State of Minnesota v. Curtis Lamon Caradine ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1933
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Curtis Lamon Caradine,
Appellant
Filed September 8, 2014
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-12-7275
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
In this appeal from his convictions of second- and third-degree controlled
substance crimes, appellant argues that the district court erred by permitting the state to
impeach him with a prior felony conviction. He raises other challenges in a pro se brief.
We affirm.
DECISION
Appellant Curtis Lamon Caradine argues that the district court committed
reversible error by permitting the state to impeach him during his testimony with a prior
conviction of a second-degree controlled-substance crime. We review the district court’s
decision about whether a witness can be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Minn. 2011). Caradine has
the burden of showing that the district court improperly admitted the evidence and that he
was prejudiced as a result. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006). We will
reverse the conviction only if the district court’s erroneous admission of evidence
substantially influenced] the jury’s decision. State v. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d 470, 482
(Minn. 2009).
Minn. R. Evid. 609(a) provides that a witness’s credibility may be attacked by
evidence of a conviction of any crime of dishonesty or of a felony, if the probative value
of using this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Generally, “[e]vidence of a
conviction . . . is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the
date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for
that conviction, whichever is the later date.” Id. (b). This rule governs impeachment of a
defendant as well as other witnesses. See State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Minn.
2009). The district court should make explicit findings supporting its impeachment
decision, but a reviewing court may independently review the record to determine if the
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district court abused its discretion. State v. Craig, 807 N.W.2d 453, 469 (Minn. App.
2011), aff’d, 826 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013); State v. Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d 715, 719
(Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001); see also Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)
1989 comm. cmt. (stating that district court “should make explicit findings on the record
as to the factors considered and the reasons for admitting or excluding the evidence”).
In order to determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the
prejudicial effect of impeaching a witness with a prior felony conviction, the district court
is directed to consider the Jones factors. See State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 537-38
(Minn. 1978). These include:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of
the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the
greater the similarity, the greater the reason for not permitting
use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of the
defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility
issue.
Id. at 538.
Impeachment value
Minnesota courts have consistently determined that even crimes not involving
dishonesty have impeachment value because “impeachment by a prior conviction aids the
jury by allowing it to see the whole person and thus to judge better the truth of the
defendant’s testimony.” Craig, 807 N.W.2d at 469 (quotation omitted). In Williams, 771
N.W.2d at 519, the supreme court noted that permitting the jury to see the “whole
person” aided it in evaluating the veracity of the defendant’s testimony. Caradine’s prior
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felony conviction had impeachment value because it permitted the fact-finder to consider
Caradine as a “whole person.”
Date
Caradine argues that the district court’s rejection of his 2003 assault conviction as
too old to have impeachment value, coupled with its determination that his 2004
controlled-substance conviction was not, made little sense in light of the short period of
time that elapsed between those two offenses. Minn. R. Evid. 609(b) prohibits the use of
a conviction that is more than ten years old, but measures the age of the conviction from
the date of conviction or the witness’s release from confinement, “whichever is the later
date.” Caradine served an executed sentence for the 2004 controlled-substance
conviction that concluded in 2009, or within four years before this trial.
Similarity
As to the third factor, the prior conviction is similar to the current offenses, which
generally weighs against use of the prior conviction for impeachment because of the
possibility that a jury may use the information substantively. See State v. Gassler, 505
N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993). While this is a concern, it is not as great a concern when a
case is tried, as it was here, to the district court instead of before a jury. State v. Hofmann,
549 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1996).
Importance of testimony
The fourth factor, the importance of the defendant’s testimony, weighs against use
of the impeachment evidence if it discourages the defendant from testifying. Gassler,
505 N.W.2d at 67; Craig, 807 N.W.2d at 470. But Caradine testified despite the district
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court’s ruling permitting use of his prior conviction for impeachment. See id. (noting that
if fact-finder hears defendant’s version of event, this factor weighs in favor of
admissibility).
Credibility
The last factor, whether the defendant’s credibility is a central issue, makes “a
greater case . . . for admitting the impeachment evidence because the need for the
evidence is greater.” State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998) (quotation
omitted). Here, Caradine claimed that the confidential reliable informant (CRI) who
purchased drugs from Caradine in three controlled buys lied during his testimony and that
the CRI actually sold drugs to Caradine. Thus, credibility was a central issue, creating a
“significant need for the admission of [the impeachment] evidence.” Gassler, 505
N.W.2d at 67.
Considering all of the Jones factors, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by permitting the state to impeach Caradine with his prior controlled-substance
conviction. But Caradine argues that the district court failed to make adequate and
specific findings on the Jones factors. See Vanhouse, 634 N.W.2d at 719 (concluding
that “district court erred by failing to place its Jones-factor analysis on the record,” but
holding error was harmless because record demonstrated that district court properly
analyzed impeachment request).
The district court’s findings here are not specific and detailed:
Based on the date and kind of the law value of impeachment,
I’ll keep out or exclude the assault in the second degree. The
issue of the controlled substance crime in the second degree,
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looking at those issues about the value and the credibility, the
concerning part, of course, is similarity so that someone is not
convicted of a similar crime. But I find that the impeachment
value is more probative than prejudicial. So, I’ll allow the
impeachment by controlled substance crime in the second
degree noting that a release from prison would have been
some time in ’09 or about that.
But the context is critical. The prosecutor, in her motion to permit use of the conviction
as impeachment, presented her argument based on the Jones factors; the district court’s
statement above was made in response to this argument. The transcript shows that the
district court considered the Jones factors and made its decision by analyzing those
factors. Based on the record, we conclude, therefore, that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by permitting the state to impeach Caradine with his prior felony
conviction.
Caradine filed a pro se supplemental brief and a pro se reply brief challenging his
convictions. Caradine’s arguments are difficult to interpret, but it appears that he is
questioning the witnesses’ credibility and alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of credibility, even when a trial is held to the
court rather than to a jury. State v. Super, 781 N.W.2d 390, 396 (Minn. App. 2010),
review denied (Minn. June 29, 2010). We assume that the district court believed the
state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence. Id. We therefore defer to the district
court’s credibility assessments here.
In order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that “(1) his trial attorneys’ performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for his attorneys’ errors,
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the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Hawes v. State, 826 N.W.2d 775,
782 (Minn. 2013). Caradine alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because he
failed to challenge the absence of an audio recording from the August 7, 2012 controlled
buy; police claimed that the audiotape was indecipherable. But the district court found
Caradine not guilty of the charge arising out of the August 7 controlled buy because
police failed to show an adequate chain of custody of the evidence. Therefore, there is no
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Affirmed.
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