In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Steven Merrill Hogy. ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1514
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Steven Merrill Hogy
Filed April 11, 2016
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge
Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-PR-07-1705
Steven Merrill Hogy, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Stephen N. Betcher, Goodhue County Attorney, Red Wing, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, John, Judge
We affirm the district court’s denial of appellant Steven Merrill Hogy’s motion for
relief from his initial civil commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program because

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
the motion is barred by the exclusive transfer-or-discharge remedies of the Minnesota
Commitment and Treatment Act (MCTA), Minn. Stat. §§ 253D.01-.36 (2014).
FACTS
Appellant Steven Merrill Hogy was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) based on a determination that he is a sexually dangerous person
(SDP) and a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP). Hogy’s initial commitment was on
December 10, 2007. He was indeterminately committed on July 23, 2008. Hogy did not
appeal his commitment.
In June 2010, Hogy moved the district court pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f)
to vacate his indeterminate-commitment order. The district court denied his motion
without an evidentiary hearing. Hogy appealed to this court. In January 2011, this court
issued an unpublished opinion affirming the district court’s denial. In re Civil Commitment
of Hogy, No. A10-1615, 2011 WL 206205 (Minn. App. Jan. 25, 2011) (Hogy I) review
granted and stayed (Minn. Apr. 19, 2011), vacated (Minn. May 15, 2012). We held that a
rule 60.02 motion was an inappropriate vehicle for Hogy’s claims, Id. at *1, and instead
directed that “a patient must bring a petition to a treatment-facility special review board in
order to raise issues related to his or her treatment.” Id. (citing In re Civil Commitment of
Lonergan, 792 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. App. 2011), rev’d in part, 811 N.W.2d 635 (Minn.
2012)).
At a hearing before the MSOP Special Review Board in February 2011, Hogy
sought provisional discharge or transfer to Community Preparation Services (CPS). The
MSOP Special Review Board denied his petition.
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In April 2011, Hogy petitioned for review of Hogy I to the Minnesota Supreme
Court. The supreme court granted and stayed review on Hogy I pending its decision in
Lonergan. The supreme court’s opinion in Lonergan clarified that the use of a rule 60.02
motion by indeterminately civilly committed patient was not universally prohibited, and
that such a motion may be proper for a narrow class of claims “that do not specifically
request transfer or discharge.” Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d at 643. The supreme court affirmed
that transfer or discharge can only be sought according to the Minnesota Commitment and
Treatment Act (MCTA). Id. at 642. In May 2012, the Hogy matter was “remanded to the
court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with” Lonergan.
Following remand from the supreme court, we issued a second unpublished opinion
on the Hogy matter in October 2012. In re Civil Commitment of Hogy, No. A10-1615,
2012 WL 5289686 (Minn. App. Oct. 29, 2012) (Hogy II), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15,
2013). We reversed in part and remanded to the district court for consideration of any of
Hogy’s claims under rule 60.02 that resembled denial-of-treatment claims; we affirmed the
district court’s denial of his other claims. Id. at *3.
Meanwhile, at the district court, a Judicial Appeal Panel affirmed the MSOP Special
Review Board’s denial of Hogy’s petition for transfer or discharge.
On remand from our decision in Hogy II, the district court dismissed all of Hogy’s
claims on their merits and with prejudice in June 2013. Hogy again appealed to this court.
In re Civil Commitment of Hogy, No. A13-1205, 2013 WL 6570583 (Minn. App. Dec. 16,
2013) (Hogy III), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2014). We affirmed, in a third unpublished
opinion in this matter, holding that Hogy had failed to assert a claim fitting “within the
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narrow class of claims that the supreme court identified in Longergan as permissible under
the provisions of rule 60.02.” Id. at *2. In Hogy III, we relied on In re Civil Commitment
of Moen, a published opinion in which we held that “a person committed as an SDP [who]
brings a motion for relief from a commitment order pursuant to rule 60.02(e) . . . based on
the alleged inadequacy of treatment in the MSOP. . .does not state a viable claim for relief
under the rule.” Id. at *1 (quoting In re Civil Commitment of Moen, 837 N.W.2d 40, 43
(Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013)).
In March 2015, The MSOP Special Review Board held another hearing to review
Hogy’s petitions for full or provisional discharge or transfer to Community Preparation
Services. Hogy’s petitions were denied.
In June 2015, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled
that “Minnesota’s civil commitment statutory scheme is unconstitutional both on its face
and as applied.” Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1173 (D. Minn. 2015) (Karsjens
I).
