In re the Marriage of: Anne Elizabeth Castle-Heaney v. Bruce Edward Heaney ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1776
In re the Marriage of: Anne Elizabeth Castle-Heaney, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Bruce Edward Heaney,
Appellant .
Filed September 22, 2014
Reversed and remanded
Hooten, Judge
Scott County District Court
File No. 70-FA-11-28455
Anne Elizabeth Castle-Heany, Prior Lake, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
John Thomas Burns, Jr., Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant-father argues that the district court erred by awarding respondent-
mother sole physical custody of their two youngest minor children without making
adequate findings of fact. Respondent-mother also appeals, contending that the district
court erred in determining the amount and duration of her spousal-maintenance award.
Because the district court based its spousal-maintenance award on errors of law and
failed to make the necessary findings of fact regarding its custody and spousal
maintenance determinations, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Appellant Bruce Heaney and respondent Anne Castle-Heaney married in 1991.
The parties separated, and Anne petitioned for divorce in October 2011. Among other
issues, the parties disputed the physical custody of the parties’ minor children: E., M.,
and C., who were, at the time of the bench trial in December 2012, 17, 13, and 9 years
old, respectively. The parties’ oldest child, Matthew, was 19 years old and had lived with
Bruce since the separation.
The parties agreed to joint legal custody of the minor children, but each sought
sole physical custody. Anne testified that she would reluctantly accept joint physical
custody. Bruce was against joint physical custody.
Dr. Michelle Millenacker was appointed as a neutral custody evaluator. Her
written report provides that E., who was especially close to Matthew, wanted to live with
her father on a full-time basis. E. told Dr. Millenacker that “[s]he does not particularly
get along with [M.] as they have such divergent interests,” but that “[s]he and [C.] are
able to enjoy time together when they go shopping.”
M. confirmed that while he “does not always get along well with [E.] and [that]
they do not spend a lot of time together,” “he enjoys watching a movie with her.” M.
also indicated that he enjoyed playing computer games with C. M. told Dr. Millenacker
that he preferred to spend time with his father and brother “because he misses them.”
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C. told Dr. Millenacker that she wanted to increase her parenting time with her
father so that she would be with him every weekend instead of every other weekend.
According to Dr. Millenacker, C. “probably has the best relationship with her mother out
of all of the kids,” but that she “would be devastated not to be with her siblings because
her siblings are her support group.” Dr. Millenacker opined that C. “needs to be with her
siblings” and that “[t]hose kids need to be together.”
Dr. Millenacker noted that Anne’s “level of anger and physical aggressiveness
towards the children is concerning,” recognizing that “[t]here are a number of similarities
between the older three children’s experiences with their mother,” in that “[s]he has been
physically aggressive to all of them, yelled at them and has tried to thwart normal
adolescent development and independence.” “Also of concern [to Dr. Millenacker] is
that out of the parties’ four children, three have expressed a desire to live with their father
on a full-time basis.” According to Dr. Millenacker, “[t]his was never a case where one
or both wanted joint physical custody.” She opined that joint physical custody would not
be ideal and that she viewed “this as a case where one [parent] needs to have sole
physical custody.” Dr. Millenacker recommended that Bruce be granted sole physical
custody of all the minor children because he “is more encouraging of the kids” while
Anne has “a punitive style.”
Dr. Susan Phipps-Yonas reviewed Dr. Millenacker’s report and conducted a
second custody evaluation. According to Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s written report, E.
“indicated that she wants to live at her father’s home on a full time basis and see her
mother only when she so chooses.” Dr. Phipps-Yonas stated that Anne’s “relationship
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with [E.] is seriously strained and shows signs of dysfunction that go beyond typical
mother/adolescent-daughter problems.”
M. desired more time with Bruce but did not convey to Dr. Phipps-Yonas that he
wanted to live with Bruce full-time. Dr. Phipps-Yonas opined that Anne’s “relationship
with [M.] is adequate at this point in time, but [that] she may need to change the manner
in which she parents teenagers.”
Dr. Phipps-Yonas stated that C. “did not want to offer any preference although she
believes it would be best for her to be on the same schedule as her older siblings.” Dr.
Phipps-Yonas opined that Anne “does have a close and loving connection with [C.]” and
that their “relationship is very solid and healthy.” Dr. Phipps-Yonas testified that “even
though [C. is] not particularly close to [E.] and [M.], she appreciates . . . the nature of
their sibling relationships, which . . . is why she doesn’t somehow want to . . . be one
place when they’re somewhere else.”
