State of Minnesota v. Daniel Leith Renville ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1265
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Daniel Leith Renville,
Appellant
Filed August 4, 2014
Affirmed
Toussaint, Judge*
Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-12-852
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota;
Steven S. Collins, Redwood County Attorney, Ryan S. Hansch, Assistant County
Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
TOUSSAINT, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the district court erred by excluding evidence that illuminated appellant’s
relationship with the victim, and by allowing the state to impeach him with prior felony
convictions. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary
determinations and there is sufficient evidence to support the convictions, we affirm.
DECISION
Evidentiary ruling
On March 13, 2013, a jury found appellant Daniel Leith Renville guilty of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct. Renville argues that the district court abused its
discretion by excluding evidence that would have explained his relationship with the
victim. When challenging the district court’s evidentiary rulings, an appellant “has the
burden of establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that appellant was
thereby prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). When the
district court errs by excluding evidence, we consider whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the excluded evidence would have significantly affected the verdict. State
v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2 (Minn. 1994). If there is a reasonable possibility that the
verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant with the evidence, the error is
prejudicial, and we will reverse and remand for a new trial. Id.
Renville argues that the district court should have allowed him to testify that he
and the victim, M.D., smoked marijuana together the day that he assaulted her, claiming
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that this evidence illuminated their relationship, tested her ability to accurately perceive
and remember events, and explained a reference she made in a text message. He also
claims that exclusion of the evidence deprived him of his right to present his version of
the facts.
A defendant has a constitutional right to fundamental fairness and the opportunity
to present a complete defense. State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. App. 1995),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996); U.S. Const. amend. V; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7. To
this end, a defendant has the right to present evidence that is material and favorable to his
theory of defense. Crims, 540 N .W.2d at 866. But this does not include the right to
present evidence that is irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative. Id. The district
court concluded that the prejudicial effect of Renville’s proffered evidence outweighed
its probative value.
Renville argues that evidence that he and M.D. smoked marijuana together was
relevant to show that they were hanging out and getting to know each other. But M.D.
and Renville both testified about how they met that day and spent time together. M.D.
testified that she and Renville spent time together around their children, but that Renville
sexually assaulted her when she rejected his advances. Renville testified that M.D.
initiated oral sex on him; they were interrupted by M.D.’s son. Later that day, M.D.
again initiated sexual contact, which resulted in consensual intercourse. Thus, Renville’s
defense, that consensual intercourse occurred, was fully presented.
Renville argues that the evidence of mutual marijuana use also challenges M.D.’s
ability to perceive and remember events. But Renville failed to make an offer of proof
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that her alleged marijuana use had this effect. See State v. Harris, 713 N.W.2d 844, 848
(Minn. 2006) (stating that in absence of an offer of proof, appellate court cannot assess
the significance of the excluded testimony, unless it is readily apparent from the
evidence). Additionally, the district court excluded any evidence related to Renville’s
alleged drug use as well; marijuana use would also affect his memory and perception.
Renville argues that the evidence also would explain a text message that M.D. sent
the morning after the assault telling a friend that Renville assaulted her. In the message,
M.D. stated that Renville had gotten “trees 4 us.” Renville asserts that “trees” is slang for
marijuana. He claims that the jury should have been allowed to evaluate M.D.’s
credibility when confronted with the reference to “trees” and her denial that “trees”
referred to marijuana. But Renville is assuming that M.D. would have made such a
denial.
Not only does Renville fail to show that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding this evidence, but he fails to show prejudice. Based on the record, there is not
a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to Renville with
this evidence. See Post, 512 N.W.2d at 102 n.2. The jury rejected Renville’s version of
events. See State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980) (stating that weighing
the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive function of the jury). Other evidence
supported M.D.’s testimony, including Renville’s initial statement to police denying a
consensual encounter and a physician’s testimony corroborating M.D.’s description of
her injury.
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Prior convictions
Renville argues that the district court erred by allowing the state to introduce
evidence of his prior felony domestic-assault and motor-vehicle-theft convictions for
impeachment purposes. The district court found that the prior felony convictions were
admissible after conducting a Jones analysis and determining that the evidence was more
probative than prejudicial. See State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978).
A district court’s ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment
of a defendant is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Ihnot, 575
N.W.2d 581, 584 (Minn. 1998). Evidence of a prior conviction is admissible for
impeachment purposes if the crime is punishable by more than one year in prison and the
probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect, or if the conviction is for a crime
involving dishonesty or false statement. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). In making this
determination, the district court considers the following factors:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of
the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the
greater the similarity, the greater the reason for not permitting
use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of
defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility
issue.
