Anna Marie Ashenbrenner v. Commissioner of Public Safety ( 2014 )


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  •                         This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A13-1475
    Anna Marie Ashenbrenner, petitioner,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    Commissioner of Public Safety,
    Appellant.
    Filed July 21, 2014
    Reversed
    Hudson, Judge
    Dakota County District Court
    File No. 19HA-CV-13-530
    Samuel J. Edmunds, Sieben Edmunds PLLC, Mendota Heights, Minnesota (for
    respondent)
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Kristi Nielsen, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
    Minnesota (for appellant)
    Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
    Smith, Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    HUDSON, Judge
    Appellant Commissioner of Public Safety appeals an order suppressing
    respondent’s urine test for Fourth Amendment violations and rescinding the revocation of
    respondent’s driver’s license.     Because the totality of circumstances shows that
    respondent voluntarily consented to the urine test, we reverse.
    FACTS
    Respondent Anna Marie Ashenbrenner was arrested for driving while impaired
    (DWI) after a Dakota County sheriff’s sergeant responded to a call about a vehicle stuck
    in the snow. When they arrived at the jail, respondent was read the implied-consent
    advisory. She stated that she understood the advisory and asked to call an attorney. The
    officer assisted respondent in using her phone, and she left a message for her attorney.
    She then told the officer she was done with the phone and agreed to take a breath test.
    Respondent attempted two breath tests but both attempts were unsuccessful because she
    was not breathing properly into the machine. Respondent then agreed to a urine test,
    which showed an alcohol concentration of .29.
    Appellant revoked respondent’s driver’s license, and respondent sought judicial
    review. All issues were waived except the admissibility of the urine test. The district
    court suppressed the urine test and rescinded the revocation of respondent’s license,
    concluding that the test was conducted in violation of respondent’s Fourth Amendment
    rights because a warrant had not been obtained and no exception to the warrant
    requirement applied.    After the district court’s order, the Minnesota Supreme Court
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    decided State v. Brooks, 
    838 N.W.2d 563
    , 568 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 1799
    (2014). On appeal, appellant argues that respondent voluntarily consented to the
    urine test.
    DECISION
    Appellant argues that, based on the totality of the circumstances, respondent’s
    consent to the urine test was free and voluntary. Both the United States Constitution and
    the Minnesota Constitution guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable
    searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Under the
    Fourth Amendment, police need a warrant supported by probable cause to conduct a
    search unless an exception exists, such as the consent of the subject of the search.
    Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 219, 
    93 S. Ct. 2041
    , 2043–44 (1973). A urine
    test is considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
    Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568
    .
    The district court concluded that respondent’s consent was not voluntary because
    respondent only agreed to take the test upon the threat of criminal penalties under the
    implied-consent advisory. Brooks made clear that “a driver’s decision to agree to take a
    test is not coerced simply because Minnesota has attached the penalty of making it a
    crime to refuse the test.” 
    Id. at 571.
    Brooks further held that a warrantless urine test is
    constitutional if the defendant voluntarily consents. 
    Id. at 572.
    For the consent exception
    to apply, the state must “show by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was given
    freely and voluntarily.”   State v. Diede, 
    795 N.W.2d 836
    , 846 (Minn. 2011).            To
    determine whether consent was voluntary, the totality of the circumstances must be
    examined “including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and
    3
    what was said and how it was said.” State v. Harris, 
    590 N.W.2d 90
    , 102 (Minn. 1999).
    When the facts are not in dispute, this court reviews the validity of a search de novo.
    Haase v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 
    679 N.W.2d 743
    , 745 (Minn. App. 2004).
    Respondent argues that appellant has not shown that her consent was voluntary
    simply because she said yes to the test. Respondent argues that the coercive nature of the
    implied-consent advisory is still a factor to be taken into consideration. Respondent
    attempts to distinguish herself from the defendant in Brooks by pointing out that Brooks
    had prior DWI offenses, was belligerent with officers, faced multiple charges in
    conjunction with his DWIs, and was able to speak with a lawyer.             According to
    respondent, those facts show that the defendant in Brooks would not be intimidated by
    the “threats” in the implied-consent advisory.      Here, the police report shows that
    respondent yelled and cussed at the officer who arrested her, kicked the officer, and
    kicked the police car. Respondent had two previous DWI convictions. She was also
    given an opportunity to contact an attorney, and after leaving a voicemail, told officers
    she was done using the phone. Respondent was read the implied-consent advisory in full
    and stated that she understood its contents. Thus, the facts are very similar to Brooks.
    There is nothing in the record to indicate that officers coerced respondent into taking the
    urine test, nor does she identify any coercive tactics. We conclude that respondent’s
    consent to the test was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and the district
    court’s suppression of the urine test must be reversed. Accordingly, the rescission of the
    revocation of respondent’s driver’s license must also be reversed. Because we conclude
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    that respondent consented to the test, we do not reach the parties’ arguments related to the
    constitutionality of Minnesota’s implied-consent laws.
    Reversed.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A13-1475

Filed Date: 7/21/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014