Tiffany Montgomery, Relator v. AT & T Mobility Services, LLC, Department of Employment and Economic Development ( 2015 )


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  •                         This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A15-0173
    Tiffany Montgomery,
    Relator,
    vs.
    AT & T Mobility Services, LLC,
    Respondent,
    Department of Employment and Economic Development,
    Respondent.
    Filed October 5, 2015
    Affirmed
    Stauber, Judge
    Department of Employment and Economic Development
    File No. 32838181-3
    Katherine L. MacKinnon, Carrie Anne Loch, Certified Student Attorney, Law Office of
    Katherine L. MacKinnon, P.L.L.C., St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for relator)
    AT&T Mobility Services, St. Louis, Missouri (respondent employer)
    Lee B. Nelson, Timothy C. Schepers, Minnesota Department of Employment and
    Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Department)
    Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and
    Smith, Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    STAUBER, Judge
    In this unemployment-benefits appeal, relator challenges a determination by an
    unemployment law-judge (ULJ) that she was terminated for employment misconduct
    because she used a store warranty procedure to obtain goods for herself. Relator argues
    that the ULJ (1) abused his discretion by failing to make specific credibility
    determinations regarding conflicting testimony as to whether relator’s use of the warranty
    procedure was authorized and (2) failed to fully develop the record by denying her
    subpoena requests. We affirm.
    FACTS
    In August 2008, relator Tiffany Montgomery began working for respondent
    AT&T Mobility Services, LLC as a sales support representative. During her employment
    with AT&T, relator was responsible for processing the returned merchandise, and she had
    “specialized knowledge of the inventory system.” She was also “in charge of making
    sure everybody was educated and understood how to appropriately conduct a J warranty.”
    A “J warranty” is a one-year warranty offered to customers by AT&T, which
    enables them to exchange defective products for new replacements. Generally, in order
    to process a J warranty exchange, a sales representative is required to confirm that the
    product was purchased from AT&T within the past year by checking the customer’s sales
    receipt or by examining the customer’s electronic purchase records in AT&T’s sales
    system. A J warranty exchange also generally requires the customer to surrender the
    defective item.
    2
    On July 21, 2014, relator took a new pair of LG headphones from the sales floor
    and instructed a subordinate sales representative to process her receipt of the headphones
    as a J warranty exchange. In conducting the transaction for the headphones, relator did
    not purchase the new headphones. She also did not return any old headphones, nor did
    she provide proof of previously purchasing headphones from AT&T within the previous
    year. A few days later, assistant manager Aaron Dreis discovered the transaction through
    his weekly review of company records. He then reviewed surveillance footage and
    relator’s account, and determined that relator took the headphones without paying for
    them. Further investigation was conducted and, during an interview, relator lied to the
    investigator, telling him that she had surrendered an old set of headphones in exchange
    for the new headphones.
    AT&T discharged relator on September 8, 2014, for theft of the headphones.
    Relator subsequently applied for unemployment benefits, and respondent Department of
    Employment and Economic Development (department) initially determined that relator
    was eligible for benefits because she was discharged for reasons other than employment
    misconduct. AT&T appealed that determination, and a de novo hearing was conducted.
    At the hearing, relator testified that she used the J warranty process to obtain a
    new set of LG headphones and that a similar exchange had been recently made by her
    assistant manager Mitch Dosh for a cellphone case. Although relator admitted that as
    part of her J warranty exchange for the new headphones, she did not surrender the
    defective headphones, did not provide proof of purchase of the defective headphones, and
    did not purchase the old headphones within a year of making the J warranty exchange,
    3
    she claimed that the J warranty exchange process was very flexible. According to relator,
    a J warranty exchange did not require a customer to return the faulty item. She also
    claimed that a sales representative could process a J warranty exchange if more than one
    year had transpired since the defective product had been purchased if a manger approved
    the transaction. Relator testified that she consulted with Dosh, and her manager, Chang
    Huang, about using the J warranty process to exchange an old set of headphones for the
    new set of LG headphones, and that they gave her permission to make the exchange.
    Relator further claimed that she and Huang walked “around the diamond on the sales
    floor with another” sales representative on July 21, 2014, looking at the different
    headsets.