According to Dr. Phipps-Yonas, the minor children “adore their older brother” and
believe that Matthew is “by far the best sibling in the family.” Dr. Phipps-Yonas
observed “some rivalries and conflicts amongst these three youngsters, but they do not
seem to be serious in nature and could likely be easily modified with some professional
help.” Dr. Phipps-Yonas opined that “it might well be detrimental to [the] children were
one parent granted sole authority over the [children’s] upbringing.” She testified that
doing so “would in effect say that one parent is devalued relative to the other
and . . . [that it] wouldn’t resolve at all the underlying issues.” Dr. Phipps-Yonas was
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concerned with either parent having sole physical custody of the children. She
recommended that the parties be awarded joint physical custody.
The parties also disputed the amount and duration of spousal maintenance. At the
time of trial, Anne was 51 years old and was earning $14.27 per hour as a teacher’s
assistant. She worked about 25 hours per week. A vocational and psychological
evaluation was conducted and admitted as evidence. Also admitted was evidence of the
parties’ paystubs, tax returns, and expense budgets.
In April 2013, the district court awarded sole physical custody of E. to Bruce and
sole physical custody of M. and C. to Anne. The district court ordered Bruce to pay
$1,461 in monthly child support beginning on July 1, 2013. The district court also
ordered Bruce to pay temporary spousal maintenance for five years beginning on April 1,
2013: $1,800 per month for the first two years; $1,300 per month for year three; $800 per
month for year four; and $500 per month for year five.
Bruce moved for amended findings of fact and conclusions of law, arguing that,
among other issues, the district court’s findings are “incomplete” and that “[n]o one has
recommended that custody be split and [for Anne to] have sole physical custody of [M.]
and [C.].” Bruce requested the district court to grant him sole physical custody of M. and
C. Anne also moved for amended findings of fact and conclusions of law, contending
that, among other issues, the district court erred by not awarding permanent spousal
maintenance.
At the hearing on the motions, the district court stated:
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I saw a big difference, and I think the evaluators did too, with
[the] teenagers and [the] two younger kids. Go back over all
these reports and see what Millenacker and Phipps-Yonas
said about [C.] and [M.] It’s different. . . . [Y]ou cannot rule
teenagers with an iron fist. . . . And if the same thing happens
with [M.] and [C.], you’ll see them leave and they’ll go to
their dad’s.
The district court amended findings unrelated to the children’s custody and
spousal maintenance. Bruce appeals the custody determination. Anne, by notice of
related appeal, challenges the spousal-maintenance award.
DECISION
I.
We first note that, contrary to Bruce’s characterization, the district court’s custody
award of E. to Bruce and M. and C. to Anne does not involve a split-custody situation
warranting a higher level of scrutiny. See Rinker v. Rinker, 358 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn.
App. 1984) (“While split custody decisions may be made within the discretion of the
[district] court, they are viewed as unfortunate and are carefully scrutinized.” (quotation
omitted)). At the time that the district court issued its amended findings, E. was 18 years
old. E. is now 19 years old. Accordingly, there is no longer jurisdiction to determine
E.’s custody, and that issue is moot. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3 (a) (1), (2) (2012)
(directing the district court, upon the dissolution of a marriage, to address the legal and
physical custody of “the minor children of the parties”) (emphasis added); Minn. Stat.
§ 645.45 (14) (2012) (defining a “minor” as an individual under the age of 18); see also
Minn. Stat. § 518D.102(c) (2012) (defining “child” under the Minnesota Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as “an individual who has not attained 18
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years of age”); Minn. Stat § 518D.201(a), (b) (2012) (providing the “exclusive
jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by” a Minnesota court).
The sole issue before us is the physical custody of M. and C. Because their custody was
awarded to Anne, this case does not present a split-custody situation
Turning to the merits, Bruce argues that the district court abused its discretion
because its custody determination is unsupported by sufficiently specific findings. We
agree.
A child-custody decision must be based on the best interests of the child. Minn.
Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(a) (2012). When examining the best interests of a child, the
district court must consider the relevant factors specified in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1
(2012). We review a custody determination for an abuse of discretion. Pikula v. Pikula,
374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). “[I]t is especially important that the basis for the
[district] court’s decision be set forth with a high degree of particularity if appellate
review is to be meaningful.” Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn. 261, 267, 187 N.W.2d 627, 631
(1971). As the supreme court has held:
[T]he family court must make written findings which
properly reflect its consideration of the factors listed in
[Minn. Stat. §] 518.17, subd. 1. Such findings would (1)
assure consideration of the statutory factors by the family
court; (2) facilitate appellate review of the family court’s
custody decision; and (3) satisfy the parties that this important
decision was carefully and fairly considered by the family
court.
Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 82, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1976).
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Here, in discussing the best-interests factors, the district court stated that “[e]ach
parent has demonstrated the ability to adequately provide for the children’s” needs,
“[e]ach parent has the ability and temperament to act as the primary caretaker of the
children,” “[t]he children are well cared for by each,” “[t]he children love and are loved
by each of their parents,” “[b]oth parents participate in various activities with the
children,” “[t]he children are adjusted to both of their homes,” “[b]oth of the homes
adequately meet the needs of the children,” “[b]oth [parents] can provide adequate living
arrangements,” “[t]he parties each have the capacity to provide the children with love,
affection and guidance,” and “[t]he parties share similar backgrounds.” The district court
also recognized that the children “are more relaxed, comfortable and engaged with one
another in their father’s home,” and that Anne “seems to have trouble controlling her
emotions and it affects the children” and “has attempted to limit [Bruce’s] contact with
the children in a minor way since the separation.”
We agree with Bruce that the district court’s order awarding sole physical custody
of M. and C. to Anne lacks sufficient particularity so as to facilitate appellate review and
satisfy the parties that the district court carefully and fairly considered its decision.
While the district court listed the best-interests-of-the-child factors and made some
relevant factual findings as to each factor, the district court’s order failed to state how
consideration of the best-interests factors impacted its decision or explain why it awarded
Anne, rather than Bruce, sole physical custody of the minor children. The district court’s
findings indicate that both parents could adequately care for the children, but Anne has
shortcomings as a parent. Based on its comments at the motion hearing, the district court
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appears to have based its decision in part on the belief that Anne’s relationships with M.
and C. are healthier than her relationships with Matthew and E. But the fact that Anne
has adequate relationships with M. and C. does not necessarily mean that it would be in
the best interests of M. and C. for Anne, rather than Bruce, to have sole physical custody
of them. And in a situation where siblings are involved, the district court must consider
“the interaction and interrelationship of the child with . . . siblings . . . who may significantly
affect the child’s best interests.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(5). The parties presented
ample evidence of the siblings’ relationships with each other. We cannot tell from the
district court’s order whether it considered this evidence or other evidence related to the
best-interests factors.
Moreover, the need for particularized findings is crucial here because the district
court rejected the recommendations of two custody evaluators. Although a custody
evaluation “may be disregarded when outweighed by other evidence,” Pikula, 374
N.W.2d at 712, the rejection of an evaluation “enlarges the need for particularized
findings,” Lawver v. Lawver, 360 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Minn. App. 1985). Here, Dr.
Millenacker recommended that sole physical custody of M. and C. be granted to Bruce,
and Dr. Phipps-Yonas recommended that Bruce should share custody. Neither evaluator
recommended that Anne should have sole physical custody of the minor children.
Although the district court has discretion to disregard the evaluations, it must explain
what other evidence outweighs the recommendations of the custody evaluators. The
district court failed to do so here.
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For these reasons, we must reverse the award of sole physical custody of M. and
C. to Anne and remand this matter to the district court for reconsideration due to its
failure to provide sufficient findings of fact to support such award. On remand, the
district court is to evaluate and weigh the best-interests factors, make a custody
determination, and set forth adequate findings in support of such determination. We
emphasize that our decision does not address the merits of the district court’s prior
custody award, but is based only upon our inability to review the award in light of the
district court’s insufficient findings. Therefore, on remand, the district court has the
discretion to re-instate its prior custody award, or make any other custody award that is in
the best interests of the children, so long as the award is supported by sufficient findings
and the law.
II.
Anne argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining the spousal-
maintenance award. We agree.
A district court must consider eight relevant factors in deciding the amount of
spousal maintenance and whether to award it on a permanent basis. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 2 (2012). “A district court generally has broad discretion in its
decisions regarding spousal maintenance. The standard of review in spousal-
maintenance determinations is whether the district court abused its discretion by
improperly applying the law or making findings unsupported by the evidence.” Melius v.
Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App. 2009) (citation omitted). A district court
abuses its discretion if its factual findings are not sufficiently detailed. Stevens v.
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Stevens, 501 N.W.2d 634, 636–37 (Minn. App. 1993). “Even where the record supports
the [district] court’s decision, the failure to make specific findings compels a remand.”
Id. at 637.
