Archie J. Pavek, Trustee of the Archie J. Pavek Revocable Trust v. City of Prior Lake ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                         This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A15-0366
    Archie J. Pavek,
    Trustee of the Archie J. Pavek
    Revocable Trust,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    City of Prior Lake,
    Appellant
    Filed December 14, 2015
    Affirmed
    Worke, Judge
    Scott County District Court
    File No. 70-CV-13-12697
    Christopher A. Neisen, Wornson, Goggins, Zard, Neisen, Morris & King, PC, New
    Prague, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Joseph A. Nilan, Daniel A. Ellerbrock, Gregerson, Rosow, Johnson & Nilan, Ltd.,
    Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Susan L. Naughton, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota (for amicus curiae
    League of Minnesota Cities)
    Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
    Kalitowski, Judge.*
    *
    Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
    Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    WORKE, Judge
    In this special-assessment dispute, appellant argues that the district court erred by
    setting aside the original $76,479 assessment and determining that respondent’s property
    received a special benefit of only $24,829. We affirm.
    FACTS
    On May 28, 2013, appellant City of Prior Lake passed Resolution 13-065 and
    awarded a construction contract for the Welcome Industrial Improvement Project
    (Welcome Avenue project). Prior Lake implemented the Welcome Avenue project, in
    part, to improve Welcome Avenue by widening and paving the road, provide municipal
    water and sewer services to properties in the area, and alleviate flooding in Markley Lake
    by building a pond to collect run-off from surrounding properties.
    Respondent Archie J. Pavek, as the trustee of the Archie J. Pavek Revocable Trust,
    owns a nearly five-acre parcel in Prior Lake. Pavek’s property is zoned “industrial” and
    located between Industrial Circle on the west and Welcome Avenue on the east. Both
    roads travel north/south. A gate borders the east side of Pavek’s property.
    Pavek’s property contains three buildings on its western half. Pavek operates a
    machine shop and wind turbine company. Pavek’s employees, along with other visitors,
    access Pavek’s property from the west on Industrial Circle. Pavek testified that although
    the property can be accessed from Welcome Avenue, it has been done so just once.
    Pavek’s property also contains an underground culvert that runs north/south across the
    entire parcel. Water that accumulates on Pavek’s property, and certain properties to the
    2
    south, drains into the culvert and catch basin and travels underground to Markley Lake.
    The culvert and catch basin are non-conforming uses that are grandfathered in. Any
    development on Pavek’s property would require him to bring the property into
    compliance with the city’s stormwater zoning requirements.
    In May 2013, Prior Lake adopted special assessments against property owners to
    help fund the Welcome Avenue project.            Pavek received assessments for street
    improvements and the stormwater pond that totaled $76,479. Pavek appealed Prior
    Lake’s assessment. During a bench trial, the district court heard testimony from two
    appraisers, Cal Haasken and Paul Gleason.
    Haasken completed an appraisal for Pavek and concluded that “general industrial”
    is the highest and best use of Pavek’s property. Haasken also stated that it is not
    economically viable to subdivide Pavek’s property.        Haasken utilized an income
    approach, a market-data approach, and a replacement-cost approach to determine the
    market value of Pavek’s property.         Haasken considered both the land and the
    improvements on Pavek’s property.        Haasken concluded that the Welcome Avenue
    project did not increase the value of Pavek’s property.
