State of Minnesota v. Gabino Otero Labra ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1230
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Gabino Otero Labra,
Appellant.
Filed July 18, 2016
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-13-8998
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Gabino Otero Labra was convicted of first-degree controlled substance crime based
on evidence that he possessed cocaine with intent to sell it. He argues that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. We conclude that police officers had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory seizure
of Otero Labra based on information provided by a confidential informant. Therefore, we
affirm.
FACTS
Otero Labra was arrested and charged after he was found to be in possession of
cocaine and intended to sell it. Before his arrest, a St. Paul police officer had been in
telephone contact with a confidential informant. At approximately 9:00 p.m. on August 1,
2013, the informant notified the officer that “a Hispanic male” was about to deliver “a large
amount of cocaine” to a man at a particular gas station in St. Paul. The officer and another
officer, dressed in plain clothes, picked up the informant in an unmarked vehicle and
traveled together to the gas station. They parked in a place with a clear view of the gas
station. Other police officers, dressed in uniform, were nearby and on alert.
Shortly after the informant and the plain-clothes officers arrived, they saw a Cadillac
vehicle stopped at a gas pump. The informant told the plain-clothes officers that the man
who was sitting in the back seat of the Cadillac on the driver’s side was the Hispanic male
who was planning to sell cocaine. The informant said that he or she was able to identify
the man because he or she had purchased drugs from him in the past.
After a short time, another man approached the driver’s side of the Cadillac on foot.
As he did so, the informant announced to the plain-clothes officers that the drug transaction
was about to take place. The plain-clothes officers relayed that information to the
uniformed officers, who quickly pulled up beside the Cadillac. One of the uniformed
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officers approached the rear driver’s-side window and ordered the man sitting there, who
later was identified as Otero Labra, to show his hands. The officer saw Otero Labra drop
something to the floor, near his feet. Because the officer was concerned that Otero Labra
might have a weapon, the officer opened the car door, pulled Otero Labra out of the vehicle,
and placed him in handcuffs. The officer then observed a clear plastic bag containing a
white substance on the floor of the car, in front of where Otero Labra had been sitting.
In November 2013, the state charged Otero Labra with one count of first-degree
controlled substance crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2012). In
June 2014, Otero Labra moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the officers when they
seized him on August 1, 2013. In October 2014, the parties agreed to submit the motion
on a stipulated record consisting of police reports and photographs of the scene of the arrest.
In March 2015, the district court decided Otero Labra’s motion in a written order. The
district court concluded, “Given the totality of the circumstances, the seizure of
Defendant’s vehicle was supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity.” The district court further concluded, “Given the totality of the circumstances,
the arrest of the Defendant and search of the Cadillac [were] supported by probable cause.”
In light of its conclusions, the district court denied Otero Labra’s motion to suppress
evidence.
The parties later agreed to a stipulated-evidence court trial and agreed that Otero
Labra could challenge the district court’s suppression ruling on appeal. See Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court found Otero Labra guilty. The district court imposed
a sentence of 103 months of imprisonment. Otero Labra appeals.
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DECISION
Otero Labra argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence. He argues that the police officers did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion
of criminal activity to justify a seizure because, he asserts, the informant’s tip was not
reliable. He does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the officers had probable
cause to search and arrest him after seizing him. If the relevant facts are undisputed, this
court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s determination of reasonable,
articulable suspicion. State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 551 (Minn. 2009).
A.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The
Fourth Amendment also protects the right of the people to be secure in motor vehicles.
State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). As a general rule, a law-enforcement
officer may not seize a person in a motor vehicle without probable cause. State v. Flowers,
734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). But a law-enforcement officer may, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory detention of a person in a motor
vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person might be
engaged in criminal activity. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). A reasonable, articulable suspicion
exists if “the police officer [is] able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. Reasonable suspicion requires “something more
than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that
objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn.
2007) (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. The
reasonable-suspicion standard “takes into account the totality of the circumstances,” i.e.,
“the whole picture.” Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quotation
omitted); see also Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182.
“The information necessary to support an investigative stop need not be based on
the officer’s personal observations.” In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn.
1997). An investigative stop may be based on an informant’s tip “if it has sufficient indicia
of reliability.” Id. An informant may be reliable because he or she has provided truthful
information to law enforcement in the past. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47,
92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923-24 (1972). A private citizen who acts as an informant for the first
time may be presumed to be reliable. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182-83; Marben v. State, Dept.
of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980). The presumption of reliability is
especially strong if the informant identifies himself or herself. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 183;
City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 889-90 (Minn. 1988). Such an
informant is more likely to provide truthful information because he or she can be held
accountable for providing false information. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 92 S. Ct. at 1923-
24; Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d at 890. An informant’s degree of accountability is greatest
when the informant provides information to law-enforcement officers face to face. Adams,
407 U.S. at 146, 92 S. Ct. at 1923; State v. Davis, 393 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Minn. 1986).
