State of Minnesota v. Donalonte Jamar Wade, Midwest Bonding, LLC ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0754
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Donalonte Jamar Wade,
Defendant,
Midwest Bonding, LLC,
Appellant.
Filed February 8, 2016
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-14-1410
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
James McGeeney, Doda & McGeeney, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant bonding company argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying its petition to reinstate and discharge a forfeited bail bond. We affirm.
FACTS
On February 28, 2014, after defendant Donalonte Jamar Wade’s initial appearance
on a charge of violating a domestic abuse no contact order (DANCO), appellant Midwest
Bonding, LLC (Midwest) posted a $60,000 bond for Wade. On September 29, 2014, Wade
pleaded guilty. Wade failed to appear for sentencing on November 7, 2014, and the district
court forfeited the bond and issued a bench warrant for Wade’s arrest.
Upon learning that Wade failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, Midwest began
efforts to locate him, including trying to call Wade and the indemnitor, running an
electronic search of jails in Minnesota, and hiring a fugitive recovery agent. On November
29, 2014, Wade was arrested by law enforcement for a separate crime. When he was
arrested, Wade admitted that he had not opened the door to police when ordered to because
he knew there were active warrants for his arrest. Wade’s warrant was cleared on
December 2, 2014, and he was sentenced on the DANCO violation charge on December
19, 2014.
Midwest filed a petition to reinstate and discharge the bond on December 30, 2014.
In the petition and in the affidavit attached to the petition, Midwest represented that Wade
was apprehended “as a result of intelligence provided by [Midwest’s recovery agent.]” On
December 19, 2014, the state informed the district court that the statement in Midwest’s
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affidavit that Wade was apprehended as a result of information provided by Midwest’s
recovery agent was false.
At the contested hearing on the petition to reinstate and discharge the bond, Midwest
conceded that its recovery agent had misrepresented the facts of the case to Midwest and
that those false facts were then represented to the district court in its petition and
accompanying affidavit. The state recommended a 17% penalty for passing on the
recovery agent’s misrepresentation in the petition and affidavit. The district court denied
Midwest’s petition to reinstate and discharge the bond and ordered that it remain forfeited
in its entirety. This appeal followed.
DECISION
If a defendant released on bail fails to appear and the bond goes into default, “the
[district] court may forgive or reduce the penalty according to the circumstances of the case
and the situation of the party on any terms and conditions it considers just and reasonable.”
Minn. Stat. § 629.59 (2014). We review a district court’s decision on a petition to reinstate
a forfeited bond for an abuse of discretion. State v. Askland, 784 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn.
2010). When determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we consider the
following factors:
(1) the purpose of bail, the civil nature of the proceedings, and
the cause, purpose and length of a defendant’s absence; (2) the
good faith of the bond company as measured by the fault or
willfulness of the defendant; (3) the good-faith efforts of the
bond company to apprehend and produce the defendant; and
(4) any prejudice to the [s]tate in its administration of justice.
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Id. (citing In re Application of Shetsky, 239 Minn. 463, 471, 60 N.W.2d 40, 46 (1953)).
Midwest bears the burden of establishing that the first three factors weigh in favor of
reinstatement, but the state bears the burden of proving any claimed prejudice. Id.
The purpose of bail, the civil nature of the proceedings, and the cause, purpose, and
length of a defendant’s absence
The purpose of allowing third parties to act as sureties and post bonds “is to relieve
the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of detaining him pending the trial
and at the same time, by placing him in the protective custody of a surety . . . , to insure his
presence for trial” without impairing the administration of justice. Shetsky, 239 Minn. at
471, 60 N.W.2d at 46. “Another [purpose] is to encourage sureties to locate, arrest, and
return defaulting defendants to the authorities to facilitate the timely administration of
justice.” State v. Vang, 763 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Minn. App. 2009).
Midwest received notice of Wade’s failure to appear and of the forfeiture and made
some efforts to locate him, including hiring a recovery agent. A little more than three
weeks after failing to appear, Wade was arrested for an unrelated crime in another county
with no assistance from Midwest. While Wade’s absence was not prolonged, the purpose
of bail was not achieved here because not only did Midwest not apprehend Wade, but its
minimal efforts in no way contributed to Wade’s apprehension.