    Gleason completed an appraisal for Prior Lake and concluded that “light
    industrial” is the highest and best use of Pavek’s property. Gleason concluded that the
    Welcome Avenue project did not affect the value of the improvements on Pavek’s
    property. He stated that only Pavek’s land benefited from the Welcome Avenue project.
    Gleason used a direct-sales-comparison approach to estimate the value of Pavek’s land
    3
    before and after the Welcome Avenue project. Gleason concluded that the Welcome
    Avenue project increased the market value of Pavek’s property by $103,000.
    Pavek testified that the Welcome Avenue project did not benefit his property
    because he uses only the Industrial Circle access point, and the project, as it relates to
    water flow, does not benefit his property. Pavek stated that if he subdivided and sold a
    1.5-acre parcel on the eastern border, the new owner could benefit from the Welcome
    Avenue project.
    On August 22, 2014, the district court ordered the assessment against Pavek’s
    property to be set aside. The district court found Haasken’s appraisal persuasive because
    he determined the market value of the land and buildings, not the land only. The district
    court, however, determined that 1.5 acres on the eastern border of Pavek’s property could
    benefit from the Welcome Avenue project if developed. The district court ordered Prior
    Lake to reassess Pavek’s property in an amount not to exceed $24,829. Prior Lake
    moved for a new trial or for an amended order. The district court denied Prior Lake’s
    motion. This appeal follows.
    DECISION
    “A special assessment is a tax, intended to offset the cost of local improvements
    such as sewer, water and streets, which is selectively imposed upon the beneficiaries.”
    Dosedel v. City of Ham Lake, 
    414 N.W.2d 751
    , 755 (Minn. App. 1987). A city’s power
    to impose special assessments is limited in three ways: (1) the land must receive a special
    benefit from the new improvement, (2) the assessment must be uniform upon the same
    class of property, and (3) the assessment may not exceed the special benefit. Carlson-
    4
    Lang Realty Co. v. City of Windom, 
    307 Minn. 368
    , 369, 
    240 N.W.2d 517
    , 519 (1976).
    An assessment set higher than the special benefit conferred constitutes a taking without
    compensation to the extent of the excess. Id. at 370, 
    240 N.W.2d at 519
    .
    A “[s]pecial benefit is measured by the increase in the market value of the land
    owing to the improvement.” Id. at 369, 
    240 N.W.2d at 519
    . An appraiser determines
    market value by identifying “what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the
    property before, and then after, the improvement.”        
    Id.
       “[M]arket value may be
    calculated on the highest and best use of the land.” Anderson v. City of Bemidji, 
    295 N.W.2d 555
    , 560 (Minn. 1980). The subject property’s present use does not control in
    determining special benefits received. Vill. of Edina v. Joseph, 
    264 Minn. 84
    , 95, 
    119 N.W.2d 809
    , 817 (1962).
    After an assessment is adopted, an aggrieved person, who makes a timely
    objection, may appeal to the district court. 
    Minn. Stat. § 429.081
     (2014). At the district
    court, “the city is presumed to have set the assessment legally, and thus introduction of
    the assessment roll into evidence constitutes prima facie proof that the assessment does
    not exceed [the] special benefit.” Carlson-Lang Realty, 307 Minn. at 370, 
    240 N.W.2d at 519
    . A landowner overcomes the presumption by introducing competent evidence that
    the assessment is greater than the increase in market value of the property due to the
    improvement. 
    Id.
     “When evidence is also received that the assessment is equal to or less
    than the increased market value, the district court must make a factual determination.”
    
