State of Minnesota v. Kelly Lee Trotter ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1150
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Kelly Lee Trotter,
Appellant.
Filed June 27, 2016
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-14-575
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from convictions of criminal damage to property, first-degree
burglary, and domestic assault, appellant argues that (1) his domestic-assault conviction
must be reversed because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
committed an act with intent to cause the complainant fear of immediate bodily harm or
death; and (2) his burglary conviction must be reversed because the evidence does not
prove that he entered the complainant’s house and committed a crime inside. We affirm.
FACTS
At 5:00 or 6:00 a.m. on September 28, 2014, J.W. woke up and went downstairs to
get a drink. Before going back to bed, she checked to make sure that her front door was
locked. As she lay back down, J.W. heard someone banging on her back door and yelling
for her to answer the door. J.W. testified that she recognized the voice, but she did not say
whose voice it was. J.W. ignored the person and fell asleep.
At about 8:00 a.m., J.W. and her boyfriend, D.B., were awakened by a loud noise.
J.W.’s ex-boyfriend, appellant Kelly Lee Trotter, was standing at the foot of the bed, and
he threw a cup of coffee and a large, heavy, metal ashtray in the direction of J.W. and D.B.
Neither object hit J.W. or D.B., but the coffee stained parts of the bed and the curtain behind
it, and the metal ashtray broke into two pieces when it hit the window.
Appellant jumped onto the bed and began wrestling with J.W. and D.B. D.B.
described appellant as “jump[ing] in between” him and J.W. When J.W. managed to push
appellant out of the bedroom, appellant told her that he loved her. The struggle resumed
with appellant pushing J.W. and D.B. back into the bedroom. While appellant swung his
arms, striking D.B. twice, J.W. climbed onto appellant’s back and repeatedly hit him. D.B.
got away and called 911. Appellant left on his own, leaving behind his wallet and his
baseball cap.
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Montevideo Police Officer George Ecklund responded to the 911 call. J.W. gave
him the cap and the wallet, which contained appellant’s identification. Ecklund did not see
any physical injuries on J.W. or D.B. Ecklund photographed the damage to the front door,
which appeared to have been kicked in. Ecklund went to the home where appellant was
residing and arrested him. Appellant was charged with two counts of first-degree burglary,
one count each of domestic assault and fifth-degree assault, and fifth-degree criminal
damage to property.
J.W. testified at trial that appellant did not have consent to enter the house or her
bedroom. She also testified that she and appellant had dated for ten months until they broke
up in August 2014 because appellant believed that J.W. had been cheating on him, which
J.W. denied.
The jury found appellant guilty of one count of first-degree burglary, domestic
assault against J.W., and criminal damage to property and not guilty of the second count
of first-degree burglary and fifth-degree assault against D.B. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I.
Appellant was convicted of domestic assault (fear), which occurs when a person
commits an act against a “family or household member . . . with intent to cause fear . . .
of immediate bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2014). Because
domestic assault (fear) is a specific-intent crime, the state must prove that the defendant
intended his actions to cause another to fear bodily harm. See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d
303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (construing identical statutory language from Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
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subd. 10(1) (2010)). “‛Bodily harm’ means any physical pain or injury . . . or any
impairment of physical condition.” Minn. Stat. 609.02, subd. 7 (2014).
Appellant argues that his domestic-assault conviction must be reversed because the
state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed an act with intent to
cause J.W. fear of immediate bodily harm or death. Appellant contends that “[t]he
circumstances proved do not exclude the reasonable and rational hypothesis that [he] did
not intend to cause [J.W.] fear of immediate harm and was only directing his actions
toward [D.B.].” But, “with intent” means “that the actor either has a purpose to do the
thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that
result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2014) (emphasis added). Therefore, the state
could prove that appellant acted “with intent” by proving that he believed that his acts
would cause J.W. to fear immediate bodily harm.
“The intent element of a crime, because it involves a state of mind, is generally
proved circumstantially.” State v. Davis, 656 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Minn. App. 2003), review
denied (Minn. May 20, 2003). Minnesota appellate courts employ a two-step process
when reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence. State v. Andersen, 784
N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010). First, we identify the circumstances proved. Id. In doing
so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. Pratt, 813
N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. 2012) (stating that the court considers the evidence “in the light
most favorable to the verdict” when determining the circumstances proved). We defer to
the fact-finder’s acceptance and rejection of proof and to its credibility determinations.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329; see also State v. Hughes, 749 N .W.2d 307, 312 (Minn.