    Former sales associates Nicki Korson and Sarah Mueller testified on relator’s
    behalf and corroborated relator’s claim that the general procedures governing J warranty
    exchanges were not always strictly enforced. But Dosh, Dreis, and Huang testified that
    relator was never given permission to conduct a J warranty exchange for the new
    headphones.
    The ULJ found testimony from AT&T’s employees that relator was not authorized
    to conduct a J warranty exchange for her headphones to be credible. The ULJ then found
    that relator’s decision to “circumvent AT&T’s policy for exchanging defective items was
    a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer had a right to reasonably
    expect of her.” Thus, the ULJ concluded that relator was ineligible for unemployment
    benefits because she was discharged for employment misconduct. Relator requested
    reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed the decision. This certiorari appeal followed.
    4
    DECISION
    I.
    This court “may reverse or modify the [ULJ’s] decision if the substantial rights of
    the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or
    decision are” not supported by substantial evidence in the record or are affected by an
    error of law. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(4)-(5) (2014).
    An applicant who is discharged from employment because of employment
    misconduct is ineligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1)
    (2014). “Employment misconduct” is defined as “any intentional, negligent, or
    indifferent conduct . . . that displays clearly: (1) a serious violation of the standards of
    behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee; or (2) a
    substantial lack of concern for the employment.” 
    Id., subd. 6(a)
    (2014). Whether an
    employee committed misconduct is a mixed question of fact and law. Schmidgall v.
    FilmTec Corp., 
    644 N.W.2d 801
    , 804 (Minn. 2002). Whether an employee committed a
    particular act is a question of fact. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 
    721 N.W.2d 340
    , 344
    (Minn. App. 2006). But whether a particular act demonstrates employment misconduct is
    a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 
    796 N.W.2d 312
    , 315 (Minn. 2011).
    Where, as here, credibility is central to the ULJ’s decision, the ULJ is required
    to “make credibility findings and to ‘set out the reason for crediting or discrediting’ the
    contested testimony.” Wichmann v. Travalia & U.S. Directives, Inc., 
    729 N.W.2d 23
    , 29
    (Minn. App. 2007) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1(c) (Supp. 2005)). Among the
    5
    factors that the ULJ may consider in making a credibility determination is whether the
    witness’s testimony is reasonable when compared with other evidence. Ywswf v.
    Teleplan Wireless Servs., Inc., 
    726 N.W.2d 525
    , 533 (Minn. App. 2007). “Credibility
    determinations are the exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed on
    appeal.” 
    Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 345
    .
    Relator argues in her brief and reply brief that because this “case was fact-
    intensive and contained numerous contradictions between multiple witnesses” the
    “credibility of witnesses had a significant outcome on the decision.” To support her
    claim, relator asserts that AT&T’s witnesses testified that the J warranty exchange is not
    flexible, while her witnesses testified that it is very flexible and used in a variety of
    circumstances. Relator claims that if the ULJ found her witnesses to be credible, her
    actions would not be misconduct, but if the ULJ found AT&T’s witnesses to be credible,
    then her actions would be misconduct. Relator argues this because the credibility of the
    witnesses was “outcome-determinative,” but the ULJ failed to make “any statutorily
    mandated credibility findings,” a remand is necessary to determine whether relator
    violated AT&T’s policy.
    We disagree. Despite relator’s claim to the contrary, any inconsistencies in
    witness testimony regarding AT&T’s policy pertaining to J warranty exchanges is not
    dispositive of whether relator engaged in employment misconduct. Our review of the
    transcript demonstrates that all of the witnesses testified consistently with respect to J
    warranty exchanges. All of the witnesses testified that a J warranty exchange generally
    required the old defective item to be returned in exchange for a new item and that proof
    6
    of purchase from an AT&T store was required for a J warranty exchange. Although there
    were some minor discrepancies in the testimony pertaining to whether exceptions could
    be made for these rules, all of the witnesses, including Korson and Mueller, who testified
    on behalf of relator, testified that defective items could not be returned more than one
    year after purchase absent manager approval. In fact, relator admitted that some type of
    manager approval was necessary to conduct a J warranty exchange if the item was
    purchased more than one year before the date of the exchange. It is undisputed that
    relator did not return the defective headset at the time she used a J warranty exchange to
    obtain the new headset, nor did she present proof of purchase for the defective headset.