    Id.,
     
    240 N.W.2d at
    519–20; see Hartle v. City of Glencoe, 
    303 Minn. 262
    , 266–67, 226
    
    5 N.W.2d 914
    , 918 (1975) (stating that the factfinder resolves any conflict in testimony as
    to whether an increase in market value exceeds the amount of an assessment).
    Standard of Review
    Upon review, this court conducts “a careful examination of the record to ascertain
    whether the evidence as a whole fairly supports the findings of the district court and
    whether these in turn support its conclusions of law and judgment.”           Carlson-Lang
    Realty, 307 Minn. at 373, 
    240 N.W.2d at
    521 (citing G.C. Kohlmier, Inc. v. Albin, 
    257 Minn. 436
    , 
    101 N.W.2d 909
     (1960)). Testimony is considered in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party, and the district court’s findings “will not be reversed on appeal
    unless they are manifestly contrary to the evidence.” G.C. Kohlmier, Inc., 
    257 Minn. at
    442–43, 101 N.W.2d at 914; see Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 
    256 N.W.2d 639
    , 640 (Minn.
    1977) (holding that the district court properly applied the standards used for reviewing
    assessments and that “[t]he findings by the [district] court are not clearly erroneous”).
    Prior Lake asserts that we apply a de novo standard of review, citing Ewert v. City
    of Winthrop, 
    278 N.W.2d 545
     (Minn. 1979) in support. But Ewert discussed the district
    court’s de novo standard of review, and cited Carlson-Lang Realty for this court’s
    standard of review. 278 N.W.2d at 548–49.
    In Ewert, the supreme court stated that after both parties present evidence on
    whether a property’s market value changed, “the district court [must] make a factual
    determination.” Id. at 548 (emphasis added). The court further stated that “[if] the
    landowner maintains that the assessment is excessive, this determination is to be a de
    novo one.” Id. The supreme court cited Buettner v. City of St. Cloud, 
    277 N.W.2d 199
    6
    (Minn. 1979). 
    Id.
     In Buettner, the supreme court stated: “[W]he[n] the sole issue
    presented is whether there has been an unconstitutional taking, the [district] court cannot
    abrogate its duty to uphold constitutional safeguards and defer to the judgment of the
    taxing authority. Decision must be based upon independent consideration of all the
    evidence.” 277 N.W.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
    The supreme court’s reasoning in Buettner and Ewert established that, for special-
    assessment disputes, the de novo standard of review applies in district court proceedings.
    Carlson-Lang Realty established that we carefully examine whether the evidence fairly
    supports the district court’s findings and whether those findings support its conclusions of
    law and judgment. 307 Minn. at 373, 
    240 N.W.2d at 521
    .
    The Evidence Fairly Supports the District Court’s Findings
    Prior Lake argues that the district court erred by concluding that Pavek’s property
    received a special benefit of only $24,829. We must first determine whether the evidence
    fairly supports the district court’s findings. 
    Id.
    Haasken testified that he used three approaches to determine the value of Pavek’s
    property. Haasken testified that the highest and best use of Pavek’s property, both before
    and after the Welcome Avenue project, was a five-acre industrial site with existing
    buildings. Gleason agreed that this is the highest and best use of Pavek’s property.
    Haasken appraised Pavek’s property in accordance with the Uniform Standards of
    Professional Appraisal Practice, which explains the processes and forms that must be
    complied with during an appraisal.        Haasken determined that the value of Pavek’s
    property, both before and after the Welcome Avenue project, was $1,200,000.
    7
    The district court found Haasken’s appraisal more persuasive because he
    determined the market value of the land and buildings. The district court recognized that
    Haasken gave opinions on the market value of Pavek’s property both before and after the
    Welcome Avenue project. The district court accepted Haasken’s conclusion that the
    highest and best use of Pavek’s property was industrial, and that a buyer would pay
    $1,200,000 for the property prior to and after the Welcome Avenue project. Finally,
    based on Pavek’s testimony that 1.5 acres of the property could benefit from the
    Welcome Avenue project, the district court found that Pavek’s property received a
    special benefit of up to $24,829. Thus, the district court’s findings are not clearly
    erroneous.
    Prior Lake argues that the district court “incorrectly criticized” Gleason’s appraisal
    for focusing on the value of the land separate from its improvements. We do not agree.
    “[A]s long as a valuation method fairly approximates the increase in a parcel’s market
    value, it may be used in an assessment proceeding.” DeSutter v. Twp. of Helena, 
    489 N.W.2d 236
    , 238 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1992). “[M]arket
    value may be calculated on the highest and best use of the land.” Anderson, 295 N.W.2d
    at 560. When evidence conflicts as to whether a special benefit exists, the district court
    must make a factual determination. Carlson-Lang Realty, 307 Minn. at 370, 
    240 N.W.2d at
    519–20. Factual determinations will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.
    Nelson, 256 N.W.2d at 640.
    Haasken evaluated the market value of Pavek’s property based on its highest and
    best use. Haasken considered both the land and its improvements and concluded that the
    8
    Welcome Avenue project did not affect the property’s market value. Haasken’s opinion
    conflicted with Gleason’s opinion, and the district court found Haasken’s appraisal more
    persuasive. The weight and credibility given to each appraiser’s opinion, however, was
    an issue for the district court to determine. See DeSutter, 
    489 N.W.2d at 240
    . Further,
    whether the market value of Pavek’s property increased is a question of fact that will not
    be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. See Nelson, 256 N.W.2d at 640. Thus, the
    district court did not err by finding Haasken’s appraisal more persuasive.
    Prior Lake argues that we should rely on Holden v. City of Eagan, 
    393 N.W.2d 526
     (Minn. App. 1986). In Holden, the subject property was used for farming and zoned
    agricultural, however, it was designated R-III (medium density townhome) under the
    city’s comprehensive land-use plan. 
    393 N.W.2d at 527
    . Appraisers for both parties
    concluded that the highest and best use, before and after improvements, was R-III and
    that the value of the property’s buildings was not affected by the improvements. 
    Id. at 529
    . The district court, however, found that the highest and best use was agricultural and
    reduced the value of three assessments, discounting the city’s appraisal, in part, because
    the appraiser did not take into account the buildings on the land. 
    Id. at 528
    . This court
    reversed the district court’s decision. 
    Id. at 529
    .
    Despite similarities, the Holden decision does not control here.         We did not
    reverse the district court’s decision in Holden simply because the district court
    discredited the city’s appraisal for not considering the structures on the Holdens’ land.
    
