In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Peter Gerard Lonergan. ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1866
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Peter Gerard Lonergan
Filed May 16, 2016
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19-P1-06-008179
Peter G. Lonergan, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Donald E. Bruce, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motions under rule 60.02 and
rule 65.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the district court abused its
discretion in (1) denying the motions without an evidentiary hearing, and (2) not properly
analyzing the legal issues underlying his motions. Because the motions are barred by the
exclusive transfer-or-discharge remedies of the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment
Act, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant, Peter Gerard Lonergan, was indeterminately committed as a sexually
dangerous person (SDP) to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) by a judgment
entered on May 13, 2009.
On June 17, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota issued an
order declaring portions of the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act (MCTA), which
includes the MSOP, unconstitutional, both facially and as applied. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109
F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1173 (D. Minn. June 17, 2015). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently stayed the district court’s decision pending appeal. Karsjens v. Jesson, No.
15-3485 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 2015).
On June 23, 2015, Lonergan filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (2014) and a motion for temporary relief under Minn. R. Civ. P.
65.01-.02. Lonergan argued that his commitment is unconstitutional in light of Karsjens
and asked the district court to void his commitment. On October 6, 2015, the district court
denied Lonergan’s motions without an evidentiary hearing. Lonergan appeals.
DECISION
I.
Lonergan moved for relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. In denying Lonergan’s
motion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the district court held that Lonergan could not use
rule 60.02 to seek discharge from commitment. This court reviews the district court’s
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denial of a rule 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion. In re Civil Commitment of Moen,
837 N.W.2d 40, 44-45 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013).
The supreme court held in In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan that a rule 60.02
motion could not be used to seek transfer or discharge from a civil commitment. 811
N.W.2d 635, 642 (Minn. 2012). The supreme court reasoned that the MCTA “provides
relief to a patient indeterminately committed as an SDP or [sexual psychopathic
personality] through a transfer or a discharge” and that it was the “exclusive remedy” for
this purpose. Id. at 641-42. In In re Civil Commitment of Moen, this court concluded that
even if a claim is described as a nontransfer, nondischarge claim, if the ultimate purpose is
a resolution that would result in discharge, the claim is one for transfer or discharge, which
must be made through the procedures set forth in the MCTA. 837 N.W.2d at 46-47.
Although Lonergan argues that he merely seeks to void a commitment that he asserts
was impermissible ab initio, the ultimate result would be discharge from MSOP. Under
the reasoning of Lonergan and Moen, this is not a permissible use of a rule 60.02 motion.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lonergan’s rule 60.02
motion.
Lonergan also argues that the district court abused its discretion because it did not
hold an evidentiary hearing on his motions. “A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing only if a factual dispute is shown by the petition.” Seifert v. Erickson, 420 N.W.2d
917, 920 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. May 18, 1988). A “purely legal
question involving construction of [a] statute and application of constitutional law” does
not merit an evidentiary hearing. Id. Lonergan asserts in his brief that the district court
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failed to review the exhibits, specifically the adjudicated findings of fact from the Karsjens
case, under the standard of strict scrutiny. He appears to argue that he should have been
allowed to litigate the constitutionality of the MCTA at the district court level. However,
to date the Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the provisions of the MCTA.
See generally Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d at 641-42; In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 875-76
(Minn. 1999); In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 270-71 (Minn. App.
2002), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002). To the extent that Lonergan’s argument
addresses the constitutionality of the MCTA, it is a purely legal issue that has been
repeatedly addressed by the supreme court and is not dependent on any particular factual
dispute raised by Lonergan. Thus, the district court did not err by denying Lonergan’s
request for an evidentiary hearing.
II.
Lonergan contends the district court abused its discretion by denying him injunctive
relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.01 and 65.02. The district court concluded that Lonergan
was not entitled to a TRO because he was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim
for relief from judgment under rule 60.02 and that he was a threat to public safety.
Lonergan argues that the district court erred in considering that he is a threat to public
safety, a claim that he asserts was unsupported by any evidence before the district court.
A court considers several factors when determining whether injunctive relief is
appropriate. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Minn. Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d 214,
220-21 (Minn. App. 2002) (citing Dahlberg Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 274-
75, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (1965)), review denied (Minn. Feb. 4, 2002). These factors
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include: (1) the nature and background of the parties’ relationship; (2) the potential harm
to the parties; (3) the likelihood that either party will prevail on the merits; (4) the factual
aspects of the case and their impact on public policy considerations; and (5) the
administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision. Id. The purpose of injunctive
relief is “to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits.” Id. at 221 (citation
omitted). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s
decision to deny injunctive relief. Id. at 220.
Consideration of these factors is not necessary. As Lonergan is currently committed
to MSOP, his continued commitment to MSOP preserves the status quo. For this reason,
the district court correctly denied injunctive relief because that preserves the status quo in
this case. See id. Even considering the factors, the district court correctly denied relief.
The likelihood that either party will prevail on the merits is “[a] primary factor in
determining whether to issue a temporary injunction.” Minneapolis Fed’n of Teachers,
AFL-CIO, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 N.W.2d 107,
110 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 1994). Even if Lonergan’s
objection to the district court’s consideration of his continued danger to the public was
valid, the district court denied Lonergan’s motion for injunctive relief because he cannot
succeed on the merits of his rule 60.02 claim. Because the analysis above confirms that
Lonergan cannot succeed on his rule 60.02 claim, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Lonergan injunctive relief.
Affirmed.
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