In the Matter of the Welfare of: G. A. H., Child. ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0279
In the Matter of the Welfare of: G. A. H., Child
Filed August 18, 2014
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
Clearwater County District Court
File No. 15-JV-13-491
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan Andrews, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Richard C. Mollin, Clearwater County Attorney, Matt Headley, Assistant County
Attorney, Bagley, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his delinquency
adjudication for fifth-degree assault. Because the circumstances proved are inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 4, 2013, appellant G.A.H. was asked to retrieve his brother from class
at Bagley High School. After doing so, he and his brother made gestures to students
inside another classroom. The supervising teacher, D.L., went into the hallway and asked
what G.A.H. and his brother were doing. G.A.H. replied that it was “none of [D.L.’s]
business” and then told D.L. that he was going to punch him in the face. D.L. escorted
G.A.H. and his brother to the principal’s office.
G.A.H. was charged with fifth-degree assault. Following a bench trial, the district
court adjudicated G.A.H. delinquent and placed him on probation. This appeal follows.
DECISION
G.A.H. argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his delinquency
adjudication because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended
to frighten D.L. We assess the sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether the
facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from those facts reasonably
support the fact-finder’s conclusion that the defendant committed the charged offense. In
re Welfare of J.R.M., 653 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Minn. App. 2002). The fact-finder is to
determine the credibility and weight given to the testimony of each witness. In re
Welfare of S.A.M., 570 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. App. 1997). We “must assume that the
fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence.” In re
Welfare of T.N.Y., 632 N.W.2d 765, 768 (Minn. App. 2001). The same standard applies
to bench and jury trials. In re Welfare of M.E.M., 674 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Minn. App.
2004).
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A defendant commits fifth-degree assault when he “commits an act with intent to
cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd.
1(1) (2012). Intent is generally proved through circumstantial evidence. State v. Smith,
825 N.W.2d 131, 136 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013). “In
circumstantial evidence cases, the circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Hawes, 801
N.W.2d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). When reviewing the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence, we first identify the circumstances proved, Smith, 825 N.W.2d at
137, and then “examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be
drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with rational
hypotheses other than guilt,” State v. Al–Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Minn. 2010).
The state proved the following circumstances: G.A.H. made gestures at students in
D.L.’s classroom; when D.L. confronted him, G.A.H. said that it was none of his business
why G.A.H. and his brother were in the hallway; while standing six to eight feet away,
G.A.H. told D.L. that he was going to punch him in the face; G.A.H. did not smile or
appear to be joking; and D.L. felt threatened and can tell from prior experience “when
kids are kidding around.” It is reasonable to infer from these circumstances that G.A.H.
intended to cause fear when he threatened to punch D.L. G.A.H. was belligerent
throughout the encounter and did not want to cooperate with D.L.’s show of authority.
G.A.H. argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove guilt, citing his own
testimony that he threatened to punch D.L. in response to D.L.’s statement that “[You’re]
gonna be finding [your] head.” But in identifying the circumstances proved, we consider
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only the circumstances consistent with the verdict. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d at 670. D.L.
testified that he does not recall making such a statement to G.A.H. Other than G.A.H.’s
testimony, which the district court did not credit, there is no evidence to support the
hypothesis that G.A.H. was afraid of D.L. or that he threatened to punch him as some
form of self-defense. And G.A.H. admitted in a separate probation-violation hearing that
his statement about punching D.L. in the face constitutes assaultive behavior.1 On this
record, we conclude that the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.
G.A.H. also asserts that the district court clearly erred by finding that G.A.H. also
threatened to “‘take off [D.L.’s] head.’” We agree the record does not contain any
evidence to support that finding. But the error is harmless because the circumstances
proved with respect to G.A.H.’s threat to punch D.L. in the face are consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Accordingly, sufficient
evidence supports G.A.H.’s fifth-degree assault adjudication regardless of whether
G.A.H. made additional threatening statements.
Affirmed.
1
The state presented the transcript of the probation-violation hearing as evidence in this
case.
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