In re the Marriage of: Jaime Dawn Starren v. Jason Charles Starren ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0141
In re the Marriage of: Jaime Dawn Starren, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Jason Charles Starren,
Respondent.
Filed October 5, 2015
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Reyes, Judge
Concurring specially, Chutich, Judge
Pennington County District Court
File No. 57FA12339
Michael M. Mattocks, Charlson & Jorgenson, P.A., Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Stephanie J.S. Harbott, Fitzgerald, Reynolds & Harbott, PLLP, Crookston, Minnesota
(for respondent)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Chutich, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant Jaime Starren challenges the district court’s (1) denial of her motion to
modify her children’s primary residence and (2) granting of respondent Jason Starren’s
motion to impose a locale restriction. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
Appellant and respondent were married in August 2002 in Thief River Falls and
have two children, J.N.S. and B.W.S. The parties separated, and, following a two-day
court trial, a dissolution judgment and decree was entered on December 26, 2013. The
decree allowed for joint legal custody of the two minor children but awarded sole
physical custody to appellant. The decree also granted respondent the following
parenting time: alternating extended weekends during the nine-month school year
(September through May) from 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday to 8:00 a.m. on Monday; the
first two full weeks of each month during the three-month summer vacation (June
through August); and alternating holidays, including every Father’s Day weekend.
Neither party appealed the original judgment and decree.
On August 7, 2014, appellant filed a motion asking the district court to
“[m]odify[] the parenting time schedule of the parties.” Appellant had begun dating
Mathew Schad, and the two wanted to move from Thief River Falls to Grand Rapids,
Minnesota. In her first affidavit accompanying the motion, appellant explained that she
wanted to move to Grand Rapids because she had family and friends living in the area,
including cousins and half-brothers. Schad’s family lived in the area as well, and the two
2
were planning on purchasing a country home there. Appellant proposed that the
parenting-time schedule be modified to account for the increased distance from Grand
Rapids to Thief River Falls. Appellant suggested that the original alternating weekend
schedule of Wednesday to Monday mornings be adjusted to a more traditional Friday-to-
Sunday schedule. To make up for the reduction in respondent’s parenting time, appellant
proposed that respondent “be given additional parenting time during the kids’ time off
from school, holidays, and long weekends, etc.”
On August 15, 2014, respondent filed a countermotion requesting that appellant’s
motion be denied in its entirety and that the district court “restrict [appellant] from
moving the children’s residence outside of the Thief River Falls School District.”
On August 21, 2014, appellant filed a second affidavit in support of her motion to
modify parenting time. In it, appellant provided a more specific proposal, suggesting that
respondent be given the first three weeks in June, the first three weeks in July, and the
first two weeks in August. Appellant also suggested that respondent be given the long
MEA weekend, other non-holiday long weekends that corresponded with his usual
parenting time, and that “[w]inter break should be mainly his,” subject to alternating time
on Christmas Day.
The district court held a motion hearing on August 21, 2014. In its extensive order
following the hearing, the district court employed a number of different legal standards in
analyzing the parties’ motions. With respect to appellant’s request, the district court
determined that the proposed parenting-time modifications were substantial enough to be
considered a “restriction” on respondent’s parenting time. And, as such, the district court
3
reasoned that appellant’s modification could only be warranted if appellant could
demonstrate that the children were endangered in respondent’s care or that respondent
had chronically and unreasonably failed to comply with the court-ordered parenting time.
The district court found that because there was no evidence of endangerment, and no
evidence of a failure by appellant to comply with court-ordered parenting time,
appellant’s motion should be denied.
In addition to employing the “endangerment” standard mentioned above, the
district court also analyzed appellant’s proposed modifications under the lower “best
interests” standard. After assessing 17 relevant factors, the district court decided that the
only factor supporting appellant’s request was her own desire to modify the parenting-
time schedule. The district court stated that “[e]ven when considered under this less
stringent standard . . . the court finds and concludes that [appellant’s] motion should be
denied.”
