Dion Dalvante Harris v. State of Minnesota ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-2059
Dion Dalvante Harris, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent
Filed August 4, 2014
Affirmed
Ross, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-10-5143
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Dion Harris entered his former girlfriend’s apartment and assaulted her. He
pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. Two years after being sentenced, Harris petitioned
for postconviction relief on the grounds that his plea was invalid. The district court held
Harris’s postconviction petition untimely and lacking merit. The district court erred in its
untimeliness holding, but we affirm its denial of Harris’s postconviction petition because
Harris has not established that his guilty plea was invalid.
FACTS
Dion Harris went to his former girlfriend’s apartment in the early morning hours
of July 4, 2010, despite being prohibited from doing so by an order for protection. Harris
physically assaulted her, grabbed the keys to her apartment, left, and then re-entered the
apartment and assaulted her a second time. His girlfriend’s sister called police. The
victim, A.C.A., and both of her roommates told police that Harris punched A.C.A. in the
face and threatened all of them with a knife. The state charged Harris with two counts of
first-degree burglary and one count of terroristic threats.
Harris agreed to plead guilty to one count of first-degree burglary if the state
would drop the other charges. At his plea hearing, Harris waived his right to a jury trial.
The prosecutor asked Harris a number of leading questions to establish the factual basis
of the plea. Harris acknowledged that he “shoved [his] way” into the apartment, that
“officers actually found a knife outside the back door where [he] had tried to get in,” that
he “didn’t have any lawful right to be in [A.C.A.’s] apartment,” that he “grabbed the keys
to the apartment . . . to re-enter the apartment,” and that he re-entered the apartment and
“punched [A.C.A.] repeatedly.” The district court asked Harris if that was what
happened, and Harris replied, “Yeah.”
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Harris changed the story somewhat when the district court asked if he disagreed
with any of the facts just laid out. Harris asserted that although he “did not have
permission to be there because the no-contact order was in effect, [A.C.A.] gave [him]
permission to come there . . . to be there with [his] kids.” He then said that “[A.C.A.]
opened the door and let [him] in.” Once inside, Harris “lost control of everything . . .
[and] punched [A.C.A.] in the head repeatedly.” Harris admitted that he told police he
grabbed A.C.A.’s keys, and he admitted that he re-entered the apartment and punched
A.C.A.
The district court accepted Harris’s guilty plea. It sentenced him on June 23, 2011.
Harris petitioned for postconviction relief on June 24, 2013, alleging that the factual basis
for his plea was insufficient. The district court denied relief. It held that the petition was
time-barred because it was filed more than two years after sentencing. It also found that
Harris’s petition failed on the merits because “[t]he ‘no-entry’ provision of an [order for
protection] satisfies the illegal entry element of burglary.”
Harris appeals.
DECISION
Harris maintains that the district court erred by finding that his postconviction-
relief petition was time-barred and that a sufficient factual basis supported his guilty plea.
His argument is persuasive on the first issue, but not the second.
We think Harris accurately maintains that he filed his petition for postconviction
relief before the statutory deadline. The issue is a legal question, which we review de
novo. Bee Yang v. State, 805 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn.
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Aug. 7, 2012). A defendant generally must file a petition for postconviction relief within
two years of sentencing. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2012). The two-year period
does not include the date of sentencing, and it does not include the last day if it lands on
“a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 34.01. If the last day is a
weekend or holiday, “the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a [weekend]
or a legal holiday.” Id. The district court sentenced Harris on June 23, 2011. Harris’s two-
year period therefore began the next day and ran until June 23, 2013. See Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4. But June 23, 2013, was a Sunday. Harris therefore had until the end of
the following day, Monday, June 24, 2013, to file for postconviction relief. Because
Harris filed his petition on that Monday, the district court erred by holding that he missed
the deadline.
But the district court did not err when it decided the merits of Harris’s petition. We
are not persuaded by Harris’s argument that the district court erroneously found his plea
to be valid. To withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing, a defendant must show the
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90,
93–94 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). A guilty plea is invalid and
manifestly unjust if it is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. at 94. We review the
validity of a guilty plea de novo. Id.
Harris challenges only the accuracy element of his plea. He bears the burden to
show that his plea was inaccurate. See id. The accuracy requirement protects defendants
from pleading guilty to crimes that are more serious than the crimes they could be
convicted of at trial. Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). If the record
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contains evidence that “would support a jury verdict that [Harris] is guilty of at least”
first-degree burglary, this requirement is met. See id. at 589 (quotation omitted). We are
satisfied that the record contains evidence that would support a guilty verdict on the first-
degree burglary charge.
A defendant commits first-degree burglary if he “enters a building without consent
and . . . assaults a person” inside. Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1 (2008). A person has
consent to enter a property if the person in lawful possession gives it. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.581, subd. 4(a) (2008). Harris undisputedly assaulted someone in the apartment. He
maintains that A.C.A., the person who possessed the apartment, consented to his entry,
undermining the factual basis for his guilty plea. The state counters that the
nonconsensual-entry element was satisfied as a matter of law when Harris admitted that
he entered the property in violation of the order for protection. We need not address the
state’s legal argument, however, because Harris acknowledged that he “shoved [his] way
past” people to gain entry and then stole keys to re-enter. When explaining in his own
words what had happened, Harris claimed that he initially had permission to enter the
apartment, but he also stated that he re-entered the apartment with the pilfered keys and
that he committed an assault after re-entering. The factual rendition in the record is
somewhat confusing, especially because Harris’s answers were at times equivocal. But
Harris must show that his plea was inaccurate, and he has failed to meet that burden. This
is because even if a jury believed that Harris initially had permission to enter the
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apartment, Harris admitted to and described both his re-entry into the apartment and the
following assault. This satisfies all elements of first-degree burglary.
Affirmed.
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