State of Minnesota v. Shawnti Tramayne Fleming ( 2014 )


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  •                           This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A14-0426
    State of Minnesota,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Shawnti Tramayne Fleming,
    Respondent.
    Filed September 15, 2014
    Reversed and remanded
    Halbrooks, Judge
    Hennepin County District Court
    File No. 27-CR-12-32133
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
    Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
    Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Kirk M. Anderson, Anderson Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
    Scott A. Lewis, Meghan Bork-Dellenbach, Lewis & Associates, PA, Minneapolis,
    Minnesota (for respondent)
    Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Chutich,
    Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    HALBROOKS, Judge
    In this pretrial prosecution appeal, the state contends that the district court erred by
    suppressing evidence found in a search incident to arrest. Because the information
    provided by a confidential reliable informant was sufficient to establish probable cause to
    arrest respondent, the search incident to arrest was valid. We reverse and remand.
    FACTS
    On September 25, 2012, a confidential reliable1 informant (CRI) contacted
    Minneapolis police officer Jeffrey Werner, offered to purchase crack cocaine from a
    contact he knew as “Joseph,” and described how his transactions with Joseph had
    transpired in the past. The CRI described Joseph as “a white male, heavyset with a
    baldhead head [sic] and would be driving a light blue car.” When the CRI had purchased
    cocaine from Joseph in the past, a third party described as a black male driving a tan
    Blazer with an identified license-plate number brought the cocaine to the meeting place
    and gave it to Joseph to give to the CRI. “[The CRI met] Joseph, [gave] Joseph the
    money, and then Joseph approache[d] the Blazer to do the transaction, and then Joseph
    [brought] the drugs back to the CRI.” The CRI had, in the past, observed the person in
    the Chevy Blazer deliver the drugs to Joseph.
    1
    The CRI had within the previous two months provided information leading to two
    narcotics-related arrests, and he had previously purchased cocaine from this seller.
    2
    In the officer’s presence, the CRI contacted Joseph and arranged to purchase one-
    half ounce of crack cocaine.      Joseph told the CRI to meet him immediately at an
    identified intersection in Minneapolis. Officers went to the area to set up surveillance.
    When officers arrived, they saw a man matching Joseph’s description seated in a
    light blue car. The CRI then arrived on a bicycle, approached the light blue car, and
    spoke with Joseph. While they were speaking, a black male later identified as respondent
    Shawnti Tramayne Fleming drove by slowly in a tan Blazer bearing the identified
    license-plate number. Fleming turned the corner and parked, and Joseph left the CRI and
    walked toward Fleming. As Joseph reached the Blazer, officers “moved in for the arrest”
    because they “didn’t want the transaction to take place.”
    In a search incident to Fleming’s arrest, officers found 14 grams of cocaine and
    more than $4,000 in the pocket of a jacket in Fleming’s lap. Fleming was charged with
    one count of first-degree controlled-substance crime (sale) in violation of 
    Minn. Stat. § 152.021
    , subd. 1(1) (2012), and one count of gross misdemeanor child endangerment2
    under 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.378
    , subd. 1(b)(2) (2012). Fleming moved to suppress the
    evidence resulting from the search, arguing that police lacked probable cause to arrest
    him. The district court granted the suppression motion, ruling that the information
    provided by the CRI supported reasonable, articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop
    but did not rise to the level of probable cause to arrest Fleming. This appeal follows.
    2
    Fleming’s young child was with him in the Blazer.
    3
    DECISION
    When the state appeals a pretrial order suppressing evidence, it must “clearly and
    unequivocally show both that the [district] court’s order will have a critical impact on the
    state’s ability to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order constituted
    error.” State v. Scott, 
    584 N.W.2d 412
    , 416 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). The state
    must satisfy the critical-impact test for this court to have jurisdiction. State v. Baxter, 
    686 N.W.2d 846
    , 850 (Minn. App. 2004). Critical impact is shown when “the lack of the
    suppressed evidence significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.”