The good faith of the bond company as measured by the fault or willfulness of the
defendant
“[A] [d]efendant’s willfulness or bad faith is attributable to the surety” and weighs
against reinstatement. Id. It is clear that Wade willfully failed to appear in court, as he
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admitted that he was trying to avoid contact with law enforcement because he had active
warrants. Furthermore, Midwest concedes that this factor weighs against reinstatement.
The good faith efforts of the bond company to apprehend and produce the defendant
Midwest took some steps to investigate Wade’s whereabouts, including hiring a
recovery agent at the cost of $6,000. But, as the district court noted, there is no indication
in the record that any of the money Midwest spent in hiring the recovery agent went to any
efforts to locate or apprehend Wade. And, despite his apparent lack of investigative effort,
Midwest’s agent falsely represented that it had provided the intelligence that led to Wade’s
arrest. Relying on its recovery agent, Midwest falsely represented to the district court that
Wade was apprehended “as a result of intelligence provided by the [r]ecovery [a]gent.” As
the district court noted, “the fact that [Midwest’s] affidavit does not identify the claimed
intelligence provided to law enforcement suggests . . . that [Midwest] did little or no
investigation or verification of its [a]gent’s claim before providing the affidavit to the
court.” While Midwest may not have knowingly misrepresented its agent’s involvement
in the apprehension of Wade, its seemingly blind reliance on the agent’s representation
indicates that Midwest lacked good faith in attempting to apprehend Wade and in claiming
credit for his apprehension.
Any prejudice to the state in its administration of justice
“[T]he prejudice-to-the-[s]tate factor in the Shetsky analysis is concerned solely
with prejudice to the [s]tate in prosecuting the defendant.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 63.
Prejudice to the state includes the delay or thwarting of the administration of justice and
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the expense incurred by the state in apprehending the defendant. See Shetsky, 239 Minn.
at 474, 60 N.W.2d at 48.
Midwest asserts that there was simply no claim of prejudice by the state and that
this factor weighs in favor of reinstatement. Although the state recommended only a 17%
forfeiture and did not specifically argue that it was prejudiced, the district court considered
the six-week delay in the administration of justice and the costs incurred by the state in
arresting Wade, holding him in custody, and transporting him to Ramsey County for
sentencing in denying Midwest’s petition. The administration of justice in this case was
only briefly delayed, but sentencing was nonetheless delayed, and law enforcement
apprehended Wade on unrelated charges in a neighboring county. Although the prejudice
to the state is not severe in this case, the state had to take additional steps to ensure Wade’s
appearance at his sentencing hearing.
Other Circumstances
Lastly, Midwest argues that the district court erroneously considered “other
circumstances” in making its bond reinstatement determination. The other circumstances
considered by the district court primarily relate to the fact that Midwest’s fugitive recovery
agent misrepresented his role in the apprehension of Wade and that Midwest passed on this
misrepresentation to the district court. In considering the misrepresentation, the district
court stated:
The passed-on misrepresentation is also quite troublesome to
the court because in deciding whether to reinstate a bail bond,
the court relies heavily on petitioners’ affidavits and assumes
the information in them to be true. Had the [s]tate never
bothered to check the accuracy of [Midwest’s] affidavit to the
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court, the court would have credited the [a]gent and [Midwest]
with providing a valuable service to the [s]tate. As things
stand, the service [Midwest] provided was of no value, not only
because its [a]gent did nothing to locate [Wade], but also
because the false affidavit calls into question whether the court
can rely on [Midwest] to fairly and honestly perform its role as
a surety.
Midwest argues that the other circumstances that the district court considered were
irrelevant to the bond reinstatement decision. But, the acts of the recovery agent and
Midwest’s reliance on his representation relate to the Shetsky factors, most directly to the
purpose of bail and the good faith of the bond company.
The district court determined that each of the Shetsky factors weighed against
reinstatement of the bond. Based on the unique facts of this case, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Midwest’s petition for reinstatement
and discharge of the bond.
Affirmed.
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