State of Minnesota v. Katherine Ann Clark ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0293
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Katherine Ann Clark,
Appellant
Filed September 8, 2014
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Dodge County District Court
File No. 20-K7-04-000200
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Paul Kiltinen, Dodge County Attorney, Mantorville, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges probation revocation, arguing that the district court abused
its discretion because the need for confinement did not outweigh the policies favoring
probation, and that remand is necessary because the district court’s findings are
inadequate and contrary to the evidence. We affirm.
DECISION
We review the district court’s probation-revocation decision for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). The district court’s
findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 2003).
Before revoking an offender’s probation, the district court “must 1) designate the
specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was
intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies
favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. The district court must “create [a]
thorough, fact-specific record[] setting forth [its] reasons for revoking probation.” State
v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). The supreme court emphasized that
in making the three Austin findings, courts are not charged
with merely conforming to procedural requirements; rather,
courts must seek to convey their substantive reasons for
revocation and the evidence relied upon. . . . [C]ourts should
not assume that they have satisfied Austin by reciting the
three factors and offering general, non-specific reasons for
revocation, as it is not the role of appellate courts to scour the
record to determine if sufficient evidence exists to support the
district court’s revocation.
Id.Appellant Katherine Ann Clark pleaded guilty to first-degree controlled substance
crime in 2006; the district court stayed adjudication and placed her on probation for 15
years with various conditions, including that she maintain contact with her probation
officer and refrain from using or possessing alcohol or illegal drugs. After her third
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probation violation, the district court imposed a 49-month sentence but stayed execution
on condition that she complete treatment and abstain from using illegal drugs or abusing
prescription drugs.
On this violation, her fourth, the district court bifurcated the revocation hearing; at
the first hearing on November 13, 2013, Clark admitted that she had failed to maintain
contact with her probation officer and that she had abused a prescription medication. She
acknowledged that she had no legal excuse for violating the conditions of probation.
Based on these admissions, the district court found that she had violated specific
conditions of her probation and that the violations were “intentional, willful, and
inexcusable.” This satisfies the first two Austin factors and the district court’s comments
on the record are sufficient for the written-findings requirement. See id., n.4 (stating that
“[t]he ‘written findings’ requirement is satisfied by the district court stating its findings
and reasons on the record”).
The district court convened a second hearing on the sole issue of whether the third
Austin factor, the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation, was
satisfied. Thus, the entire hearing involved consideration of this issue, with Clark’s
attorney emphasizing the policies for continuing probation and the state asserting the
need for confinement. The district court also asked questions to clarify the parties’
positions. At the conclusion of the presentation, the district court commented, “I will
make the requisite findings that the need for incarceration outweighs any benefits of a
probationary sentence. To not execute at this juncture will be to unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the original offense, which should have been a commit in the first place.”
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The district court added, “And lastly, I will make the requisite finding that [Clark]
exhausted all community resources.” Although the district court recited that not
executing Clark’s sentence would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the original
offense, rather than the violation, it is clear to us that the district court made an adequate,
fact-specific statement that demonstrates that the district court considered the third Austin
factor. The district court’s statements on the record satisfy the written-findings
requirement. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Clark’s
probation.
Clark argues that the district court improperly inquired into her religious affiliation
because her proposed treatment program has a religious orientation. There is no
indication that the district court considered Clark’s religious affiliation in reaching its
decision and, in any event, Clark admits that religious affiliation is not a prerequisite to
acceptance into the program.
Affirmed.
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