Philip Carl Naatz v. Commissioner of Public Safety ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-2113
Philip Carl Naatz, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent
Filed July 28, 2014
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CV-13-616
Cecil E. Naatz, Marshall, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Anne Catherine Fuchs, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
Appellant seeks review of a district court order sustaining the revocation of his
driver’s license under the implied-consent statute. We affirm.
FACTS
Marshall police officer Derick Determan was on routine patrol just after 3:00 a.m.
when he stopped a vehicle driven by appellant Philip Carl Naatz because one of the
vehicle’s headlights was out. Determan noticed that appellant had trouble pulling over
and operating his blinkers. While talking with appellant, Determan observed signs of
alcohol consumption. Appellant admitted drinking four or five beers that evening. After
appellant failed field sobriety tests, Determan arrested appellant and transported him to
jail. Determan read appellant the implied-consent advisory, and appellant said that he
understood the advisory. Appellant exercised his right to consult with an attorney, and
then he agreed to submit to a breath test, which revealed an alcohol concentration of .12.
Appellant’s driver’s license was revoked under the implied-consent statute, Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.52, subd. 4(a) (2012).
Appellant petitioned for judicial review of the order revoking his license, and the
parties submitted the matter on an evidentiary record that included the police reports.
Appellant narrowed the issues presented to the district court to whether the breath-test
result should be suppressed based upon Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
The district court made the following findings of fact: appellant’s vehicle was stopped
for a traffic violation; appellant was arrested for driving while impaired; the implied-
consent advisory was read to appellant; appellant exercised his right to speak with an
attorney; after conferring with an attorney, appellant agreed to take a breath test; and
appellant’s license was revoked after the test revealed that his alcohol concentration was
.12. The district court concluded that appellant knowingly and voluntarily consented to
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the breath test. The court denied appellant’s petition to rescind the revocation. This
appeal followed.
DECISION
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; accord Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. This right extends to people who are detained by police on suspicion of drunk
driving and asked to submit to chemical testing for the presence of alcohol. McNeely,
133 S. Ct. at 1558 (blood testing). A warrant is necessary for such a search unless an
exception to the warrant requirement applies. Id. When the facts are undisputed, the
validity of a search is a question of law, which we review de novo. Haase v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 679 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Minn. App. 2004).
In McNeely, the Supreme Court held that “natural metabolization of alcohol in the
bloodstream [does not] present[] a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-
driving cases” and that “exigency in this context must be determined case by case based
on the totality of the circumstances.” 133 S. Ct. at 1556. In State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d
563, 567 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014), the Minnesota Supreme
Court acknowledged that, under McNeely, three warrantless searches of Brooks’s blood
and urine could not “be upheld solely because of the exigency created by the dissipation
of alcohol in the body.” But the supreme court also considered whether the searches
could be upheld because Brooks consented to the searches. Id.
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In the first incident, after Brooks was stopped for an apparent traffic violation, he
showed signs of intoxication, was read the implied-consent advisory, sought advice of
counsel, and agreed to provide a urine sample. Id. at 565. In the second incident, after
Brooks was stopped because sparks were flying underneath his vehicle, he showed signs
of intoxication, was read the implied-consent advisory, sought advice of counsel, and
agreed to take a blood test. Id. In the third incident, Brooks was stopped while asleep
behind the steering wheel of a running vehicle, showed signs of intoxication, was arrested
and read the implied-consent advisory, sought advice of counsel, and agreed to a urine
test. Id. at 565-66.
The supreme court analyzed the totality of the circumstances in each of the three
incidents and applied the preponderance-of-evidence standard to determine the validity of
the warrantless searches under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at
568-70. The supreme court rejected Brooks’s claim that, because test refusal is a crime
in Minnesota, his consent was coerced. Id. at 570. The supreme court held “that Brooks
voluntarily consented to the searches . . . .” Id. at 569-70, 572.
The district court issued its order denying appellant’s petition for rescission before
the Minnesota Supreme Court released its opinion in State v. Brooks. But the district
court applied essentially the same analysis to the warrantless search in this case as the
supreme court applied to the searches in Brooks. Appellant’s letter brief to this court
acknowledges that the supreme court’s decision in Brooks “would seem to be dispositive
of this appellate issue” unless further review was granted in Brooks. Further review was
not granted.
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The district court record and findings show that police had reasonable grounds for
stopping appellant’s vehicle and for suspecting that appellant was under the influence;
appellant was read the implied-consent advisory, said he understood the advisory,
consulted with an attorney, and agreed to take a breath test. As in Brooks, these
circumstances establish that the warrantless search was valid because appellant
voluntarily consented to the search.
Affirmed.
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