    And although relator claimed that she purchased the defective headset from an AT&T
    store, she admitted that the defective headset was purchased more than one year before
    she used a J warranty exchange to obtain the new headset. Based upon the undisputed
    testimony from all of the witnesses, manager approval was required to conduct such an
    exchange. Thus, the narrow dispositive issue before the ULJ was whether relator had
    permission from a manager to conduct the J warranty exchange for the new headset
    because it had been more than a year since relator purchased her old headset.
    Relator testified that she had permission from her managers to conduct a J
    warranty exchange for the new headset. Conversely, relator’s managers specifically
    testified that they had given no such permission. The ULJ found that the testimony from
    relator’s managers that relator “was not authorized to J Warranty exchange her
    headphones was consistent, reasonable and provided a more likely sequence of events
    than [relator’s] self-serving denial.” The ULJ’s finding adequately sets forth the basis for
    7
    his credibility determination. See 
    Ywswf, 726 N.W.2d at 533
    (stating that among the
    factors that the ULJ may consider in making a credibility determination is whether the
    witness’s testimony is reasonable when compared with other evidence). And because
    Korson and Mueller had no knowledge of the events surrounding relator’s termination, it
    was unnecessary for the ULJ to make specific credibility findings pertaining to Korson
    and Mueller’s testimony. Therefore, a remand for further credibility findings is
    unnecessary.
    Because the ULJ found that relator did not have permission to conduct a J
    warranty exchange for the headset, the issue becomes whether relator’s J warranty
    exchange for the headset constituted employment misconduct. “Dishonesty that is
    connected with employment may constitute misconduct.” Icenhower v. Total
    Automotive, Inc., 
    845 N.W.2d 849
    , 856 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted), review
    denied (Minn. July 15, 2014). In Cherveny v. 10,000 Auto Parts, this court concluded
    that “[r]elator’s dishonesty in an investigation by the employer into an alleged theft of
    employer’s goods was misconduct sufficient to disqualify relator from unemployment
    compensation benefits.” 
    353 N.W.2d 685
    , 688 (Minn. App. 1984); see also 
    Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 344
    (holding that employee’s single incident of theft from employer has
    significant adverse impact on employer and constitutes employment misconduct). And a
    warning is not required before an employee’s termination for employment misconduct
    results in the disqualification for unemployment benefits. See Auger v. Gillette Co., 
    303 N.W.2d 255
    , 257 (Minn. 1981) (stating that warning was not essential to demonstrate
    employees acted in willful disregard of employer’s interest).
    8
    Here, the ULJ found that relator did not have permission to conduct a J warranty
    exchange for the new headset. The ULJ also found that relator was dishonest during the
    investigation of the J warranty exchange for the headset when she told the investigator
    that she had surrendered her old, defective headset at the time of the J warranty exchange.
    The ULJ’s findings are supported by the record. Accordingly, the ULJ did not err by
    concluding that relator was discharged for employment misconduct.
    II.
    A ULJ “must exercise control over the hearing procedure in a manner that protects
    the parties’ rights to a fair hearing,” and “must ensure that all relevant facts are clearly
    and fully developed.” Minn. R. 3310.2921 (Supp. 2014). To serve that purpose, a ULJ
    “may issue subpoenas to compel . . . the production of documents . . . upon a showing of
    necessity by the requesting party.” Minn. R. 3310.2914, subp. 1 (Supp. 2014). “A
    request for a subpoena may be denied if the testimony or documents sought would be
    irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly cumulative or repetitious.” 
    Id. On appeal,
    a ULJ’s
    denial of a subpoena request is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
    Icenhower, 845 N.W.2d at 853
    .
    Relator argues that the ULJ abused its discretion by denying her subpoena requests
    for (1) a copy of the surveillance footage inside the store for the entire day of July 21,
    2014; (2) AT&T’s records of Dosh’s personal warranty exchanges; (3) employee
    mobility discount records; and (4) her personal discipline and transaction records.
