Richard Allen Gumphrey v. Commissioner of Public Safety ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1387
Richard Allen Gumphrey, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.
Filed July 7, 2014
Affirmed
Chutich, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No.: 27-CV-13-5289
Eric J. Nelson, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori A. Swanson, Attorney General, Stephanie Hilstrom, Assistant Attorney General,
Uzodima Franklin Aba-Onu, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Chutich, Judge; and
Huspeni, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Appellant Richard Allen Gumphrey challenges the district court’s order sustaining
the revocation of his driver’s license. Because the totality of circumstances establishes
that he voluntarily consented to a breath test, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 21, 2013, at approximately 1:17 a.m., Officer David Hackley of the
Maple Grove Police Department observed a vehicle that crossed over fog lines on two
occasions while exiting a freeway. As the vehicle turned right off the exit ramp, it again
drifted over the fog line, crossed into a right-hand turn lane, then veered back into the
lane of traffic.
Officer Hackley stopped the vehicle and identified the driver as appellant Richard
Allen Gumphrey. In conversing with Gumphrey, Officer Hackley detected “a strong
odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle.” Officer Hackley then conducted
field sobriety tests and performed a preliminary breath test. Officer Hackley arrested
Gumphrey on suspicion of driving while impaired and transported him to the Maple
Grove Police Department.
At 1:56 a.m., Officer Hackley read Gumphrey the implied-consent advisory,
which included the statement, “[y]ou have the right to consult with an attorney. If you
wish to do so, a telephone and directory will be available to you.” When asked if he
understood the advisory, Gumphrey responded that he did. When asked if he wished to
consult with an attorney, Gumphrey stated that he did not. Gumphrey agreed to take a
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breath test and Officer Timothy Erickson administered the test. The breath test resulted
in a reported value of .11 registered at 2:11 a.m.
Because Gumphrey’s alcohol concentration was over the legal limit, the
Commissioner of Public Safety (commissioner) revoked Gumphrey’s driver’s license.
Gumphrey petitioned for judicial review of the revocation of his driver’s license. On
May 14, 2013, the district court held a hearing and subsequently issued an order
sustaining the revocation of Gumphrey’s driver’s license. It found that Gumphrey was
read the implied-consent advisory, understood it, and then agreed to take the breath test.
The district court concluded that “[t]here is no evidence of exigent circumstances,
but there is evidence of consent given knowingly, freely, and voluntarily.” This appeal
followed.
DECISION
Gumphrey argues that the district court erred in concluding that the totality of the
circumstances establishes that he validly consented to the search. We disagree.
“When the facts are not in dispute, the validity of a search is a question of law
subject to de novo review.” Haase v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 679 N.W.2d 743, 745
(Minn. App. 2004). In reviewing the constitutionality of a search, “we independently
analyze the undisputed facts to determine whether evidence resulting from the search
should be suppressed.” Id. We do not overturn a district court’s conclusions of law
“absent erroneous construction and application of the law to the facts.” Id. In an
implied-consent case, the commissioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that a search was constitutional. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846
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(Minn. 2011); see Johnson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 392 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Minn. App.
1986).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee people the right to be
free from unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10.
Taking a sample of a person’s breath is a search under the Fourth Amendment and
requires a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412–13 (1989); State v. Netland,
762 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Minn. 2009). Consent is such an exception. Diede, 795 N.W.2d
at 846.
The supreme court recently held in State v. Brooks that a driver may validly
consent to testing after being informed that refusal to submit to testing is a crime. State v.
Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). The
Brooks court acknowledged that chemical testing under the implied-consent statute is a
search subject to Fourth Amendment protections; a warrant is required unless the search
falls under an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. “For a search to fall under the
consent exception, the [s]tate must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant freely and voluntarily consented.” Id.In determining whether consent is voluntary, this court considers the totality of the
circumstances, “including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is,
and what was said and how it was said.” Id. at 568–69 (quotation omitted). In the
implied-consent context, the nature of the encounter includes how the police came to
suspect that the driver was driving under the influence, how the request to submit to
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chemical testing was made, including whether the driver was read the implied-consent
advisory, and whether the driver had the right to consult with an attorney. Id. at 569.
Gumphrey relies on Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S. Ct. 1788(1968), to contend that the commissioner failed to establish that he consented to the
breath test, but Bumper does not compel that result. In Bumper, a law enforcement
officer claimed authority under a search warrant to search a home and the homeowner
allowed him to execute the purported search warrant. Id. at 546–47, 88 S. Ct. at 1791.
The record contained no evidence that a valid search warrant was issued to the officer,
however. Id. at 549–50 n.15, 88 S. Ct. at 1792. The Supreme Court held that “[a] search
conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it
turns out that the warrant was invalid.” Id. at 549, 88 S. Ct. at 1792. It reasoned that
without a warrant, the state has the burden to prove that the person consented to the
search, and that the “burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence
to a claim of lawful authority.” Id. at 548–49, 88 S. Ct. at 1792.
Gumphrey asserts that, similar to Bumper, the commissioner failed to establish
more than his “acquiescence” to the breath test. As the trier of fact, the district court is in
the best position to distinguish between “consent” and mere “acquiescence,” however.
See State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (stating that “the trier of fact
is in the best position to determine credibility and weigh the evidence”). In reviewing the
district court’s findings for error, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in
finding that Gumphrey’s “consent [was] given knowingly, freely, and voluntarily.” See
Haase, 679 N.W.2d at 745. Officer Hackley read Gumphrey the implied-consent
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advisory, and Gumphrey said that he understood it. Officer Hackley did not state that he
was acting pursuant to a warrant and did not otherwise act coercively in requesting the
breath test.
Gumphrey further tries to distinguish Brooks by contending that, unlike Brooks,
he did not consult with legal counsel and he had no previous experience with
investigations of alleged drunk driving. He states that the key factor in the Brooks’
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is that Brooks actually consulted with an attorney.
To be sure, the Brooks court did note that “[t]he fact that Brooks consulted with
counsel before agreeing to take each test reinforces the conclusion that his consent was
not illegally coerced.” 838 N.W.2d at 571. But the supreme court suggested that “the
ability to consult with counsel” is important as well in evaluating whether consent was
voluntary. Id. at 572 (emphasis added). Here, Gumphrey was given an opportunity to
consult with an attorney, but chose not to exercise that ability. And no evidence in the
record suggests, and Gumphrey does not assert, that officers pressured him to forego the
opportunity to consult with an attorney.
In addition, the record does not reflect whether Gumphrey has previous experience
with law enforcement for alleged drunk driving. Even assuming that this traffic stop was
Gumphrey’s first experience, he told the officer that he understood the implied-consent
advisory, and no evidence suggests otherwise. Gumphrey did not tell the officer that he
did not understand the advisory, nor did he ask the officer to read it again. And he chose
not to consult with an attorney. In sum, under Brooks, the district court properly
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sustained the revocation of Gumphrey’s driver’s license because the totality of the
circumstances establishes that Gumphrey validly consented to the breath test.
Affirmed.
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