Following Karsjens I, Hogy filed motions in state district court in Goodhue County
for relief from final judgment pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 and a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or temporary injunction pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 65. Hogy
argued that because the MCTA is unconstitutional according to Karsjens I, his commitment
was unlawful ab initio. Therefore, Hogy requested relief from the judgment of
commitment, or a TRO or temporary injunction causing his conditional release. The
district court denied his motions on July 27, 2015 without an evidentiary hearing. The
district court denied Hogy’s motion pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 because, it
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determined, (1) rule 60.02 does not apply to requests for discharge from civil commitment;
(2) his motion was not based on a change in operative facts supporting his commitment;
and (3) “the federal district court order does not alter the applicable binding legal precedent,
apply to his commitment proceeding, or even constitute a final decision.” The district court
also denied his motion for a TRO or temporary injunction, concluding that Hogy would
not prevail on the merits of his motion to vacate his commitment. Hogy now appeals the
July 2015 denial of his motions.
In the federal action, the district court moved on to a “post-trial Remedies Phase” in
which various state officials were invited to formulate solutions to the MCTA’s problems.
Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 6561712, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Oct. 29, 2015)
(first interim relief order) (Karsjens II). The defendants did not offer proposals but instead
responded to remedies proposed by amici curiae, arguing that the proposals were
unworkable and improper. Id. at *5. The federal district court issued a “First Interim Relief
Order,” Id. at *15–17, and subsequently denied defendants’ motion for a stay of the order.
Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 7432333, at *7 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2015)
(Karsjens III). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stayed the interim-relief order
pending the federal appeal. Karsjens v. Piper, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 2015).
DECISION
Hogy asks this court to vacate the district court’s order and remand for an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of his rule 60.02 motion. He specifically contends that
the district erred by ruling without an evidentiary hearing, by adopting language from the
state’s pleadings, and by ruling before Hogy had filed a reply to the state’s pleadings.
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I.
Hogy moved the district court for relief from judgment or order pursuant to Minn.
R. Civ. P. 60.02(d), (e) and (f). He now argues that the district court erred by ruling on his
motion without an evidentiary hearing.
“Questions of civil procedure present issues of law, which we review de novo.” City
of Barnum v. Sabri, 657 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Minn. App. 2003). We review the district
court’s denial of a rule 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion. Moen, 837 N.W.2d at 44–
45. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is “based on an erroneous view of the
law” or is “against the facts in the record.” City of North Oaks v. Sarpal, 797 N.W.2d 18,
24 (Minn. 2011).
In his brief on appeal, Hogy argues that he “never sought discharge” but rather
sought to have the commitment found “void for lack of jurisdiction.” The district court
held as a matter of law that Hogy could not use rule 60.02 to seek discharge from
commitment.
“[A] petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if a factual dispute is shown
by the petition.” Seifert v. Erickson, 420 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. App. 1988), review
denied (Minn. May 18, 1988). A “purely legal question involving construction of [a]
statute and application of constitutional law” does not merit an evidentiary hearing. Id.Rule 60.02 states, in relevant part,
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or the party’s legal representatives from a final
judgment (other than a marriage dissolution decree), order, or
proceeding and may order a new trial or grant such other relief
as may be just for the following reasons:
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...
(d) The judgment is void;
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or
(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.
It is unclear which facts relevant to rule 60.02, if any, Hogy would seek to dispute
at a hearing. Hogy argues that “this case turns on whether the state has demonstrated that
the [MCTA] is narrowly tailored” to meet the interests of “protecting the public from
sexual violence and rehabilitating the mentally ill,” citing In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867,
872 (Minn. 1999). To the extent that Hogy’s complaint addresses the constitutionality of
the MCTA, it is a purely legal issue already being addressed by the federal courts and not
dependent on any particular factual dispute raised by Hogy. However, to the extent that
Hogy raises a claim particular to himself, there is no interpretation of his claim except that
he seeks transfer or discharge, or that he seeks a modification of his treatment program.
Claims for transfer, discharge, or modification of an MSOP treatment program are
not allowed under rule 60.02. Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d at 643 (explaining that only a narrow
class of claims “that do not specifically request transfer or discharge” may be raised by a
patient of MSOP under rule 60.02); see also Moen, 837 N.W.2d at 43 (“[A] person
committed as an SDP [who] brings a motion for relief from a commitment order pursuant
to rule 60.02(e) . . . based on the alleged inadequacy of treatment in the MSOP. . . does not
state a viable claim for relief under the rule.”). The MCTA provides the “exclusive
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remedy” for a patient committed as an SDP pursuing transfer or discharge, and a rule 60.02
motion may not seek those ends. Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d at 642. Hogy has not
demonstrated a factual dispute that entitles him to an evidentiary hearing.
II.
Hogy argues that the district court erred by adopting the language of the state’s
pleadings without making independent determinations. Hogy cites no authority that states
it is inappropriate for a district court to adopt language from pleadings. This argument is
without merit.
III.
Hogy contends that the district court erred by ruling before he filed a reply to the
state’s pleadings. Hogy relies on Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.03(c), which states, “The
moving party may submit a reply memorandum, limited to new legal or factual matters
raised by an opposing party’s response to a motion . . . .” Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.03(c)
(emphasis added). Hogy does not articulate any “new legal or factual matters” raised by
the state to which he was deprived an opportunity to respond. This argument is also
meritless.
Affirmed.
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