State of Minnesota v. A. K. N. ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0776
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
A. K. N.,
Appellant.
Filed December 27, 2016
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge
Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-13-3607
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Dominic J. Haik, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Stephen V. Grigsby, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s refusal to expunge records held by the
Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) and the Minnesota Department of Health
(MDH). Appellant argues that the district court did not make sufficiently individualized
findings and in effect exempted the DHS and the MDH from application of the
expungement statute. We affirm.
FACTS
The State of Minnesota charged appellant A.K.N. with malicious punishment of a
child and domestic assault, based on an incident that occurred on July 13, 2013. The state
alleged that A.K.N. struck her 13-year-old son multiple times with a belt and also struck
her husband when he attempted to intervene. An officer who responded to the disturbance
reported that A.K.N.’s son had red marks on his arm and welts with bruising on his legs.
The officer also reported that A.K.N.’s husband had swollen red marks on his back
consistent with being struck with a belt.
A.K.N. pleaded guilty to gross misdemeanor malicious punishment of a child, and
the state dismissed the domestic-assault charge. The district court stayed adjudication of
guilt and placed A.K.N. on supervised probation for one year. On October 6, 2014, the
district court discharged A.K.N. from probation and dismissed the malicious-punishment
charge.
The DHS conducts background studies regarding individuals who provide direct
care to patients of programs supervised by the DHS and the MDH. See Minn. Stat.
§ 144.057, subd. 1 (Supp. 2015) (providing that DHS conducts background checks for
MDH); Minn. Stat. § 245C.03, subd. 2 (Supp. 2015) (requiring the DHS to conduct
background studies on personal-care-assistance programs under Minn. Stat. § 256B.0659
(2014)). If the DHS determines that an individual is disqualified from providing direct
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patient care, the individual may request reconsideration from the MDH. Minn. Stat.
§ 144.057, subds. 2-3 (2014); see also Minn. Stat. § 245C.21 (2014) (procedure for
requesting a reconsideration).
The DHS disqualified A.K.N. from serving as a personal-care attendant for her
daughter based on the incident involving her son and then husband. In December 2015,
A.K.N. petitioned the district court to expunge the dismissed charges. The DHS and the
MDH objected. The DHS and the MDH argued that they need access to A.K.N.’s records
for the purpose of evaluating the risk she would pose if employed in direct-care positions,
such as a personal-care attendant. The district court granted A.K.N.’s petition in part.
However, the district court concluded that in “order to balance [A.K.N.’s] desire for
expungement, and the agencies’ concerns for public safety, . . . DHS and MDH should be
excluded from this Expungement Order.” This appeal follows.
DECISION
A.K.N. contends that the district court erred by denying expungement of her records
with the DHS and the MDH. A.K.N. sought expungement under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02,
subd. 3(a)(2) (2014), which provides that a person may petition for expungement of a
criminal record if the “petitioner has successfully completed . . . [a] stay of adjudication
and has not been charged with a new crime for at least one year since completion of the . . .
stay of adjudication.” The district court shall grant petitions under that section “unless the
agency or jurisdiction whose records would be affected establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that the interests of the public and public safety outweigh the disadvantages to
the petitioner of not sealing the record.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(b) (2014). In
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making that determination, the district court must consider 12 factors, including “the risk,
if any, the petitioner poses to individuals or society,” “the length of time since the crime
occurred,” “the reasons for expungement,” and “other factors deemed relevant by the
court.” Id., subd. 5(c) (2014).
We review a district court’s decision regarding whether to expunge criminal records
for an abuse of discretion. State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013). Appellate
courts “will not overrule the district court unless the court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary or capricious manner or based its ruling on an erroneous interpretation of the law.”
State v. R.H.B., 821 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Minn. 2012). Appellate courts “may also reverse
the district court if its ruling is against the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The district court refused to expunge A.K.N.’s records with the DHS and the MDH
because “[t]he knowledge of [A.K.N.’s] criminal background is essential in making a
determination as to whether [A.K.N.] is fit to provide assistance to vulnerable populations.”
The district court reasoned, “Knowledge of [A.K.N.’s] conviction goes directly to the
[DHS and MDH’s] ability to protect the public.” The district court noted that “[o]ne of the
victims was a minor,” that the incident involved physical force and “occurred only a few
short years ago,” and that the limitations on the expungement requested by the DHS and
the MDH would “impact[] a small portion of employment opportunities” because other
“employment agencies will not have access to these records.”
A.K.N. argues that the district court “improperly took into account facts with regard
to a charge that was dismissed and failed to make sufficiently individualized findings . . .
and in effect exempted the DHS and MDH from the application of the expungement law.”
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This argument raises an issue that is similar to one presented in State v. R.H.B., 821 N.W.2d
at 817. In R.H.B., the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a state agency opposing
expungement must do more than present generalities; the agency must present evidence of
unique or particularized harm. Id. at 822-23. R.H.B. sought expungement under Minn.