The district court further concluded that appellant’s motion should be denied
because she failed to show a “substantial change in circumstances.” The district court
noted that appellant’s affidavits mention how she had previously thought of relocating to
Grand Rapids. The district court reasoned that because she previously thought of moving
to Grand Rapids and because she is currently thinking about moving to Grand Rapids,
there has been no change in circumstances, which provides further support for the motion
being denied.
With respect to respondent’s request for a locale restriction, the district court made
two conclusions of law. First, it recognized that while the original dissolution decree
4
established legal and physical custody for the children, it failed to designate their
“residence.” The district court determined that under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.01, it could
“correct” the mistake of the original dissolution decree and include a provision
establishing Thief River Falls as the children’s residence. Second, the district court
concluded that under Schisel v. Schisel, it had authority to impose an in-state locale
restriction. 762 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Minn. App. 2009). The district court determined that
it was “necessary to protect the minor children’s best interests through a residency
restriction” and ordered that the original judgment and decree be modified to include a
provision stating:
The minor children’s residence shall not be moved from the
city of Thief River Falls unless: (A) [appellant] and
[respondent], in a written stipulation, agree to a modification
of the minor children’s residence; or, (B) the court, after
finding that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the
minor children or the parties and that modification is
necessary to serve the best interests of the minor children,
orders a modification of the minor children’s residence.
In sum, the district court denied appellant’s request to modify parenting time and
granted respondent’s request to impose a locale restriction limiting the children’s
residence to Thief River Falls. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Although the parties proffered a number of arguments in their briefs and at the oral
arguments to this court, there are only two pertinent issues on appeal: (1) whether the
district court abused its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion and (2) whether the
5
district court abused its discretion when it granted respondent’s motion to impose a locale
restriction. Each is addressed below.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s
motion.
The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547,
550 (Minn. 1995). A district court abuses its discretion if its findings are unsupported by
the record or if it misapplies the law. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn.
1985). A district court’s findings of fact underlying a parenting-time decision will be
upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 735
(Minn. 1978). However, identifying the legal standard applicable to a motion to modify
parenting time is a question of law that is subject to de novo review. Dahl v. Dahl, 765
N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009).
In a dissolution or separation proceeding, a district court is required to issue an
order regarding the “physical custody and residence” of the parties’ minor children.
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(a)(2) (2014) (emphasis added). Here, despite the fact that
this provision was in place when the district court entered its December 26, 2013
judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, see Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(a)(2) (2012),
that judgment failed to make an explicit finding regarding the children’s residence. We
conclude, however, that the December 26, 2013 judgment contains an implicit finding
that the residence of the children was Thief River Falls. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765
N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (recognizing that a district court made an implicit
6
finding regarding the respondent’s credibility when it ruled in her favor despite
conflicting testimony).
“Residence” is defined as “the place where a party has established a permanent
home from which the party has no present intention of moving.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003,
subd. 9 (2014). Prior to the original dissolution hearing, appellant submitted an affidavit
in which she stated: “I do not believe that either [respondent], nor I, intend to leave the
immediate area. We both will live in the same community, and the children will attend
the same school, as they have in the past.” By her own admission, appellant had no
intention of leaving her home in Thief River Falls. Accordingly, the district court found
that “[n]either party expressed any desire to take the children from the Thief River Falls
community.” The December 26, 2013 judgment further discussed the numerous
connections between the children and Thief River Falls, including a network of family
members helping with caretaking duties, relationships built from attending St. Bernard’s
Catholic School, and a multitude of extracurricular and community activities in which the
children participate. All of these relationships and activities were based in Thief River
Falls, and no other city was ever mentioned until appellant brought her current motion.
We therefore conclude that the December 26, 2013 judgement and decree implicitly
included a finding that the children’s residence was Thief River Falls.1
1
We note that in its November 25, 2014 order, the district court determined that under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.01, it could correct its previous December 26, 2013 judgment to
include a provision establishing Thief River Falls as the children’s residence. Because
we agree that the December 26, 2013 judgment established the children’s residence as
Thief River Falls, we need not consider the propriety of the district court’s use of Minn.
