Nathan J. Knoernschild v. Dennis Halverson ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0909
Nathan J. Knoernschild, et al.,
Respondents,
vs.
Dennis Halverson,
Appellant.
Filed April 11, 2016
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-14-4623
Christopher P. Renz, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)
Dennis Halverson, Champlin, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondents
on their defamation claims against appellant, arguing that the district court improperly
(1) limited the time allowed for oral argument at the summary-judgment hearing and
(2) disregarded evidence that appellant provided shortly before the summary-judgment
hearing, after he failed to comply with a discovery order. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Lance G. Stendal, vice president of respondent Omega Management,
Inc., was the property manager for the Elm Creek Courthome Association, Inc. (the
association). Appellant Dennis Halverson resided in a home owned by his mother and
located in a common-interest community governed by the association. A series of disputes
between Halverson and Stendal and members of the association’s board of directors led to
the district court granting Stendal’s and the board members’ petitions for harassment
restraining orders (HROs) against Halverson. Respondent Nathan J. Knoernschild of
respondent law firm Thomsen & Nybeck, P.A. (T&N) represented Stendal and the board
members in the HRO proceeding.
About two months after the HROs were issued, Halverson sent an e-mail to
Knoernschild, claiming that the affidavits supporting the petitions for HROs contained
false information and that Knoernschild knew that the information was false. Halverson
forwarded the e-mail to several other T&N attorneys. Knoernschild sent an e-mail to
Halverson denying Halverson’s allegations and instructing Halverson to stop contacting
T&N attorneys and staff. Halverson responded that he intended to continue informing
T&N’s “Board Members” about Knoernschild’s preparation of “fraudulent affidavits.”
Halverson later sent an e-mail to a T&N shareholder, claiming that the four affidavits
supporting the petitions for HROs contained 130 “instances of perjury.”
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Halverson posted numerous YouTube videos accusing Knoernschild of committing
and suborning perjury. Halverson also posted YouTube videos about Stendal and Omega,
alleging that they violated and failed to uniformly enforce association rules. Halverson
stated in an interrogatory answer that he included the names of T&N attorneys and Omega
employees in a YouTube video description to “attract more people to [his] videos.”
Halverson posted the videos on other webpages in addition to YouTube. He also posted
derogatory comments and messages about respondents on webpages associated with
respondents.
Knoernschild sent Halverson a letter stating that Halverson’s allegations against
Knoernschild and T&N were false and demanding that Halverson remove all defamatory
statements from the Internet. Halverson did not comply, and respondents brought this
defamation action against him seeking damages and an order requiring him to remove
statements and videos from the Internet and enjoining him from publishing or
communicating any false statements about respondents. Respondents served Halverson
with interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admissions.
Halverson responded but answered the interrogatories in summary fashion, referring
respondents to his videos and to documents that he had submitted to Knoernschild, rather
than identifying the specific facts that formed the basis for his defamatory statements.
On July 24, 2014, respondents’ attorney sent a letter to Halverson stating that his
discovery responses were inadequate and identifying the deficiencies. Halverson did not
respond, and respondents brought a motion to compel discovery. On December 11, 2014,
the district court issued an order directing Halverson to respond to respondents’
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interrogatories with “full and substantive answers” and to produce the documents requested
by respondents within ten days. Halverson failed to comply with the order within the ten-
day time limit, and the record does not indicate that he made any attempt at compliance.
On December 31, 2014, respondents filed a motion for summary judgment.
Respondents argued that they were entitled to summary judgment on the merits and
because Halverson did not comply with the discovery order. On January 2, 2015,
Halverson provided respondents with the documents they had requested, and, as part of his
response to the summary-judgment motion, submitted an affidavit identifying some
allegedly false statements in the affidavits supporting the petitions for HROs. Halverson
initially acted pro se in this lawsuit, and a certificate of representation by an attorney
representing Halverson was not filed until January 20, 2015. Following a hearing, the
district court granted respondents’ summary-judgment motion. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I.
Halverson argues that the time allowed for oral argument at the summary-judgment
hearing was insufficient. The district court has discretion to limit the time allowed for oral
arguments. See State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 197 (Minn. 1992) (stating that district
court has discretion to set time limit on closing argument). Even if the district court erred,
Halverson is only entitled to reversal of the summary judgment if the error was prejudicial.
Midway Ctr. Asssocs. v. Midway Ctr, Inc., 309 Minn. 352, 356, 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (1975)
(stating that appellant must show both error and prejudice to obtain reversal).
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The parties agree that, at the beginning of the summary-judgment hearing, the
district court stated that each party would have 15 minutes for argument. Halverson argues
that 15 minutes was insufficient time for his attorney to address all of the evidence in the
case. But the detailed memorandum accompanying the district court’s order shows that
the court carefully considered the record evidence.1 Also, Halverson’s attorney filed a 41-
page memorandum opposing respondents’ summary-judgment motion.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the time for oral argument
to 15 minutes for each party. And even if the district court did err, Halverson has not shown
that any prejudice resulted from the time limit.
II.
Halverson argues that the district court erred by disallowing the evidence in his
January 20, 2015 affidavit because he “responded to interrogatories to the best of his
ability.” The district court may impose sanctions, including prohibiting a person from
introducing designated matters into evidence, if a party disobeys a discovery order. Minn.
R. Civ. P. 37.02(b)(2). “The choice of a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery
order is a matter within the [district] court’s discretion.” Chicago Greatwestern Office
Condo. Ass’n v. Brooks, 427 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Minn. App. 1988).
The district court stated:
[Halverson] refused to identify any false statements or
instances of perjury or subornation of perjury, as requested in
1
Although the district court precluded Halverson from supporting his claimed truth defense
with the January 20, 2015 affidavit because the evidence was not provided during
discovery, the district court also concluded that, even when the affidavit was considered,
respondents were entitled to summary judgment.
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[respondents’] interrogatories. Moreover, he refused to
respond to the Court’s order dated December 11, 2014, which
required him to identify within ten days the factual basis for
these assertions. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.02,
[Halverson] is precluded from supporting this claimed defense
with information that was not disclosed in discovery.
In determining whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing a
discovery sanction, appellate courts consider whether (1) the district court set a deadline
for compliance, (2) the district court gave a warning regarding the potential sanctions for
noncompliance, (3) the failure to comply with discovery was an isolated event or part of a
pattern, (4) the failure to comply was willful or without justification, and (5) the moving
party has demonstrated prejudice. Frontier Ins. Co. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 788
N.W.2d 917, 923 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2010).
The district court’s discovery order imposed a ten-day time limit and stated, “if
[Halverson] fails to comply with any aspect of this Order, the Court may grant relief
pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.02, which may include the rendering of judgment by
default.” Halverson’s failure to respond to the July 2014 letter from respondents’ attorney
and his failure to provide any supplemental discovery until after respondents moved for
summary judgment show willfulness and a pattern of noncompliance. Respondents could
not be expected to respond to Halverson’s claim that his statements were true without any
information about why he believed that the statements were true, and Halverson was given
ample time to respond to the discovery requests.
“Although some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has
repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as
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attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N .W.2d 115,
119 (Minn. App. 2001). Halverson cannot reasonably claim that his pro se status prevented
him from responding to respondents’ discovery requests. Legal training was not needed to
understand respondents’ requests to identify the factual basis for Halverson’s claim that his
statements were true.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded Halverson from
supporting his truth defense with information that was not disclosed in discovery and
granting summary judgment for respondents based on the absence of evidence supporting
Halverson’s truth defense. Because the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment on this basis, we need not address the remaining issues raised by the parties.
Affirmed.
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