Stat. § 609A.02 (2010). Id. at 820-21. The statute authorized an individual to petition the
district court “to seal all records relating to an arrest, indictment or information, trial, or
verdict if all pending actions or proceedings were resolved in favor of the petitioner.”1 Id.
at 820 (quotation omitted).
R.H.B. had been acquitted of assault charges and asked the district court to seal
records regarding the charges. Id. at 819. The Minnesota Supreme Court summarized the
state’s evidence in opposition to expungement as follows:
Here, the State presented three affidavits to support its
argument that sealing R.H.B.’s criminal record would threaten
public safety. Two affiants from the Wright County DHS said
that open criminal records help the agency to “streamlin[e]
investigations” about past criminal activities and may help to
demonstrate a history or pattern of misconduct. And a
detective from a municipal police department in Wright
County stated that open criminal records give investigating
officers “more tools,” “assist[ ] them in conducting their
investigation,” “show potential gaps in their investigations,”
and “help[ ] [them] when they are questioning a suspect.”
Id. at 822.
1
In 2014, the Minnesota Legislature amended this statute to grant petitioners who
successfully completed a stay of adjudication the same option for expungement as
petitioners who had all pending actions or proceedings resolved in their favor. 2014 Minn.
Laws ch. 246, § 6, at 811-12.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by granting expungement because the state presented evidence that was “unremarkable and
generalized, and could be submitted in nearly every expungement case.” Id. at 822-23.
The supreme court noted that the affiants stated reasons to maintain “a Defendant’s
criminal arrest record, rather than why it is in the public’s interest to maintain [the
petitioner’s] criminal record” and that “the State presented almost no evidence that sealing
[the petitioner’s] criminal record would present a unique or particularized harm to the
public.” Id. at 823.
In this case, the DHS and the MDH emphasized that A.K.N. struck her child and
husband multiple times with a belt. The departments argued that removing their access to
records regarding that incident would undermine their ability to disqualify A.K.N. from
working with children and adults who are vulnerable to abuse. They also argued that the
incident occurred recently and that A.K.N. had not presented evidence of rehabilitation.
Unlike the circumstances in R.H.B., where the state presented generalized evidence
that could apply in nearly every expungement case, the DHS and the MDH relied on facts
showing a unique or particularized harm to the public. The DHS and the MDH argued that
given the specific circumstances of A.K.N.’s case, expungement would undermine the
departments’ ability to disqualify A.K.N. from positions that provide direct care to
vulnerable individuals, placing those individuals at risk of harm.
The district court made several findings to support its decision to limit the scope of
its expungement order. First, the district court found that A.K.N.’s “criminal background,
especially in regards to the abuse and malicious punishment convictions, are imperative to
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[the DHS and MDH’s] determination of whether [A.K.N.] is fit to provide services to
vulnerable individuals.” The district court noted that the relevant records documented
A.K.N.’s use of physical force against a minor child. This finding addressed factors that
the court must consider, such as “the nature and severity of the underlying crime” and “the
risk, if any, the petitioner poses to individuals or society.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd.
5(c) (2014). A.K.N. argues that the district court failed to consider the facts specific to her
case. However, the district court specifically found that A.K.N. used “physical force to
discipline her son, and used physical force against her husband.”
Second, the district court found that only a few years had passed since A.K.N.
committed the offense. A.K.N. argues that the district court did not adequately explain
why not enough time had passed since the incident. A.K.N. argues that enough time has
passed to justify expungement as soon as an individual is eligible to request expungement
under the statute.
“If the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous
language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning . . . .” State v. Rick,
835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. 2013). On one hand, the expungement statute establishes
that a person may seek expungement one year after completion of a stay of adjudication.
Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(2). On the other hand, the statute includes “the length
of time since the crime occurred” among the factors the district court shall consider when
determining whether to deny expungement based on an objection. Minn. Stat. § 609A.03,
subd. 5(c). Under the plain language of the statute, if there is an objection to expungement,
satisfaction of the one-year requirement for petitioning does not necessarily establish that
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enough time has passed between the offense and the request for expungement. Given the
particular circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the district court erred in reasoning
that not enough time had passed since A.K.N.’s offense to tip the relevant balance in her
favor.
Third, the district court noted that A.K.N. sought expungement for the purpose of
becoming her daughter’s personal-care attendant. The DHS and the MDH opposed
expungement because they consider an applicant’s criminal history when determining
whether the applicant should qualify as a personal-care attendant. The district court
balanced the public interest in protecting vulnerable individuals from abuse against
A.K.N.’s interest in working as her daughter’s personal-care attendant and determined the
balance in favor of the public. The decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, especially
where the district court denied expungement only with respect to the DHS and the MDH.
In sum, the DHS and the MDH presented evidence showing that a particular harm
could result if A.K.N.’s expungement petition were granted as to those departments, and
the district court narrowly tailored its denial of expungement to prevent that harm. In doing
so, the district court did not exempt the DHS and the MDH from the expungement statute.
Instead, it based the denial on the particular facts of this case. The district court properly
applied the expungement law, and its ruling is not against the facts in the record. Because
the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to seal A.K.N.’s records with the
DHS and the MDH, we affirm.
Affirmed.
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