    Id.
     at 528–29. Rather, this court reversed the district court’s decision for two reasons: (1)
    there was insufficient evidence to find that the highest and best use of the property before
    9
    improvements was agricultural; and (2) the district court erred in finding that a building’s
    decrease in value upon development of the property into its highest and best use reduced
    the benefit derived from the improvements. 
    Id.
    Prior Lake also argues that the district court improperly relied upon the present use
    of Pavek’s property in determining whether it received a special benefit. We are not
    persuaded. The district court adopted Haasken’s appraisal, which determined the highest
    and best use of the property to be industrial while using the existing buildings.
    Additionally, the district court recognized that both appraisers believed the “highest and
    best use” to be industrial. Finally, when adjusting the special-assessment amount, the
    district court found that 1.5 acres could be developed as “light industrial.” The present
    use of Pavek’s property, coincidentally, happens to be its highest and best use. Thus, the
    district court relied on the highest and best use of Pavek’s property.
    Prior Lake also argues that the district court erred by excluding portions of
    Pavek’s property from assessment. Prior Lake relies on Gibbish v. Vill. of Burnsville,
    
    294 Minn. 318
    , 
    200 N.W.2d 310
     (1972). But this case does not support Prior Lake’s
    position. In Gibbish, the district court set aside assessments that were imposed against
    two separate parcels of land. 294 Minn. at 318–19, 
    200 N.W.2d at 312
    . The district
    court found the assessments invalid because portions of each parcel were not suitable for
    development. 
    Id. at 321
    , 
    200 N.W.2d at 313
    . The supreme court held:
    Evidence as to the effect of an assessment on portions
    of an assessed parcel is material to the question of market
    value of the entire parcel, but cannot be used to defeat an
    assessment when the increase in market value of the entire
    10
    parcel by reason of the improvement exceeds the cost of the
    improvement.
    
    Id. at 318
    , 
    200 N.W.2d at 311
    . The supreme court also stated that the district court
    should have made findings as to the value of the subject property both before and after
    the improvement. 
    Id.
     at 322–23, 
    200 N.W.2d at 314
    .
    Here, unlike Gibbish, the district court did not set aside the assessment because
    portions of Pavek’s property were not suitable for development. Rather, the district court
    found Haasken’s appraisal and Pavek’s testimony persuasive. The district court found
    that both appraisers agreed that the highest and best use of Pavek’s property was
    industrial, which is the property’s present use. Additionally, based on Pavek’s testimony
    that a portion of his property could benefit from the Welcome Avenue project, the district
    court found that the property received a special benefit in the amount of $24,829.
    Finally, Prior Lake argues that a district court must conduct an analysis of the
    subject property’s market value both before and after the improvements are implemented.
    Minnesota courts have recognized this requirement. See Edward Kraemer & Sons, Inc.,
    v. Village of Burnsville (In re Vill. of Burnsville), 
    310 Minn. 32
    , 40–41, 
    245 N.W.2d 445
    ,
    450–51 (1976) (remanding because the district court did not make findings on central
    issue of improvement’s effect on market value ); Peterson v. City of Inver Grove Heights,
    
    345 N.W.2d 274
    , 277 (Minn. App. 1984) (“[T]he [district] court’s failure to make
    findings on the before and after market value of respondent’s property would have been a
    separate and sufficient ground for reversing and remanding this case.”).
    11
    Here, the district court adopted Haasken’s appraisal, which concluded that the
    market value of Pavek’s property prior to the Welcome Avenue project was $1,200,000.
    The district court also found that Pavek’s property received a special benefit of $24,829.
    A “[s]pecial benefit is measured by the increase in the market value of the land owing to
    the improvement.” Carlson-Lang Realty, 307 Minn. at 369, 
    240 N.W.2d at 519
    . Thus,
    the district court found that the property’s market value increased by $24,829 as a result
    of the Welcome Avenue project.
    Considered in a light most favorable to Pavek, the district court’s findings are not
    clearly erroneous because the evidence fairly supports the district court’s findings.
    Additionally, the district court’s findings fairly support its conclusions of law and
    judgment.
    Affirmed.
    12