    9
    A.     Surveillance video
    At the de novo hearing, relator requested that the ULJ subpoena a copy of the
    surveillance footage for July 21, 2014. Relator sought the video in order to corroborate
    her claim that she had permission to conduct a J warranty exchange for the headphones
    because the video allegedly showed her walking around the store with Huang looking at
    “headphones for her.” The ULJ concluded that a subpoena for the video was unnecessary
    because the video had no audio, which would make it impossible to determine from the
    video whether relator had “approval from . . . Huang or . . . Dosh to J warranty her
    headset.”
    Relator argues that by declining to subpoena the video, the “ULJ failed in the
    statutory obligation to ensure that all relevant facts are clearly and fully developed.” 1 But
    as we discussed above, the only relevant issue in dispute is whether relator had
    permission to conduct a J warranty exchange for the headphones. Because the video
    lacks audio, it fails to resolve this issue. As the department points out, although the video
    might corroborate relator’s claim that she walked around the store with Chang on July 21,
    2014, “one could only speculate as to the nature and purpose of [relator and Chang’s]
    interaction.” Therefore, the video was irrelevant, and the ULJ did not abuse its discretion
    by denying relator’s request to subpoena the video.
    1
    Relator also claims that we should require the ULJ on remand to impose an adverse-
    inference sanction upon AT&T for its spoliation of the surveillance video. But relator’s
    spoliation claim is being raised for the first time on appeal and, therefore, the claim is not
    properly before us. See Thiele v. Stich, 
    425 N.W.2d 580
    , 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that
    this court will generally not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal).
    10
    B.        Dosh’s warranty exchange
    Relator also challenges the ULJ’s denial of her request to subpoena Dosh’s
    personal warranty exchanges. Relator claims that Dosh used a J warranty exchange to
    process a transaction for his own personal cell-phone case. Because he denied doing a J
    warranty exchange for the case, relator claims that his personal records would
    corroborate her testimony and support her “contention that AT&T permitted the ‘J’
    transactions.”
    Relator is unable to establish that the ULJ abused its discretion by failing to
    subpoena Dosh’s personal warranty exchanges. Again, the issue in this case is whether
    relator had permission to conduct a J warranty exchange for her headphones. Any
    records pertaining to Dosh’s personal warranty exchanges would not have resolved this
    issue. Consequently, Dosh’s warranty-exchange records were irrelevant to the issue of
    permission. Moreover, it is well settled that a violation of an employer’s policies by
    others is not a defense to employment misconduct. Dean v. Allied Aviation Fueling Co.,
    
    381 N.W.2d 80
    , 83 (Minn. App. 1986); see also Sivertson v. Sims Sec., Inc., 
    390 N.W.2d 868
    , 871 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that whether or not other employees violated same
    rules and were disciplined or discharged was not relevant to the present case), review
    denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1986). Therefore, even if Dosh failed to follow company policy
    in exchanging his case, such conduct would not excuse relator’s failure to follow
    AT&T’s policy.
    11
    C.     Employee mobility discount records
    Relator argues that the “ULJ failed to ensure that all relevant facts were clearly
    and fully developed when he dismissed as irrelevant employee mobility discount
    records.” Relator claims that these records would be an “unbiased report to establish how
    a ‘J’ transaction occurred in normal business, including how [relator] had previously
    performed the transactions, which would have also helped resolve directly contradicting
    testimony.” But again, the uncontradicted testimony was that relator needed manager
    approval to process her J warranty transaction for the headphones. The employee
    mobility discount records were irrelevant to establishing whether such approval had been
    granted.
    D.     Relator’s personal discipline and transaction records
    Relator further argues that the ULJ failed to ensure that the record was fully
    developed by declining to grant relator’s request to subpoena her personal discipline and
    transaction records. But it was undisputed that relator was never disciplined for any
    conduct prior to her discharge. Moreover, neither her personal discipline record nor her
    personal transaction records were relevant to determining the dispositive issue: whether
    relator had manager approval to conduct her J warranty exchange for the headset.
    Therefore, the ULJ did not abuse its discretion by denying relator’s subpoena requests.
    Affirmed.
    12