-Doyle I adoption of the $8,015 figure for Doyle’s
post-emancipation expenses is not barred because the law-of-the-case doctrine applies
only to legal issues, not factual matters. See Dean Van Horn Consulting Assocs., Inc. v.
Wold, 395 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine
did not apply to a factual matter). But our statements in Doyle I and Doyle II addressed a
legal issue: the sufficiency of the district court’s findings regarding Doyle’s expenses.
Klein is therefore precluded from relitigating, as he attempts to here, whether the district
court’s factual finding is sufficiently supported by the record.
The law-of-the-case doctrine “may also be applied to unappealed [district] court
decisions made at an earlier stage of the same case.” Emp’rs Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Breaux,
516 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. App. 1994), review dismissed (Minn. Sept. 16, 1994). Even
if we allowed that Klein could have reasonably contested the $8,015 finding
notwithstanding our statement in Doyle I, he did not raise that issue in Doyle II, and he
did not file a petition for further review with the supreme court in either Doyle I or Doyle
II. As such, he forfeited his opportunity to contest the issue and is precluded from
challenging it now even if “none of the principles or doctrines requiring that judicial
decisions have preclusive effect apply to this case in a technical sense.” Loo, 520
N.W.2d at 743-44; see also id. at 744 n.2 (holding that, even where the law-of-the-case
doctrine (or the related doctrine of res judicata) does not “quite fit,” preclusion applies
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when necessary to protect the “finality of judgments”). We echo the sentiment expressed
by the supreme court in General Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 303 Minn. 565,
565, 228 N.W.2d 261, 261 (1975): “[T]here comes a time when litigation must end. We
believe that time has arrived in this case.”
IV.
Having addressed issues arising from the long-running litigation over the terms of
the district court’s 2008 judgment and decree, we turn now to Doyle’s motion to enforce
a cost-of-living adjustment provision. Doyle argues that the district court erred by
denying her motion to implement a cost-of-living adjustment to her permanent spousal
maintenance award. “A district court has broad discretion over issues of spousal
maintenance, and generally we will not reverse a decision regarding maintenance absent
an abuse of this discretion.” Grachek v. Grachek, 750 N.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Minn. App.
2008), review denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2008). But when the issue involves the
interpretation of a statute, we review it de novo. Id. at 331.
A district court must include a cost-of-living adjustment provision when it
establishes, modifies, or enforces a spousal maintenance agreement. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.75, subd. 1(a) (2014). But it “may waive the requirement of the cost-of-living
clause if it expressly finds . . . that the order for maintenance . . . has a provision such as a
step increase that has the effect of a cost-of-living clause.” Id., subd. 1(b) (emphasis
added).
The district court here stated that its 2% annual adjustments to Doyle’s expected
income on remand after Doyle II “effectively provide a level of maintenance not subject
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to yearly cost-of-living adjustments.” Klein argues that this is a finding that these
adjustments are step increases that have the effect of a cost-of-living clause. But the
district court’s and Klein’s analyses turn the meaning of a cost-of-living adjustment on its
head. A cost-of-living adjustment is “[a]n automatic increase or decrease in the amount
of money, usu[ally] support or maintenance, to be paid by one party to another, the
adjustment being tied to the cost-of-living-adjustment figures maintained and updated by
the federal government.” Black’s Law Dictionary 399 (9th ed. 2009); see also Minn.
Stat. § 518A.75, subd. 1(a) (noting the sources that may be used to calculate cost-of-
living adjustments). A cost-of-living adjustment is therefore based on expected changes
in a maintenance recipient’s expenses, not her income. The district court’s consideration
of presumed 2% annual increases in Doyle’s income would leave her expected expenses
unchanged and have the effect of decreasing, rather than increasing, her spousal
maintenance award. As such, they are not step increases having the effect of a cost-of-
living-adjustment clause within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 518A.75, subd. 1(b). We
therefore reverse the district court’s denial of Doyle’s motion to implement a cost-of-
living adjustment, and remand with instructions for the district court to implement a cost-
of-living adjustment in Doyle’s spousal maintenance award in a manner consistent with
this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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