State of Minnesota v. Johnathan Richard Beying ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1708
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Johnathan Richard Beying,
Appellant
Filed September 2, 2014
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Peterson, Judge
Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-12-865
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Peter James Orput, Washington County Attorney, Robin Michelle Wolpert, Assistant
County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
In this sentencing appeal, appellant argues that (1) the district court had no
authority to impose a no-contact order as part of his sentence and (2) his top-of-the-box
sentence is excessive. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
Appellant Johnathan Beying pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2010). Under the
sentencing guidelines, the presumptive sentence range for this offense is 144 months to
187 months. At the sentencing hearing, appellant asked the district court to impose the
bottom-of-the-box sentence, and respondent State of Minnesota asked the court to impose
a sentence of 156 to 187 months. The district court sentenced appellant to 187 months
and ordered him to have no contact with the victim. Appellant argues that the district
court erred by imposing the no-contact order as part of his sentence and by imposing the
top-of-the-box sentence without stating its reasons for doing so.
DECISION
I.
This court reviews a sentence imposed by the district court “to determine whether
the sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate,
excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact issued by the
district court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2010). This court has explained that
because Minnesota courts
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do not have inherent authority to impose terms or conditions
of sentences for criminal acts and must act within the limits of
their statutory authority when imposing sentences[,] . . . a
district court may not impose a no-contact order as part of an
executed sentence unless the order is expressly authorized by
statute.
State v. Pugh, 753 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23,
2008).
Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), which is a felony offense, see Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 2 (2010) (defining felony). The sentence expressly authorized by statute for a
person convicted of violating Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), is imprisonment for not
more than 30 years or payment of a fine of not more than $40,000, or both. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 2(a) (2010). In addition to imprisonment and a fine, a person convicted
of violating Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), may be sentenced to pay court-ordered
restitution and a local correctional fee. Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1(a) (2010). We have
not found any statute that expressly authorizes a district court to impose a no-contact
order as part of a sentence for violating Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a).
Respondent acknowledges that, under Pugh, a district court may not impose a no-
contact order unless it is expressly authorized by statute. But respondent argues that this
case “is distinguishable from Pugh because the purpose of the [no-contact order] here is
not to punish Appellant by adding a term or condition of confinement—it is to protect
[the victim] and the administration of justice.”
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Regardless of the purpose of the no-contact order, it was imposed as part of
appellant’s sentence; the only basis for imposing the order was that appellant was found
guilty of violating Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a). Therefore, because no statute
expressly authorizes a district court to impose a no-contact order as part of a sentence for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct and district courts do not have inherent authority to
impose sentences for criminal acts, the district court did not have authority to impose a
no-contact order as part of appellant’s sentence, and we reverse the no-contact order
imposed by the district court.
II.
Appellant argues that the district court imposed an excessive sentence when it
sentenced him to the maximum presumptive term of imprisonment allowed under the
sentencing guidelines without addressing any of the factors discussed in State v. Trog,
323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (discussing mitigating sentencing factors).
This court reviews sentences imposed by the district court for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn.
July 20, 2010). Sentence ranges in the sentencing guidelines are presumed appropriate
for the crimes to which they apply. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D (Supp. 2011). “All three
numbers in any given cell [on the sentencing guidelines grid] constitute an acceptable
sentence . . . .” State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 359 n.2 (Minn. 2008). “[A]ny
sentence within the presumptive range for the convicted offense constitutes a
presumptive sentence.” Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428.
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Absent “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a
sentence outside the range on the grids,” the district court must impose the presumptive
guidelines sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D. A district court is not required to
explain its reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence, and we may not interfere with
the district court’s exercise of discretion so long as “the record shows the sentencing
court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a
determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. 1985). “[I]t would be
a rare case which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart.” State v. Kindem, 313
N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
This case is not the rare case that warrants reversal of the district court’s refusal to
depart. The record demonstrates that the district court carefully reviewed the information
presented before imposing a sentence within the guidelines range. The district court was
not required to explain its reasons for imposing a guidelines sentence. Therefore, we
affirm the 187-month sentence.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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