In re the Marriage of: Rachelle Frances Norgren v. Randy Dean Norgren ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0194
In re the Marriage of:
Rachelle Frances Norgren, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Randy Dean Norgren,
Appellant.
Filed October 19, 2015
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-FA-08-1528
Dennis W. Hagstrom, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)
Charles A. Krekelberg, Krekelberg, Skonseng & Miller, PLLP, Pelican Rapids,
Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.*
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
In this post-dissolution appeal, appellant husband argues that the dissolution
judgment should be reopened to permit a civil judgment for damages to be included in
the marital estate and divided between the parties. We affirm.
FACTS
The 32-year marriage of appellant-husband Randy Dean Norgren and respondent-
wife Rachelle Frances Norgren was dissolved on February 5, 2014. The parties’ marital
income was derived from a farm, a gas station, and wife’s employment in health care.
After wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage in 2008, the district court issued a
temporary order directing husband to manage the parties’ farm and share with wife 50%
of any profits from the farm after deducting related expenses.
While the temporary order was in effect, in January 2011, Roger Halverson
brought a trespass lawsuit against husband for damages caused by three of husband and
wife’s cows. The cows allegedly got out of a fenced pasture, wandered onto Halverson’s
property, and, over the course of a week, damaged numerous trees on Halverson’s
property, which is a commercial tree operation. Halverson sought $31,250 in actual
damages and statutory treble damages for trespass involving damage to trees, as provided
for under Minn. Stat. § 561.04 (2010).
According to husband, because he reads at a first-grade level, either his daughter
or wife assisted him in reading and answering the trespass complaint. When husband
received a motion for summary judgment in the trespass action on August 16, 2013, his
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daughter read the motion papers to him, but he did not respond to the motion. Husband
also did not attend the summary-judgment hearing because “[he] didn’t think [he] had to
in order to get a trial date.” On September 23, 2013, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Halverson and ordered entry of judgment in the claimed amount of
$93,750.
Also on September 23, 2013, husband and wife entered into an oral stipulation that
was incorporated into the dissolution judgment. Husband asserts that he was not aware
of the trespass judgment until January 2014. The dissolution judgment was entered on
February 5, 2014.
In an August 7, 2014 order, the district court denied husband’s motion to vacate
and set aside the trespass judgment. The court rejected husband’s arguments that (1) the
judgment was the result of his excusable neglect and included factual misrepresentations
and (2) the damages award was inequitable.
On August 28, 2014, husband moved to reopen and modify the dissolution
judgment to include the damages awarded in the trespass judgment as a marital debt to be
divided between the parties. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion,
ruling that husband is solely responsible for the trespass damages because he had not
shown excusable neglect, mistake, or inequity to support reopening the dissolution
judgment and decree under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1), (5) (2014). This appeal
followed.
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DECISION
Whether to reopen a dissolution judgment and decree under Minn. Stat. § 518.145,
subd. 2, is a decision within the district court’s discretion. Clark v. Clark, 642 N.W.2d
459, 465 (Minn. App. 2002). “The moving party bears the burden of establishing a basis
to reopen the judgment and decree.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 428
(Minn. App. 2007). A district court abuses its discretion if it acts “against logic and the
facts on record.” Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002).
A dissolution stipulation is considered a binding contract. Shirk v. Shirk, 561
N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997); see Anderson v. Anderson, 303 Minn. 26, 32, 225
N.W.2d 837, 840 (1975) (stating that courts favor the use of stipulations in dissolution
proceedings and that “[w]here the parties stipulate as to the facts, the effect of the
stipulation is to take the place of evidence”). A stipulation may be vacated for equitable
reasons, but “upon entry of a judgment and decree based on a stipulation, different
circumstances arise, as the dissolution is now complete and the need for finality becomes
of central importance.” Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 521-22. A dissolution decree is final when
entered, subject to the right of appeal. Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 1 (2014).
The statute governing reopening a dissolution judgment and decree provides:
On motion and upon terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party from a judgment and decree, order, or
proceeding under this chapter, except for provisions
dissolving the bonds of marriage, annulling the marriage, or
directing that the parties are legally separated, and may order
a new trial or grant other relief as may be just for the
following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
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(2) newly discovered evidence . . .;
(3) fraud . . . or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment and decree or order is void; or
(5) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment and
decree or order should have prospective application.
The motion must be made within a reasonable time,
and for a reason under clause (1), (2), or (3), not more
than one year after the judgment and decree, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken.
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.