Relevant factors for determining maintenance include the parties’ incomes and
expenses. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a), (g). Here, the district court determined:
“[Anne] has a gross monthly income of $1,391.33 and reasonable monthly living
expenses of $5,552. [Bruce] has a gross monthly income of $9,879.23 and reasonable
monthly expenses of $4,720.” On appeal, the parties do not dispute the district court’s
findings regarding their gross monthly incomes or Anne’s reasonable monthly living
expenses.
But, Anne argues that the district court improperly calculated Bruce’s monthly
living expenses by including “expenses attributed to the parties’ adult son, Matthew.”
It’s unclear how the district court calculated Bruce’s expenses, but the finding of $4,720
almost matches the total from Bruce’s submitted expense schedule, which includes a line
item of $200 for “Matthew.” The record provides no clarification of this line item. In
any event, we have held that the district court “must fairly determine maintenance
without considering the needs of the adult children in setting the amount of
maintenance.” Musielewicz v. Musielewicz, 400 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. App. 1987),
review denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987). Accordingly, the district court abused its
discretion by including Matthew’s expenses in the calculation of Bruce’s reasonable
living expenses.
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Anne also complains that the district court erred by awarding only $1,800 per
month in spousal maintenance for the first two years and by setting a reduction in the
amount of future maintenance, arguing that “such a result clearly does not balance [her]
need with Bruce’s ability to pay.” Based on the district court’s determinations on
incomes, expenses, child support, and spousal maintenance, Anne would have a monthly
shortfall of $889.67, while Bruce would have a monthly surplus of $1,916.23.1 But, a
maintenance award generating a budgetary shortfall for one or both parties does not
automatically render the award of spousal maintenance an abuse of discretion. See
Ganyo v. Engen, 446 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. App. 1989) (upholding spousal-
maintenance award that resulted in shortfall for husband). Indeed, there are numerous
other factors to be considered in addition to the parties’ incomes and expenses that are to
be considered in the determination of an equitable spousal-maintenance amount. See
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2.
Even so, the district court’s discussion on spousal maintenance fails to explain
how other factors contributed to its determination. We cannot tell from the decision how
the district court arrived at its maintenance amount and schedule. Moreover, the district
court improperly used gross income in determining maintenance. A district court “must
make a determination of the payor spouse’s net or take-home pay.” Kostelnik v.
Kostelnik, 367 N.W.2d 665, 670 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. July 26,
1
Anne: $1,391.33 (gross income) + $1,461 (child support) + $1,800 (maintenance) =
$4,652.33 (total monthly income) – $5,552 (expenses) = $899.67 shortfall.
Bruce: $9,897.23 (gross income) – $1,461 (child support) – $1,800 (maintenance) –
$4,720 (expenses) = $1,916.23 surplus.
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1985). Here, the district court used the parties’ gross monthly incomes even though there
was ample evidence of the parties’ income tax liabilities, including their paystubs and tax
returns. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by both failing to explain its
decision and using gross income.
Finally, Anne argues that the district court erred by not awarding permanent
spousal maintenance. The duration of maintenance must be determined by considering
the same eight factors for determining the amount of maintenance. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 2. “Where there is some uncertainty as to the necessity of a permanent
award, the court shall order a permanent award leaving its order open for later
modification.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3 (2012). The statute “requires that a
[district] court order permanent maintenance if the court is uncertain that the spouse
seeking maintenance can ever become self-supporting.” Aaker v. Aaker, 447 N.W.2d
607, 611 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990).
Here, the district court determined that Anne “is currently unable to provide
adequate self-support and support for the minor children through her current
employment.” The district court also noted Anne’s “spotty employment history
throughout the marriage, . . . time away from the workforce, lack of some minor job skills
and training, and . . . minor physical limitations.” Despite the district court’s recognition
of Anne’s employment limitations, the district court again failed to explain how the
statutory factors contributed to its decision to reject Anne’s request for permanent spousal
maintenance. For this reason as well, the district court abused its discretion.
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Because the district court determined the spousal-maintenance award by
improperly including Matthew’s expenses in determining Bruce’s monthly expenses and
by using the parties’ gross incomes, instead of their net incomes, and because the district
court did not provide adequate findings in support of its denial of Anne’s request for
permanent spousal maintenance, we reverse the district court’s order with respect to the
spousal-maintenance award and remand for further consideration consistent with this
decision. On remand, the district court has the discretion to reopen the record and
determine whether, and what, additional evidence should be considered to reach an
equitable outcome.
Reversed and remanded.
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