Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Robi J. Briggs ( 2014 )


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  •                           This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A13-2089
    Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    Robi J. Briggs,
    Appellant.
    Filed July 14, 2014
    Affirmed
    Bjorkman, Judge
    Carver County District Court
    File No. 10-CV-13-606
    Curt N. Trisko, Schiller & Adam, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
    William B. Butler, Butler Liberty Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly,
    Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    BJORKMAN, Judge
    Appellant homeowner challenges summary judgment in this eviction proceeding,
    arguing that respondent lacks standing and that the underlying mortgage foreclosure was
    invalid. We affirm.
    FACTS
    This eviction action follows a foreclosure on appellant Robi Briggs’s real property
    in Waconia. Bank of America held a mortgage on the property and began a foreclosure-
    by-advertisement proceeding when Briggs defaulted on her payments. At the sheriff’s
    sale on October 1, 2012, the bank was the successful bidder and obtained title to the
    property. The bank assigned the sheriff’s certificate of sale to respondent Federal Home
    Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), subject to the expiration of the redemption
    period on April 1, 2013, and filed and recorded the assignment with the county recorder.
    Briggs did not redeem the property and continued to reside on the property after the
    redemption period expired. On May 14, 2013, Freddie Mac commenced this action.
    Freddie Mac moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. This appeal
    follows.
    DECISION
    I.     Freddie Mac has standing to bring an eviction action.
    Standing is a legal question, which we review de novo. Builders Ass’n of Minn. v.
    City of St. Paul, 
    819 N.W.2d 172
    , 176 (Minn. App. 2012). Standing requires a party to
    demonstrate a personal stake in a justiciable controversy. 
    Id. A sufficient
    stake may
    exist “if the party has suffered an injury-in-fact or if the legislature has conferred standing
    by statute.” Olson v. State, 
    742 N.W.2d 681
    , 684 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted).
    Briggs argues that Freddie Mac lacks standing because the bank did not have a
    legal interest in the property at the time it purported to assign its interest in the sheriff’s
    2
    certificate.1 We disagree. As the holder of the sheriff’s certificate, upon expiration of the
    redemption period, Freddie Mac owned all right, title, and interest of the mortgagor in the
    property. Minn. Stat. §§ 580.12, .19 (2012). As the property owner, Freddie Mac has an
    interest in resolving the conflict of who is entitled to present possession of the property,
    and has standing under the eviction statute to bring this action.            See Minn. Stat.
    § 504B.285, subd. 1(1)(ii) (2012). Moreover, to the extent Briggs’s standing argument
    challenges the foreclosure process itself, it is not properly raised in this proceeding. See
    Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Hanson, 
    841 N.W.2d 161
    , 164 (Minn. App. 2014)
    (“Parties generally may not litigate related claims in an eviction proceeding.”);
    AMRESCO Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Stange, 
    631 N.W.2d 444
    , 445-46 (Minn. App.
    2001) (affirming dismissal of claims related to underlying foreclosure in eviction action
    because challenges to the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure process could be raised
    in a separate proceeding).
    II.    Freddie Mac is entitled to summary judgment.
    Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is
    no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a
    matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. On appeal from summary judgment, we review
    the evidence de novo, in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Valspar
    Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s, Inc., 
    764 N.W.2d 359
    , 364 (Minn. 2009).
    1
    Briggs argues the bank previously assigned the mortgage to Freddie Mac, and thus did
    not have authority to make a bid at the sheriff’s sale or assign its interest in the associated
    sheriff’s certificate to Freddie Mac.
    3
    An eviction proceeding is a “summary court proceeding to remove a tenant or
    occupant from or otherwise recover possession of real property.”                Minn. Stat.
    § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2012). To prevail in an eviction action based on a foreclosed
    mortgage, a party must show that (1) the other party remains on the real property, (2) the
    mortgage has been foreclosed, (3) the time for redemption has expired, and (4) the
    plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property. Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 1 (2012).
    When a foreclosure sale occurs, the sheriff’s certificate is the record of sale, and provides
    prima facie evidence that all the requirements of law have been complied with, and that
    the purchaser or its assignee has obtained title. Minn. Stat. §§ 580.12, .19.
    Briggs argues that Freddie Mac is not entitled to summary judgment because the
    foreclosure was invalid. We are not persuaded. Briggs obtained a loan to purchase the
    property, signed a promissory note and mortgage to secure it, and ultimately defaulted on
    her payment obligations. The bank foreclosed the mortgage, purchased the property at
    the foreclosure sale, and assigned the sheriff’s certificate to Freddie Mac subject to the
    redemption period. Briggs does not dispute that she did not redeem the property and did
    not vacate the property at the end of the redemption period. The only arguments Briggs
    makes in opposing eviction are challenges to the underlying foreclosure. As we noted
    above, these challenges are generally outside the scope of an eviction action.           See
    AMRESCO Residential Mortg. 
    Corp., 630 N.W.2d at 445-46
    . And the extremely narrow
    exception to this rule, available only when “the eviction action presents the only forum
    for litigating these claims,” Fraser v. Fraser, 
    642 N.W.2d 34
    , 41 (Minn. App. 2002),
    does not apply here. Briggs has availed herself of numerous opportunities in state and
    4
    federal court to challenge the foreclosure process. Freddie Mac is entitled to an eviction
    judgment as a matter of law.
    Affirmed.
    5