R. Civ. P. 60.01. See Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987) (stating that a
7
We next turn to appellant’s motion to modify parenting time, which is ordinarily
analyzed under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (2014). But section 518.175, subdivision
5(a) states that “[i]f modification would serve the best interests of the child, the court
shall modify . . . an order granting or denying parenting time, if the modification would
not change the child’s primary residence.” Id., subd. 5(a) (emphasis added). Here, even
though appellant’s motion asks the district court to “[m]odify[] the parenting time
schedule,” it also seeks to change the children’s primary residence from Thief River Falls
to Grand Rapids. Therefore, section 518.175, subdivision 5, does not require
modification of parenting time based on the child’s best interests. Instead, appellant’s
motion is properly classified as a motion to modify the children’s primary residence,
which is instead analyzed under Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (2014). See Suleski v. Rupe, 855
N.W.2d 330, 334-35 (Minn. App. 2014) (“A modification of custody or a change of the
child’s primary residence requires that the district court utilize the procedures set forth in
Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) and associated caselaw.” (emphasis added)).2
Under section 518.18(a), “no motion to modify a custody order . . . may be made
earlier than one year after the date of the entry of a decree of dissolution.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.18(a). This time limit does not apply if the district court “finds that there is
persistent and willful denial or interference with parenting time, or has reason to believe
district court’s decision will not be reversed if we reach the same result on different
grounds).
2
We acknowledge that this court’s Suleski opinion was filed after the parties’ motions to
the district court in this case and before the district court’s order resolving those motions,
and therefore, that counsel did not have the benefit of that opinion when those motions
were filed.
8
that the child’s present environment may endanger the child’s physical or emotional
health or impair the child’s emotional development.” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(c). As
previously stated, the parties’ dissolution judgment and decree was entered on December
26, 2013. Appellant’s motion was brought on August 7, 2014, within the one-year period
prohibited by section 518.18(a). The motion did not allege, and the district court did not
find, denial or interference with parenting time or that the children were endangered by
their present environment. Appellant’s motion was thus barred by Minn. Stat.
§ 518.18(a).3 That the district court reached the same result using different reasoning is
not grounds for reversal. See Katz, 408 N.W.2d at 839. The district court’s denial of
appellant’s motion is hereby affirmed.
II. The district court abused its discretion when it granted respondent’s motion
to impose a locale restriction.
Respondent’s request to impose a locale restriction preventing the children from
being moved outside of Thief River Falls is properly interpreted as a motion to modify
custody. See Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2008) (reasoning
that modifying a locale restriction falls “within the ambit” of the custody modification
statute); Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 269 (granting district courts the authority to impose in-
state locale restrictions after analyzing section 518.17, subdivision 3, which governs
custody orders). Appellate review of custody determinations is governed by the abuse of
discretion standard. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 710. A district court abuses its discretion if
3
Because appellant’s motion is barred on timeliness limitations, we make no comment as
to its merits.
9
its findings are unsupported by the record or if it misapplies the law. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d
at 123.
Because respondent’s motion asked the district court to modify custody, it is
appropriately analyzed under section 518.18. Therefore, just as was the case with
appellant’s motion above, the one-year limitation in section 518.18(a) applies. See Minn.
Stat. § 518.18(a). Because respondent’s motion was filed on August 15, 2014—within
one year of the December 26, 2013 judgment—the only way it could be granted is if the
district court “finds that there is persistent and willful denial or interference with
parenting time, or has reason to believe that the child’s present environment may
endanger the child’s physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional
development.” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(c). And just as was the case with appellant,
respondent made no allegation of interference with parenting time or that the children are
endangered by their current environment. Therefore, respondent’s motion to impose a
locale restriction should have been similarly denied under the time limitations of section
518.18(a). The district court’s order to the contrary, which grant respondent’s request for
a locale restriction, is hereby reversed.