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The reliability of an informant’s tip also depends on the quality and quantity of the
information provided. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990).
Some informants do not “provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday
observations.” Id. at 329, 110 S. Ct. at 2415. But even if an informant provides information
that is lacking in detail and cannot be corroborated, law-enforcement officers may be
justified in conducting an investigative seizure in certain circumstances. See id. at 329-31,
110 S. Ct. at 2415-16. That is so because
[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion
can be established with information that is different in quantity
or content than that required to establish probable cause, but
also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.
See id. at 330, 110 S. Ct. at 2416; see also Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-47, 92 S. Ct. at 1923-
24. On the other hand, if an informant cannot be deemed reliable, and if the informant
provides too little information about suspected criminal activity and too little information
about the basis of the informant’s knowledge, the reasonable-suspicion standard may not
be satisfied. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-71, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1378-79
(2000).1
1
Both Otero Labra and the state cite opinions of this court concerning whether an
informant’s tip provided a law-enforcement officer with probable cause to conduct a
search. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
June 16, 2004); State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. App. 2000); State v. Ward, 580
N.W.2d 67 (Minn. App. 1998). We acknowledge that, in assessing the reliability of an
informant’s tip, “[t]he same approach applies in the reasonable-suspicion context [as in the
probable-cause context], the only difference being the level of suspicion that must be
established.” White, 496 U.S. at 330-31, 110 S. Ct. at 2416; see also id. at 328-29, 110 S.
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B.
In this case, the district court expressed concern about “the lack of information that
has been submitted with regard to the background of the confidential informant.” The
district court stated that it normally would expect to receive more information concerning
the basis of an informant’s knowledge and the informant’s reliability. Consequently, the
district court considered the suppression issue to be a “close call.” Nonetheless, the district
court denied the motion to suppress based on its findings that police officers knew the
informant’s identity, that the informant had told the officers that his or her knowledge was
based on prior drug transactions with Otero Labra, that the informant had made statements
against his or her own interests, and that the informant’s tip that “a Hispanic male” would
appear at the gas station to make a cocaine sale was corroborated by the events that
occurred as the informant and officers watched.
We agree with the district court that the information provided to the officers before
they arrived at the gas station was limited. The informant had provided only a generic
description of a suspect and had not provided any information about the vehicle in which
the suspect would be traveling. The informant had not provided enough details to allow
the officers to conclude with a high level of confidence that the informant had predicted
the suspect’s future behavior. Before arriving at the gas station, the informant had not
explained the basis of his or her knowledge that the suspect would engage in a drug
Ct. at 2415. Nonetheless, to ensure that we properly apply the reasonable-suspicion
standard, we confine our analysis to precedential opinions arising from the reasonable-
suspicion context.
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transaction at this particular place and time. If the officers had nothing more than the
information provided by the informant before they arrived at the gas station, the tip might
have been insufficient to satisfy the reasonable-suspicion standard, for essentially the same
reasons as in J.L., in which the Court stated that an informant’s tip needs to “identify a
determinate person” and “be reliable in its assertion of illegality.” 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.
Ct. at 1379.
The distinctive feature of this case, however, is that the informant accompanied
officers to the gas station and continued to provide information as events unfolded. The
informant identified the suspect, Otero Labra, by his location inside a particular vehicle at
the gas station while both the informant and the officers were observing the scene. The
informant told the officers that he or she was able to identify Otero Labra because he or
she had purchased drugs from Otero Labra in the past. The informant alerted the officers
to the anticipated drug transaction when the intended buyer walked toward the Cadillac.
The informant’s on-the-scene, contemporaneous conveyance of additional information to
the officers sufficiently corroborated the earlier tip that a sale of cocaine would take place
at that particular place and time.
We reiterate that the reasonable-suspicion standard requires only a minimal showing
of “something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182
(quotation omitted). In this case, the informant’s tip bore some “indicia of reliability”
based on the informant’s admission to having previously purchased drugs from Otero
Labra. See G.M., 560 N.W.2d at 691. The reliability of the informant’s tip was enhanced
significantly by the fact that he or she provided information to officers face to face. See
8
Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S. Ct. at 1923; Davis, 393 N.W.2d at 181. The officers did not
seize Otero Labra based solely on the information the informant had provided before they
arrived at the gas station. Rather, the officers seized Otero Labra only after receiving
additional information from the informant while both the informant and the officers
observed Otero Labra and others at the gas station. Given the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
when they approached Otero Labra and seized him.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Otero Labra’s motion to suppress
evidence.
Affirmed.
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