    State v. Kim, 
    398 N.W.2d 544
    , 551 (Minn. 1987).              The state need not show that
    conviction is impossible after the pretrial order—only that the prosecution’s likelihood of
    success is seriously jeopardized. State v. Underdahl, 
    767 N.W.2d 677
    , 683 (Minn. 2009).
    The critical-impact test is satisfied here. The charged offenses are first-degree
    controlled-substance crime (sale) and gross misdemeanor child endangerment.               The
    suppressed evidence is the crack cocaine and cash found in Fleming’s jacket. Without
    the cocaine and cash, the state’s chances of successfully prosecuting Fleming are
    significantly reduced. See Kim, 398 N.W.2d at 551. Accordingly, we proceed to the
    merits of the case. See Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 416.
    Whether there is probable cause to arrest depends on findings of fact that are
    reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, but it is ultimately a question of law to be
    reviewed de novo. State v. Horner, 
    617 N.W.2d 789
    , 795 (Minn. 2000). The de novo
    standard also applies to our review of a district court’s legal determinations within its
    4
    pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence. State v. Gauster, 
    752 N.W.2d 496
    , 502
    (Minn. 2008).
    A warrantless arrest is lawful if it is supported by probable cause.          State v.
    Williams, 
    794 N.W.2d 867
    , 871 (Minn. 2011). If an arrest is valid, police may conduct a
    warrantless search of the suspect incident to the arrest without additional justification.
    State v. Walker, 
    584 N.W.2d 763
    , 766 (Minn. 1998). A search incident to arrest is
    justified “when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might
    be found,” Arizona v. Gant, 
    556 U.S. 332
    , 333 (2009) (quotation omitted), and allows
    officers to search a person’s body and the area within his or her immediate control, State
    v. Ortega, 
    770 N.W.2d 145
    , 149 (Minn. 2009).
    Probable cause exists if a person of ordinary care and prudence would, based on
    the objective facts, entertain “an honest and strong suspicion” that a specific individual
    committed a crime. State v. Wynne, 
    552 N.W.2d 218
    , 221 (Minn. 1996). “In applying
    this test, a court should not be unduly technical and should view the circumstances in
    light of the whole of the arresting officer’s police experience as of the time of the arrest.”
    State v. Carlson, 
    267 N.W.2d 170
    , 174 (Minn. 1978). The level of suspicion required for
    probable cause to arrest is the same as probable cause to search. In re Welfare of G.M.,
    
    560 N.W.2d 687
    , 695 (Minn. 1997). “Whereas probable cause to search requires police
    to have a reasonable belief that incriminating evidence is in a certain location, probable
    cause to arrest requires police to have a reasonable belief that a certain person has
    committed a crime.” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted).
    5
    Here, the police relied heavily on information provided by a CRI. “Police may
    rely on an informant’s tip if the tip has sufficient indicia of reliability.” State v. Cook,
    
    610 N.W.2d 664
    , 667 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). Whether
    information provided by an informant is sufficient to establish probable cause is
    determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. State v. Munson, 
    594 N.W.2d 128
    , 136 (Minn. 1999); see also Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238-39, 
    103 S. Ct. 2317
    ,
    2332 (1983) (adopting “the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has
    informed probable cause determinations” and stating, “We are convinced that this
    flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and
    private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires.”).
    Our caselaw applying this flexible standard focuses on the factors that are most
    relevant to the circumstances of each particular case. See, e.g., Munson, 594 N.W.2d at
    136 (considering CRI’s proven track record and the corroboration of details about a
    vehicle and its occupants); State v. Holiday, 
    749 N.W.2d 833
    , 841 (Minn. App. 2008)
    (considering firsthand observations and corroboration of defendant’s name, nickname,
    physical description, gang affiliation, and vehicle information); State v. Ross, 
    676 N.W.2d 301
    , 304-05 (Minn. App. 2004) (considering CRI’s track record, firsthand
    knowledge, corroboration of suspect’s clothing, vehicle information, time and place of
    arrival, and correlation of the suspect’s given name with his street name).