In the district court, husband asserted two statutory grounds for reopening the
dissolution judgment and decree: “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect,” and that it was not “equitable” to exclude the trespass damages from the
dissolution judgment and decree. On appeal, husband asserts that the trespass judgment
was excluded by “mistake,” the trespass judgment constitutes an “encumbrance” on the
farm operation that the dissolution decree directs to be distributed to both parties, and the
district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion and inequitable.
Mistake/excusable neglect.
There are several undisputed facts that make husband’s failure to raise the issue of
the outstanding trespass judgment during the dissolution proceeding not excusable and
not a mistake: (1) husband admittedly became aware of the trespass judgment in January
2014, but he did not inform the district court about the judgment until August 2014, six
months after the February 2014 dissolution judgment was entered; (2) although husband
admitted that he received the trespass complaint and responded to it, he incorrectly
concluded that the trespass lawsuit had “gone away” and did not account for potential
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damages from the lawsuit in the proposed dissolution stipulation; (3) husband did not
appear at the summary-judgment hearing in the trespass action, although he admitted that
he received notice of the hearing; and (4) husband was represented by counsel in the
dissolution action, and the district court in the trespass action found that husband had
been involved in prior lawsuits, all of which should have prompted him to seek legal
counsel in the trespass action. See Black v. Rimmer, 700 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Minn. App.
2005) (stating that a party’s neglect that leads to an adverse judgment is inexcusable),
review dismissed (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005); Elk River Enters., Inc. v. Adams, 357 N.W.2d
139, 140 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that a party’s nonappearance at a hearing is not
excusable when it is intentional).
In rejecting husband’s excusable-neglect argument, the district court stated that
husband
knew of the [trespass] judgment prior to the final hearing and
entry of the Judgment and Decree on February 5, 2014. His
neglect has been found inexcusable in the [trespass] matter
and due to his knowledge of the [trespass] lawsuit and
judgment prior to entry of the Judgment and Decree, this
Court must find that [husband] has not made a showing of
excusable neglect.
The district court’s reasoning is not against logic and the facts on record.
The district court also found that husband failed to meet his burden to show that
the failure to address the trespass damages in the dissolution judgment and decree was a
mistake. Husband’s awareness of the trespass judgment before the dissolution judgment
became final contradicts his claim of mistake. The district court found that husband “was
aware of the [trespass] judgment against him prior to its entry” and could have taken
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actions to correct the omission of the trespass judgment in the dissolution stipulation, but
did not. Again, the district court’s reasoning is not against logic and the facts on record.
Husband’s actions do not show excusable neglect or mistake within the meaning
of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying husband’s motion to reopen the dissolution judgment and decree to include the
damages awarded in the trespass action.
Other issues.
Husband included two additional issues in his appellate brief. Husband argues
that (1) the trespass judgment is an encumbrance included under the provision in the
judgment and decree that requires payment of all outstanding mortgages and
encumbrances on the premises awarded to the parties as tenants in common to be sold by
auction; and (2) the district court’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to
law, and therefore an abuse of discretion and inequitable in consideration of the facts in
this particular case.”
(1) The decree awarded the farm to the parties as tenants in common, required
the farm to be sold, and required that the sale proceeds be distributed equally to the
parties after, among other actions, “all the outstanding mortgages and encumbrances on
the premises” are paid off. The issue whether the trespass judgment constituted an
encumbrance on the farm was not raised in the district court, and the district court did not
consider the issue. We, therefore, decline to address the issue for the first time on appeal.
See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (explaining that an appellate court
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will only consider issues on appeal that were presented to and considered by the district
court).
(2) Husband combines a general argument that the district court’s decision not
to reopen the dissolution judgment was an abuse of discretion with an argument that the
district court should have reopened the dissolution judgment for equitable reasons under
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(5). “[T]o reopen a judgment and decree because
prospective application is no longer equitable, the inequity must result from the
development of circumstances substantially altering the information known when the
dissolution judgment and decree was entered.” Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 430 (quotation
omitted). The district court considers “whether there is inequity in prospective
application of the judgment and decree as a result of the development of circumstances
beyond the parties’ control that substantially alter the information known when the
judgment and decree was entered.” Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
Husband does not identify any circumstances that substantially alter the
information known to him when the dissolution judgment was entered, nor does the
record suggest the existence of such information. Husband, therefore, has not identified
any changed circumstances necessary to reopen the dissolution on the theory that it is no
longer equitable. Furthermore, other facts suggest, and the district court found, that
appellant’s neglect in defending the trespass action vitiates his equity claim now, because
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he could have taken actions that may have successfully defended against the trespass
action, or at least reduced the damages award.
Affirmed.
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