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2008) (stating that juries are “in the best position to weigh the credibility of the evidence
and thus determine which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their
testimony”).
Next, we examine the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
circumstances proved. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329. All of the circumstances proved
must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. Id. We
do not defer to the fact-finder’s choice between rational hypotheses. Id. at 329-30.
However, a rational hypothesis negating guilt must be based on more than mere conjecture
or speculation. State v. Al–Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 480 (Minn. 2010); Andersen, 784
N.W.2d at 330.
In a specific-intent case, the defendant’s intent, “as contrasted with the effect upon
the victim, becomes the focal point for inquiry.” State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 396
(Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). The reason for this focus is because “the legislature
intended to forbid conduct that is done with the intent of causing fear in another of
immediate bodily harm or death, without regard to whether the victim is aware of the
conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The crime is in the act done with intent to cause fear,
not in whether the intended result is achieved.” Id. Accordingly, the effect of the assault
on the victim may be introduced at trial as evidence of the defendant’s intent, but it is not
essential to support a conviction. Id.
In determining whether a defendant intended another to fear bodily harm, relevant
circumstances include “the defendant’s conduct, the character of the assault, and the
events occurring before and after the crime.” In re Welfare of T.N.Y., 632 N.W.2d 765,
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770 (Minn. App. 2001). The fact-finder may presume that the defendant intended the
natural and probable consequences of his acts. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179
(Minn. 1997).
The state proved the following circumstances: Appellant entered J.W.’s house by
kicking in a locked door, and J.W. and D.B. awoke after hearing a loud noise to find
appellant in their bedroom. Appellant threw coffee and a large, heavy, metal ashtray in
the general direction of J.W. and D.B. Appellant threw the ashtray with enough force that
it broke when it struck the window behind the bed, and J.W. ducked when appellant threw
the ashtray. J.W. and D.B. were in bed together, and, about two months earlier, appellant
had ended his relationship with J.W. because he believed that she was cheating on him.
Appellant jumped onto the bed between J.W. and D.B. and began struggling with them.
Appellant told J.W. that he loved her. When J.W. attempted to push appellant out of the
bedroom, appellant pushed her and D.B. back into the bedroom.
Appellant’s argument fails to recognize that, even if he was only directing his
actions toward D.B., his actions occurred in J.W.’s presence. Considering the
circumstances in their entirety and the natural and probable consequences of appellant’s
acts, it is not reasonable to infer that appellant did not believe that his acts would cause
J.W. to fear immediate bodily harm. See Hough, 585 N.W.2d at 397 (rejecting argument
that evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions of multiple counts of second-degree
assault (fear) when defendant only intended to scare one of home’s occupants and was
unaware that others were present in home because, “when an assailant fires numerous
shots from a semiautomatic weapon into a home, it may be inferred that the assailant
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intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death to those within the home,” and
because “it was a natural and probable consequence that [defendant’s] actions would
endanger people other than [his intended victim]”). We therefore conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed an
act with intent to cause J.W. fear of immediate bodily harm.
II.
Appellant was convicted of first-degree burglary under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd.
1 (2014), which states:
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to
commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and
commits a crime while in the building . . . commits burglary in
the first degree . . . if: (a) the building is a dwelling and another
person, not an accomplice, is present in it when the burglar
enters or at any time while the burglar is in the building.
The state’s theory of the case was that the predicate offenses for the burglary charges were
domestic assault against J.W. and fifth-degree assault against D.B.
Appellant argues that, because the evidence was insufficient to support the
domestic-assault conviction, it was also insufficient to support the burglary conviction
because the jury found appellant not guilty of fifth-degree assault. The district court
instructed the jury that appellant was guilty of first-degree burglary if he committed any of
the following four crimes while in J.W.’s home: (1) domestic assault (harm); (2) domestic
assault (fear); (3) fifth-degree assault (harm); or (4) fifth-degree assault (fear).
Because we have concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant
committed domestic assault (fear), we also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
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prove that appellant committed first-degree burglary. The evidence proved that appellant
entered J.W.’s home when J.W. and D.B. were present and, while in the home, committed
domestic assault.
Affirmed.
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