    Here, the district court correctly observed that the standard is “the totality of the
    circumstances of the particular case,” and found that the CRI’s recent provision of
    information leading to two arrests “strongly indicates to this court that the CRI was
    6
    credible.”   We agree.      The district court then considered whether officers had
    satisfactorily corroborated the CRI’s information and found this aspect lacking. The
    district court stated that the police had corroborated only
    three pieces of information: 1) that Defendant was a black
    male (which the court notes is an extremely minimal physical
    description of Defendant); 2) that Defendant drove a tan
    Blazer with license plate [number]; and 3) that Defendant
    would, at the time of the drug transaction, drive to and stop
    near [Joseph], who would then approach Defendant.
    The district court determined that although the information provided by the CRI
    was reliable, officers did not have probable cause to arrest Fleming because they had not
    identified him by name. But our caselaw has never required the identification of a
    defendant by name to establish probable cause, nor would this be practical.3 In Cook, the
    deficiency was not that officers had failed to identify the defendant by name, but that the
    CRI had failed to predict the defendant’s future behavior. Ross, 
    676 N.W.2d at 305
    (“The crux of our reasoning [in Cook], though, was that the CRI ‘did not predict any
    future behavior’ by the defendant; thus leading to a conclusion that the CRI had only
    passed along easily obtainable information and not inside information.”).        Here, the
    CRI’s detailed, predictive information is more like the information provided in Ross and
    Munson than the publicly available, non-predictive information provided in Cook.
    3
    Fleming urges us to conclude that officers should have determined the identity of the
    registered owner of the tan Blazer. We are not persuaded. Under the circumstances of
    this case, the identity of the vehicle’s registered owner would not “illuminate the
    commonsense, practical question whether there is ‘probable cause’” to arrest its driver,
    who may or may not be its registered owner. See Gates, 
    462 U.S. at 230
    , 
    103 S. Ct. at 2328
    .
    7
    The district court’s summary of the information supplied by the CRI and
    corroborated by the police omits many details that make up the totality of the
    circumstances: (1) the CRI ordered crack cocaine from Joseph as he said he could;
    (2) Joseph and his vehicle matched the descriptions provided; (3) Joseph was in the
    expected vehicle at the expected location at the expected time; (4) the CRI spoke with
    Joseph as predicted, after which a tan Blazer arrived at the time and place predicted;
    (5) the driver of the tan Blazer stayed in his car while Joseph approached him; and (6) the
    CRI waited at Joseph’s vehicle. The corroboration of minor details can give credence to
    the information provided by an informant and can bolster an informant’s reliability.
    Holiday, 
    749 N.W.2d at 841
    . The district court also failed to consider other factors
    bearing on reliability, such as the informant’s firsthand knowledge of the transaction, that
    the transaction was arranged in the officer’s presence, that the CRI gave a statement
    against interest in acknowledging past transactions with this seller, and that the CRI
    initiated contact with police to arrange the transaction.
    The ultimate question is whether a person of ordinary care and prudence would
    entertain “an honest and strong suspicion” that Fleming had committed a crime when,
    after the CRI had arranged with Joseph to purchase crack cocaine, Fleming arrived at the
    time and place and in the exact vehicle predicted by the CRI, and Joseph left the CRI and
    approached Fleming.        Wynne, 552 N.W.2d at 221.           Under the totality-of-the-
    circumstances standard, all facts of the case are considered. Williams, 794 N.W.2d at
    872. The district court here focused on the details that the CRI knew about Fleming
    aside from his role in the transaction, rather than how much of the CRI’s information was
    8
    corroborated, how reasonable it was to suspect based on that information that Fleming
    had committed a crime, and other factors bearing on reliability. We conclude based on
    the totality of the circumstances that the information supplied by the CRI was sufficient
    to establish probable cause to arrest Fleming. The district court therefore erred by
    suppressing the evidence.
    Reversed and remanded.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A14-426

Filed Date: 9/15/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021