Lastly, we recognize that the time limit outlined in section 518.18(a) ended on
December 26, 2014. Now that the time limit has passed, nothing in this opinion should
be construed to limit a party from filing a new motion to impose a locale restriction or to
modify custody or parenting time. As described above, a motion to modify custody or to
10
impose a locale restriction would be analyzed under section 518.18(d).4 When faced with
such a motion, a district court employs the three-step analysis outlined in Boland v.
Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Minn. App. 2011).
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
4
We note that in analyzing appellant’s motion, the district court stated that section
518.18(d) “requires that there be a ‘substantial change in circumstances’ for a parenting-
time modification.” (Emphasis added.) This statement is erroneous for three reasons.
First, the “substantial” language quoted by the district court does not appear anywhere in
section 518.18 and every reference to a “change” in circumstances is unaccompanied by
an adjective. See Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(i), (iv). Second, as explained above,
appellant’s motion was not properly classified as a motion to modify parenting time but
rather a motion to modify the children’s primary residence. Third, motions to modify
parenting time are analyzed under section 518.175, subdivision 5.
11
CHUTICH, Judge (concurring)
I agree with the majority that Jason Starren’s motion to impose a locale restriction
is properly interpreted as a motion to modify a custody order under section 518.18(d),
and that the district court abused its discretion when it granted this motion. I believe that
the majority erred, however, in also analyzing Jaime Starren’s motion to modify
parenting time under this same section, which employs a heightened standard for a
custody order modification, instead of applying the less stringent best-interests analysis
available under section 518.175, subd. 5.
Notably, neither party argued that the heightened standard of section 518.18(d)
applied to this motion to modify parenting time. To find that the requested modification
impermissibly changed “the child’s primary residence” under section 518.175, subd. 5,
the majority essentially imposed a de facto locale restriction of Thief River Falls that, all
parties agree, did not exist in the original decree.
Moreover, the meaning of “primary residence,” considering the use of “residence”
in sections 518.175, subd. 5, 518.18(d), 518.17, subd. 3(a)(2), and 518.003, does not
seem to have been definitively resolved by caselaw to date. See Goldman v. Greenwood,
748 N.W.2d 279, 282–84 (Minn. 2008) (discussing the applicability of section 518.18(d)
to a motion to remove a pre-existing locale restriction from a custody order); Suleski v.
Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334–36 (Minn. App. 2014) (defining “primary residence” as the
“principal dwelling or place where the child lives” but declining to apply section 518.18
to a district court order modifying parenting time after a mother with sole physical
custody moved); Schisel v. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d 265, 269–70 (Minn. App. 2009)
CS-1
(interpreting the phrase “physical custody and residence” under section 518.17, subd.
3(a)(2) to hold that a district court may restrict the in-state residence of a minor child
upon a showing that the restriction is necessary to serve the child’s best interests). See
also Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 269 Minn. 351, 371, 131 N.W.2d 632, 645
(1964) (stating that “the language used in an opinion must be read in the light of the
issues presented” (quotation omitted)); Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288, 41
N.W.2d 438, 443 (1950) (stating that supreme court decisions implicating an issue that
was not raised and addressed are not precedential authority regarding that issue).
Finally, it seems incongruous to interpret the relevant statutes in such a way that
the heightened standard for modification of a custody order would apply to assess a
motion to modify parenting time when a parent with sole physical custody is moving
within Minnesota while a less stringent best-interests analysis governs the request of a
parent with whom the child resides to move the child to another state. See Minn.
Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(b) (providing eight best-interests factors for analysis of a parent’s
request to move a child’s residence to another state). Accordingly, under the
circumstances of this case, I believe that the best-interests analysis available under
518.175, subd. 5 applies to the motion to modify parenting time.
Here, the district court actually applied a best-interests analysis under section
518.175, subd. 5, among several other analyses, and found that the proposed modification
of parenting time would not serve the best interests of the children. Given the broad
discretion that must be accorded a district court in determining parenting time, I would
affirm this decision and therefore concur in the result reached by the majority.
CS-2