In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Michael Thomas Schumann. ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0014
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Michael Thomas Schumann.
Filed June 13, 2016
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge
Brown County District Court
File No. 08-PR-15-1080
Steven D. Winkler, Jennifer L. Thon, Jones and Magnus, Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Charles W. Hanson, Brown County Attorney, Bailey Breck Rolfsrud, Deputy County
Attorney, New Ulm, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Toussaint,
Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his commitment as a person who is mentally ill under the
Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act (the MCTA), Minnesota Statutes section
253B.09 (2014). Because the record supports the district court’s determination that
appellant meets the statutory criteria for civil commitment, we affirm.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
FACTS
Appellant Michael Thomas Schumann was born in 1984, and lived in Comfrey,
Minnesota. In 2010 and 2012, appellant exhibited behaviors that were concerning to his
family and to police, resulting in psychological evaluations through the VA Hospital
system. In October 2015, the police department received a report that appellant made
homicidal threats to harm people. Appellant was placed on an emergency hold. The doctor
who signed the statement in support of the emergency hold stated that appellant was a
“patient with known bipolar illness and escalating [manic] behavior . . . over [the] past 6
[weeks].” Appellant was transported to the New Ulm Medical Center and hospitalized in
the Behavioral Health Unit for 72 hours. Appellant was later transferred to the St. Cloud
VA Hospital with a discharge diagnosis of a mood disorder, psychosis, nonspecific
psychotic disorder, alcohol abuse, and bipolar disorder with psychiatric symptoms. Upon
his transfer and admission to the St. Cloud VA Hospital, appellant was evaluated by a
psychiatrist who diagnosed him with bipolar I disorder with psychotic features, alcohol-
use disorder, cannabis-use disorder, and personality disorders. Respondent State of
Minnesota filed a petition for judicial commitment, requesting that the district court
commit appellant to the commissioner of human services as both mentally ill and
chemically dependent and claiming that “serious physical harm” would come to appellant
or to others unless appellant was held in a treatment facility. The district court determined
that probable cause supported the petition and ordered appellant to be held at the VA Health
Care system in St. Cloud pending civil commitment proceedings.
2
The district court held a commitment hearing on October 26 and 30, 2015. The St.
Cloud VA Hospital psychiatrist testified that, based on her daily observations, appellant
suffered from bipolar disorder with psychotic features, alcohol-use disorder, cannabis-use
disorder, and personality disorders. The psychiatrist characterized appellant’s condition as
a “substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation or memory.”
She testified that during appellant’s stay at the hospital, he “regularly escalate[d] into . . .
verbal aggression with other residents and staff” and “made threats to harm the other vets,”
causing hospital staff to be concerned for the safety of other residents. The psychiatrist
testified that as a result of appellant’s mental illness, there was a “strong possibility” that
his conduct could pose a danger to himself or to others. An expert witness testified that
appellant’s mental condition grossly impaired his judgment and his behavior, requiring
commitment to the commissioner of human services. The district court also heard
testimony from appellant’s sister and mother, who described incidents where appellant
made violent threats against other people. The district court concluded that clear and
convincing evidence supported a determination that appellant met the criteria of a person
who is mentally ill under Minn. Stat. § 253B and that there was no suitable less-restrictive
alternative to judicial commitment. The district court ordered that appellant be civilly
committed, and this appeal follows.1
1
In February 2016, the district court found that appellant had stabilized on the acute unit
of the St. Cloud VA Hospital and was an appropriate candidate for admission to the
Residential Rehabilitation Treatment Program (the RRTP), an inpatient mental health
residential program.
3
DECISION
The issue before this court is whether the district court erred by finding that clear
and convincing evidence supported a determination that appellant is mentally ill under the
MCTA. Our review of a district court’s civil commitment decision focuses solely on
whether the district court complied with the statutory requirements of the MCTA. In re
Civil Commitment of Janckila, 657 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. App. 2003). The district
court’s factual findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous, In re
McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Minn. 1995), and we give due regard to the district
court’s credibility determinations, In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003).
But we review de novo whether clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the
district court’s commitment determination. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn.
1995).
Civil commitment is appropriate “[i]f the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the proposed patient is a person who is mentally ill . . . .” Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2014). The MCTA defines a person who is mentally ill as:
[A]ny person who has an organic disorder of the brain or a
substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception,
orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or
understand, which is manifested by instances of grossly
disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions and poses a substantial
likelihood of physical harm to self or others as demonstrated
by:
(1) a failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or
medical care as a result of the impairment;
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(2) an inability for reasons other than indigence to obtain
necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care as a result of
the impairment and it is more probable than not that the person
will suffer substantial harm, significant psychiatric
deterioration or debilitation, or serious illness, unless
appropriate treatment and services are provided;
(3) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others;
or
(4) recent and volitional conduct involving significant damage
to substantial property.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(a) (2014).
The district court must find that one of these statutory elements is present, but may
not engage in speculation. McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d at 623. When ordering commitment,
the district court must “specifically state” in its findings of fact and conclusions of law the
conduct which is the basis for determining that the requisites for commitment are met.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2.
Appellant argues that he does not meet any of the four statutory criteria in section
253B.02, subdivision 13(a), to support a finding that he is mentally ill. In its commitment
order, the district court found that “[t]here has been no documented failure by [appellant]
to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care as a result of his impairment”
and that “[t]here has been no recent and volitional conduct involving significant damage to
substantial property,” suggesting that appellant’s commitment is not based on subdivisions
13(a)(1), (2), or (4). Appellant argues that he is therefore subject to civil commitment only
if the evidence shows that he recently attempted or threatened to harm himself or others
under subdivision 13(a)(3).
5
Appellant argues that there is “no indication in the record” that he attempted to harm
others or himself so as to rise to the level of creating a substantial likelihood of harm. The
district court weighed the evidence and reached a different conclusion. The district court
found that appellant made “recent threats to physically harm others,” including
“generalized threats that [appellant] makes indicating he will make people’s lives miserable
and kill people . . . [raising a] concern that he will provoke others into assaulting him.”
Appellant also made statements to several people that he believes himself to be
“invincible,” and made threats to “teach them all a lesson.”2 The district court also credited
testimony from the psychiatrist that appellant “regularly escalates and becomes verbally
aggressive, making verbal threats to harm other patients.” The district court recognized
that it could not speculate about possible future harm to others. However, the MCTA does
not require that “the person must either come to harm or harm others before commitment
as a mentally ill person is justified”; it only requires that “a substantial likelihood of
physical harm exists[.]” McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d at 623.
Appellant argues that his conduct does not rise to the level of an immediate threat
to physically harm others and suggests alternative ways of interpreting the evidence and
testimony. But the district court credited the expert testimony, and we defer to the district
court’s assessment of witness credibility, particularly when the factual findings rest on
expert testimony. Janckila, 657 N.W.2d at 904; Thulin, 660 N.W.2d at 144. The district
court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, and we determine, based on our de novo
2
In particular, the district court expressed concern about appellant’s recent statements
about a 65- to 70-year-old woman that he threatened to sodomize.
6
review, that clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the district court’s
decision to commit appellant under Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(a)(3), on the ground
that he was mentally ill.
Affirmed.
7