State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 654 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Jones, 271 N.W.2d at
538). The district court “should demonstrate on the record that it has considered and
weighed the Jones factors.” Id. at 655.
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Impeachment value
A prior conviction need not involve a crime of dishonesty. Any felony conviction
can be used for impeachment, if “the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect.” Minn. R. Evid. 609(a). “[A] prior conviction can have
impeachment value by helping the jury see the ‘whole person’ of the defendant and better
evaluate his or her truthfulness.” Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655 (citing State v. Gassler,
505 N.W.2d 62, 66-67 (Minn. 1993)); see also State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702, 707
(Minn. 1979). “[I]t is the general lack of respect for the law, rather than the specific
nature of the conviction, that informs the [jury] about a witness’s credibility.” State v.
Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. 2011) (stating that felony convictions are probative of
a witness’s credibility, and the fact that a witness is a convicted felon has impeachment
value).
The district court ruled that this factor weighed in favor of admissibility because
Renville chose to testify and with that decision asked the jury to accept his word. The
court stated that the jury should be informed about Renville’s trustworthiness and
contempt for the law when asking them to believe him. Because Renville’s felony
convictions have probative value under the whole-person rationale, the district court
correctly determined that this factor weighed in favor of admissibility.
Date of conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history
Convictions occurring within ten years of trial are presumptively not stale.
Gassler, 505 N.W.2d at 67; Minn. R. Evid. 609(b). The district court determined that this
factor weighed in favor of admissibility because Renville’s prior convictions occurred
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within ten years—motor-vehicle theft in March 2004 and felony domestic assault in
March 2009. The district court also stated that the convictions were not, “in light of
[Renville’s] criminal history, isolated incidents.” The district court correctly determined
that this factor weighed in favor of admissibility.
Similarity of the past crime with the charged crime
The greater the similarity of the alleged offense to the prior conviction, the more
likely it is that the conviction is more prejudicial than probative. Jones, 271 N.W.2d at
538. “[I]f the prior conviction is similar to the charged crime, there is a heightened
danger that the jury will use the evidence not only for impeachment purposes, but also
substantively.” Gassler, 505 N.W.2d at 67.
The district court correctly concluded that Renville’s prior convictions were not
similar to the charged offense and weighed in favor of admissibility. See id. at 64, 66-67
(prior second-degree attempted-murder conviction admissible in first-degree murder
trial); State v. Frank, 364 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Minn. 1985) (prior rape convictions
admissible in first-degree-criminal-sexual-conduct trial).
Importance of defendant’s testimony and the centrality of the credibility issue
Courts may consider the fourth and fifth Jones factors together. See Swanson, 707
N.W.2d at 655 (grouping the fourth and fifth factors together). “[I]f the defendant’s
credibility is the central issue in the case . . . a greater case can be made for admitting the
impeachment evidence, because the need for the evidence is greater.” State v. Bettin, 295
N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980). Credibility is central to the case “if the issue for the jury
narrows to a choice between defendant’s credibility and that of one other person.” Id.
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The district court determined that these factors weighed in favor of admissibility
because: “if [Renville] decides to testify and offers testimony that conflicts with the
State’s witnesses, his credibility would certainly be central to his case.” Because
Renville testified and his credibility was a central issue the district court correctly
determined that this factor weighed in favor of admissibility.
Renville argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a
separate Jones analysis for each conviction. The Minnesota Supreme Court has allowed
district courts to apply the Jones factors to several prior convictions in one analysis. See
State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 680-81 (Minn. 2007) (applying the Jones factors to five
prior convictions in one analysis).
Renville also argues that the district court failed to instruct the jury on how to use
the evidence. But the district court stated in final jury instructions: “[Y]ou must be
especially careful to consider any previous conviction only as it may affect the weight of
the defendant’s testimony. You must not consider any previous conviction as evidence of
guilt of the offense for which the defendant is on trial.” Because the Jones factors weigh
in favor of admissibility, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
Renville’s prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes.
Pro se claims
In his pro se supplemental brief, Renville argues that his trial counsel admitted his
guilt in the presence of the jury and failed to obtain exonerating evidence, and that the
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district court failed to offer him a continuance. A thorough review of the record shows
that Renville’s claims lack merit.
Affirmed.
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